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Contextualising all-African peacekeeping political and ethical dimensions

Massey, S.

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**CONTEXTUALISING ALL-AFRICAN
PEACEKEEPING: POLITICAL AND
ETHICAL DIMENSIONS**

S. M. Massey

Volume One

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**A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the University's
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

ABSTRACT

The hypothesis underlying this research is that Africa's leaders are under a moral/political imperative to summon the will to develop a capacity to intervene in conflicts, possibly with external assistance, but without direct *extra*-continental intervention. This begs two questions. Is Africa right – politically and morally - to assume this task? And should the rest of the world, particularly the traditional intervening powers, accept and/or promote and/or assist African self-pacification? A trend toward subsidiarity and the regionalisation of conflict management in the African context followed reversals for United Nations and Western policy in the early 1990s, notably in Somalia and Rwanda. In the wake of these setbacks the universal impulse to intervene wherever necessary was overshadowed by a particularist/relativist position that distinguished Africa and African conflicts as cases apart. This translated in theoretical terms to a switch away from a cosmopolitan position allowing of international intervention to a communitarian position that promotes the African 'community' or African sub-regional 'communities' as the primary loci for addressing conflict. The continental organisation, the Organisation of African Union (OAU), has been hampered in assuming this task by its strict Charter adherence to state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of its member states. As a result the logic of subsidiarity devolved on Africa's sub-regional organisations, in particular the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). However, these organisations have found development of a security framework problematic, suffered from internal rivalries and have been hindered by paucity of funds and logistics. Interventions undertaken under the auspices of these bodies have often been of dubious legitimacy under international law. Viewed from the perspective of the 'just war' tradition these interventions also invariably seem morally suspect. Unwilling to intervene directly, the United States, France and Britain have established a joint initiative to enhance peacekeeping capacity in Africa. This project, under funded and ill considered, has proven inadequate from the perspective of both African participants and its sponsors. The research examines two case studies – intervention by the OAU in Chad in 1980-1982 and the peacekeeping operation undertaken by ECOWAS in Guinea-Bissau in 1998-1999. These cases confirm that existing mechanisms are ineffective for addressing African *intra*-state conflict. Moreover, they show that *extra*-African involvement remains an enduring feature of conflict on the continent. A return to the universal/cosmopolitan impulse in terms of international intervention in African conflicts seems unlikely in the short to medium term. In view of this neglect Africa must continue the project of self-pacification. The West is under a moral duty to set aside narrow national interests and expand and improve its existing peacekeeping capacity enhancement programme.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAFC	Allied Armed Forces of the Community
ACHPR	African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights
ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance
ACRF	African Crisis Response Force
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ACSS	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
ADF	Allied Democratic Front
AFDL	<i>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Kinshasa</i>
AHG	Assembly of Heads of State and Government
ANAD	<i>Accord de non-agression et d'assistance en matière de défense</i>
AU	African Union
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Training Team
CAR	Central African Republic
CEEAC	<i>Communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique centrale</i>
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMC	Conflict Management Centre
CMD	Conflict Management Division
CPP	Conflict Prevention Pool
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
E-IMET	Expanded International Military Education and Training
EAC	East African Cooperation/Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EFAP	<i>Eléments français d'assistance opérationnelle</i>
EIPC	Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities

EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
EUCOM	European Command
FAN	<i>Forces Armées du Nord</i>
FAO	<i>Forces Armées du Occidentales</i>
FAR	<i>Forces Armées Rwandaises</i>
FAP	<i>Forces Armées Populaire</i>
FAT	<i>Forces Armées du Tchadiennes</i>
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FROLINAT	<i>Front de Libération Nationale de Tchad</i>
FY	Fiscal Year
GAFCSC	Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College
GUNT	<i>Gouvernement d'Unité Nationale du Tchad</i>
IAF	Inter-African Force
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHEDN	<i>Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale</i>
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IPA	International Peacekeeping Academy
JCET	Joint Combined Exchange Training
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MISAB	<i>Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui</i>
MMC	<i>Mission militaire de coopération</i>
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MONUC	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en république Démocratique du Congo</i>
MOT	Military Observer Team
MSF	<i>Médécins sans Frontières</i>
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group in Rwanda
OAU	Organisation of African Unity

OFR	Operation Focus Relief
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OMIB	Observer Mission in Burundi
OMIC	Observer Mission in Comoros
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RECAMP	<i>Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix</i>
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SRO	Sub-regional organisation
STTT	Short-Term Training Team
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UMA	<i>Union du Maghreb arabe</i>
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCR	United Nations high Commission for Refugees
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Mission in Somalia
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defence Force
US	United States
WNBFB	West Nile Bank Front
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defence Force

INTRODUCTION

Since the fifteenth century, the history of Africa has been a history of intervention.

Stanlake Samkange remarks that,

[A]frica's traditional perspective on intervention is understandably based to a large extent on the continent's past experience and geopolitical situation, including: colonisation; the legacy of neo-colonial and Cold War-related activity in Africa; the complex political dynamics between African states; and Africa's political and economic weakness in the broader global context.¹

However, since the independence era one set of interventions has purported to act for altruistic and pacific ends, yet peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations have failed to stem conflict on the continent. Moreover, the conduct and intent of these missions have been controversial in Africa, as well as within the international community and those countries mandated to intervene. In 1991, in an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN), President George Bush delineated a 'new world order', 'built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations' and based on '*Pax Universalis*'.² Seen in a benevolent light this aspiration seemingly revived Wilsonian notions of global collective security based on shared Western liberal values and the rule of law. The instrument for ensuring peace would be the UN. However, Bush underestimated the complexity and cost in ordering a post-Cold War world. A growing inability or unwillingness by the Western powers to intervene in African conflicts combined with rising pan-African repudiation of a hidden agenda behind the 'new world order' to promote the notion of African self-pacification. As early as 1967 Ali Mazrui had declared that, '*Pax Africana* asserts that the peace of *Africa* is to be assured by the peace of *Africans* themselves'.³ As *intra*-state conflict proliferated during the 1990s Mazrui was moved to restate the demand for 'African solutions to African conflicts'.⁴ The thesis aims to study the political and ethical dimensions of all-African peacekeeping

¹ Sankange, Stanlake, 'African Perspectives on Intervention and State Sovereignty', *African Security Review*, 11/1 (2002), p.25.

² Bush, George, 'Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations', New York, 23 September 1991.

³ Mazrui, Ali A., *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition* (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1969), p.203.

⁴ Mazrui, Ali A., 'External Marginalisation; Internal Democratisation', paper presented to the Conference on the Marginalisation of Africa, African Studies Centre, Coventry University, 16-17 December, 1996.

and peace-enforcement interventions. The hypothesis is that Africa's leaders are under a moral/political imperative to summon the will to develop a capacity to intervene in conflicts, possibly with external assistance, but without direct *extra*-continental intervention.

Peacekeeping, and in particular peace-enforcement, interventions imply failure. They are often costly both in funding and lives. Short-term emergency interventions do not address the causes of the conflict but at best can limit death, destruction and displacement. Long-term interventions might hold a peace, but also entrench the relative positions of the combatants. Richard Jackson makes the valid point that 'without an appropriate diagnosis of the causes of conflict, remedial action becomes a futile, if not dangerous exercise.'⁵ An appreciation of Africa's particular history, colonial and pre-colonial, is vital for those concerned with preventing conflict. Likewise the reasons for the prevalence in Africa of elements that enable conflict to ignite, such as poverty and the weak state, need critical examination. Hopefully a better understanding of these factors and a wiser application of knowledge gleaned will limit conflict on the continent. However, this research does not study the causes of African wars nor indeed why human conflict in general endures. For the foreseeable future peacekeeping intervention will remain a last, albeit imperfect, resort to contain African conflict. The thesis addresses the question of whether Africans should assume this task themselves, as well as whether the rest of the world, especially the traditional intervening powers, should accept and/or promote and/or assist African self-pacification.

Intervention in a conflict with a view to upholding or enforcing peace can take several forms. Preventive diplomacy, enforced economic sanctions and exclusion from international society involve varying degrees of external involvement in the affairs of a sovereign state intended to persuade or coerce that state into changing policy. The most extreme form of peace intervention involves the deployment of foreign troops within the territory of a sovereign state with a view to resolving or attenuating a conflict. This type of military intervention provides the substance of the thesis. Whilst such intervention can operate in both *inter*-state and *intra*-state conflict, this research restricts itself to the most

⁵ Jackson, Richard, 'Violent Internal Conflict and the African State: Towards a Theoretical Framework', paper presented at the African Studies Association of the UK Biennial Conference, Trinity College, Cambridge, 11-13 September 2000.

common type of conflict in Africa, civil conflict. Military intervention also has wide parameters. The most basic deployment is the military observer mission. Invariably small, either unarmed or only carrying side arms, these missions are invited to enter a conflict zone to monitor a ceasefire or observe reconstruction of state apparatus including the monitoring of elections. This type of intervention is of only digressive interest to this research. The basis of the thesis is medium to large-scale multinational peacekeeping or peace-enforcement intervention. These key terms are defined in Chapter One. Unilateral interventions, even if ostensibly intended as peace operations, are not considered. The missions covered by the research are at least battalion strength, about 600 troops, and enjoy international recognition and/or receive authority from the United Nations (UN) and/or a regional or sub-regional organisation. The thesis is also temporally delimited. The period of study stretches from the onset of political autonomy in Africa, with key dates being Ghanaian independence in 1957 and Guinean independence in 1958 to the end of January 2000. The geographic orbit of study is the continent of Africa. Analysis of the evolution of conflict management undertaken by the Organisation of African Union (OAU) necessarily incorporates the contribution of all its members including states from the Maghreb, Morocco excepted.⁶ However, experience of peace operations has been largely confined to sub-Saharan Africa. As such the bulk of the research will concentrate on this substantial area.

The thesis necessarily adopts a trans-disciplinary approach to its subject. James O'Connell argues that the study of peacekeeping concerns,

[C]oncepts of peace and freedom and justice (philosophy and law); peace between states and between world regions (international studies and economics); between races and ethnic groups (politics and sociology); and peace between social classes as well as the social leavening of efforts to remove class divisions (politics, economics and sociology).⁷

This research also incorporates a historical perspective. The evolution of intervention as a mechanism to resolve conflict, but particularly the manner in which this mechanism applies in Africa will be studied through the optic of specific histories.

⁶ The OAU comprises 53 member states – all the African states minus one. Following the OAU's recognition of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1985 Morocco quit the organisation.

Whilst there is a body of work concerning intervention, peacekeeping intervention *per se* is not heavily theorised. This research does not seek explicitly to remedy this situation. Theory is outlined in order to inform the empirical analysis in the later chapters. Intuitively, the discussion of peacekeeping might be held to fall within the discipline of International Relations (IR). Core concepts in IR such as the dichotomy between realism and liberal internationalism or cosmopolitanism as against communitarianism, as well as the status of the concept of state sovereignty are clearly important to the study of peacekeeping wherever it takes place. However, IR as a bounded discipline invariably shuns the normative. As Fred Halliday comments – ‘international affairs are, notoriously, the area where moral considerations apply least’.⁸ Given the aim of the thesis – analysis of the political/moral nexus in all-African peacekeeping – a trans-discipline approach seems apposite. IR’s traditional unwillingness to treat with ethical discourse is too constraining for this research. Indeed, Barry Buzan and Richard Little warn that IR ‘remains curiously insulated from the other social sciences and history’.⁹ For Buzan and Little this insulation ‘takes the form of a semi-permeable membrane that allows ideas to filter into IR, but seems to block substantial traffic in the other direction’.¹⁰ In response to this observation, the research seeks to borrow from IR whilst operating within the wider social scientific/historical environment.

There is a clear association between politics and ethics. Connectedness runs both ways. Within the context of peacekeeping intervention, politics or diplomacy might be taken as ethics in action. Likewise, and within the same context, ethics can be seen as a branch of politics rather than philosophy. Halliday isolates four areas in international affairs where questions of morality should be unavoidable – war, economics and wealth, human rights and our attitudes to the state itself.¹¹ All these areas of moral discourse impinge when considering all-African peacekeeping.

⁷ James O’Connell, ‘The world context since September 11 and options for building peace’, paper presented at the Royal Commonwealth Society, London, 24 January 2002.

⁸ Halliday, Fred, *Rethinking International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p.236.


⁹ Buzan, Barry, and Little, Richard, ‘Why International Relations Has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to Do About It’, *Millennium*, 30/1 (2001), p.19.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.19.

¹¹ Halliday, Fred, ‘Morality in International Affairs: A Case for Robust Universalism’, in Bill McSweeney, *Moral Issues in International Affairs: Problems of European Integration* (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp.16-21.

The structure of the thesis is based on seven chapters and a conclusion. Each chapter is preceded by a brief overview of aims and content. A note on methodology is included later in the introduction. The first chapter defines core terms, traces the genealogy of the concept of peacekeeping and examines the trend towards subsidiarity that has resulted in the current shift towards regionalisation of conflict management, in particular in Africa. The second chapter reviews, analyses and assesses the literature in order to contextualise theoretical considerations – political and moral - that underpin *why* and *whether* Africa's leaders are under a moral/political imperative to summon the will to develop a capacity to intervene in conflicts, possibly with external assistance, but without direct *extra*-continental intervention. It also considers the related questions of *when* and *how* all-African interventions should take place. Chapter Three deals with the role of the OAU in conflict resolution. Chapter Four is concerned with the current lead in conflict resolution taken by Africa's sub-regional organisations (SROs) in particular the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Chapter Five examines the reasons behind Western disengagement from direct intervention in African conflicts in the 1990s and assesses the effectiveness and validity of initiatives developed outside Africa intended to enhance the capacity of African militaries and polities to undertake all-African peacekeeping missions, in particular those of the US, France and Britain. Chapter Six, a case study, analyses reasons behind and the manner in which the OAU intervened in the civil war in Chad in 1980-1982. Chapter Seven, a second case study, looks at the more recent intervention by ECOWAS in the civil war in Guinea-Bissau in 1998-1999. The conclusion seeks to marshal the substance of the thesis, analysing accumulated data in the light of the hypothesis and research questions, as well as putting forward some tentative prescriptions for future all-African interventions.

Map 1: Political map of Africa



Source: Central Intelligence Agency

Notes on Methodology

Steps in the research process may be outlined as follows. First, a literature overview was made across IR, the social science disciplines and history. The aim was to ascertain the evolution of thought and current thinking on where peacekeeping in Africa, and specifically the notion of all-African peacekeeping stood within the wider concept of peace intervention. At this stage the search was not exhaustive but targeted at discovering the extent of the literature on African self-pacification, how it tied in with my preliminary thoughts on the subject and whether there was scope to add to the existing body of work. Whilst there were numerous studies, both monographs and journal articles, concerning specific all-African interventions, there was no overview of the development of the concept, especially the consolidation of the notion of African self-pacification as a norm since the American reversal in Somalia. Moreover, a large part of the existing work concentrated on logistical, military and financial obstacles to self-policing, rather than the political and ethical dimensions of the concept. The literature search continued throughout much of the period of study. In particular, new searches were made just prior to field research and after data collection and evaluation.

The second step was to define the core concepts within a political/ethical context. Thirdly, the bounds of the thesis were set. Research would be limited to multinational, medium to large-scale all-African peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations. The research would concentrate on the specific issue of intervention and not causality. A time limit from the independence era to the end of January 2000 was set and a wide geographical orbit – the whole of Africa – established.

A fourth step was the selection of case studies and type of methodology. Case study research involves processes that are appropriate for the subject matter of the thesis and the way it is treated. The thesis attempts a blend of the empirical and theoretical. The type of data available dictated the research methodology employed - qualitative analysis – involving questions about ‘how and why acts, events, structures and thoughts occur’.¹² Case studies treat historical snapshots as systems of intelligible relations. The collation and use of data is valuable not because it is necessarily new but, because marshalled into cases, it serves as a conduit. Generalisation *is* possible from one case study. An

¹² Sutton, R., and Shaw, I., ‘What theory is *not*’, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 40 (1995), p.378.

apparently deviant case can serve to confirm a hypothesis. However, a more reliable method is case comparison – explanation through the use of structured, focused comparison of more than one case. The approach is one of ‘rich’ or ‘thick’ description of specific events and issues that are representative of the history and experience of all-African peace operations, pertinent to the research questions and comparable in substance, if not necessarily in outcomes.

There have been nineteen all-African interventions in thirteen countries that fall broadly within the parameters of the research. Size and aim of the intervention – military observation rather than peacekeeping/peace-enforcement – preclude six of these missions. The remaining operations were in chronological order – Zaire (1977 and 1978-1979), Chad (1979, 1980, 1981-1982), Mozambique (1986-1992), Liberia (1990-1998), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), CAR (1997-1998), DRC (1998-2002), Lesotho (1998-1999), and Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999). One important rationale for the settled choice of the interventions in Chad and the operation in Guinea-Bissau was the issue of relevant comparison. Both missions operated under a Chapter VI mandate with a view to upholding a precarious ceasefire. The two operations also span the evolution of African self-policing allowing comparison over the longest possible period. It is a valid assumption that the consequences and lessons of the intervening interventions will have acted upon, or failed to act upon, subsequent operations. The Chad and Guinea-Bissau interventions receive significantly less coverage in the literature than the operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone and, as such, warrant attention. The studies also allow comparison between the approach of the continental body in its one full intervention and the most engaged sub-regional organisation, ECOWAS. Disadvantages to the selection of the case studies are largely the reverse of the advantages. The two operations were small in terms of troop numbers with limited mandates and thus not representative of the shift toward larger interventions with robust mandates and wider aims. A further drawback is that by selecting two instances in which all-African intervention was widely held to have failed, the case study element of the thesis might prejudice the overall assessment of self-pacification.

In the event, the final choice of studies was based in large part on the practical issue of access to field research. As a part-time student with a full-time job the

opportunities for field research were limited to a number of relatively short trips, rather than an extended stay in one place. At the start of the research, the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were ongoing and travel to those countries not advised. The ECOMOG operation in Guinea-Bissau, however, was more accessible. Using Gambia as a base it is possible to reach three countries involved in the conflict and intervention – Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Gambia itself. As a tourist destination Gambia is also relatively inexpensive and reachable. Five trips were made to this region. Given that the research stresses the role of African international organisations it was also appropriate to spend some time at the headquarters of the pre-eminent continental body, the OAU Secretariat in Addis Ababa. Further research was conducted in Cairo *en route* to Addis. Finally various interviews were conducted in Kampala during three visits to Uganda.

Fieldwork represented the fourth step of the research process. As mentioned the work took place in a series of two week visits. Time was divided, although not strictly, into three parts - the collation of written documentation, unstructured but formal interviews and a degree of participant observation/discussion in various circumstances. Authorisation to access materials was always sought from the most senior person in attendance. Government officials and workers at African international organisations were invariably very receptive to requests to visit archives and libraries. The Gambian government allowed access to papers applicable to Gambia's role in the Guinea-Bissau operation, as well as other papers relevant to that intervention. The African Commission for Democracy and Human Rights in Banjul also allowed open access to its files on that intervention. The OAU Conflict Management Division at the OAU Secretariat in Addis allowed access to its archives as well as the newly opened Conflict Management Centre. Universities in Egypt, Ethiopia and Uganda were also generous with their time and willing to allow access to their libraries.

Interviews were unstructured and largely based on open-ended questions to as wide a range of relevant persons as would agree to be interviewed. The work was conducted with no prior instrumentation. The research questions in the thesis are not amenable to the compilation and analysis of lengthy questionnaires. Nonetheless, a core set of questions helped to orient the large majority of interviews.

- Are you in favour of the concept of 'African solutions to African problems'?
- Do you believe that African states and organisations are right to embark upon their own peace operations?
- What position should the international community – the UN and the Western powers – take?
- Is Africa currently capable of self-pacification?

These core questions were usually asked toward the end when an interview had, hopefully, become more discursive. The aim of most interviews was to ask specific questions arising from the research. A set of questions specific to the person/persons being interviewed would be framed with this end in mind. The range of formal interviews was skewed toward members of the elite. The argument in the thesis is, for the most part, conducted at the level of government, secretariat and scholarly community. Nonetheless the view of the bulk of the population - the 'peacekept' - is clearly important to the success of the self-pacification project and was solicited when possible. The assistance of well placed and well respected friends in Gambia and Uganda afforded the opportunity to meet some very senior politicians and soldiers. Interviews were conducted with almost every senior Gambian government minister or civil servant connected with the Guinea-Bissau operation including the Foreign Minister and Permanent Secretary to the President. In Uganda it was possible to see numerous senior politicians, as well as the current Army Commander who took time to attend an interview at my lodgings at the university. The senior staff at the OAU Conflict Management Division gave up a morning to answer questions and engage in discussion. Given the often politically sensitive nature of the subject matter the question of the informed consent of the interviewee was important. In general the case was that the more senior the respondent, the more open the conversation. Civil servants could be reticent until their minister spoke up. Members of the public and other ranks in the armed forces could be more reticent still. However, regardless of status or rank, and in keeping with good ethical practice, the interviewee was always made aware of the context of the research and consent obtained to take notes and use the material gathered. A further problem with the candour of the senior personalities was a possible difficulty in maintaining strict objectivity. The substance of these interviews was cross checked against other unconnected sources. Unsubstantiated assertions by interviewees have been presented as such.

The final element of fieldwork was participant observation/discussion. These ranged from the informal – such as coffee in the NCO mess in Bakau Barracks in Gambia and meals with scholars and journalists at Makerere University in Kampala – to participation in more formal circumstances. Some time was spent at the Parliament Building in Kampala gauging the temper of debates and attempting impromptu interviews. The staff at the OAU Conflict Management Division allowed extended access to the then new Conflict Management Centre. In January 2000 special permission was granted by the Gambian Foreign Minister to attend the plenary session of talks between the Senegalese government and the MFDC rebels from Casamance also attended by delegations from Guinea-Bissau and Gambia. Participant observation/discussion was invariably *ad hoc* – I was unaware that I would be attending the Casamance talks until just before they started. As such there was no reliance on gathering information in this way. Nonetheless, such opportunities were useful in assessing ‘mood’. Material gathered was subject to the same checks and critical analysis as formal interviews.

Steps five and six - data collation and critical assessment of the data – were conducted concurrently with continued visits to Africa over a four-year period. In a final step the fundamental hypothesis was compared with the empirical data. As mentioned above, the research steps are underpinned by a qualitative methodology. The approach incorporates theory from the social sciences and history, but prioritises politics and ethics as the focus of the fundamental research question. Martyn Hammersley puts forward several preferences of qualitative researchers – a preference for the analysis of words and images rather than numbers, a preference for observation rather than experiment, a preference for unstructured rather than structured interviews and a preference for meanings rather than behaviour.¹³ The methodology is not dependent on bringing forth fresh data. The basis of the methodology is reordering and reappraising published material and material already in the public domain. Of course one of the aims of the fieldwork was to fill any deficiencies in this material. As with the formal interviews and participant observation/discussion element of the fieldwork the critique of the literature was potentially open to bias and inaccuracies. Therefore, there is an effort to separate

¹³ Hammersley, Martyn, *What's wrong with Ethnography? Methodological Explorations* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp.160-172.

empirical data from interpretation, to cross check the former and critically analyse the latter.

Quantitative data is not altogether shunned. As David Silverman points out, 'ultimately, objectivity should be the common aim of all social science'.¹⁴ However, one obvious problem is that the potentially sensitive and secretive nature of the subject matter might encourage manipulation and/or misrepresentation of data. For example, on occasion it might suit actors in an intervention to play down refugee flows, whilst on another occasion it might suit to exaggerate them. Such quantitative indicators are of use to the research only when extraneous material in the data has been removed by subjective interpretation. As such quantitative data is used sparingly in order to bolster qualitative analysis. Indeed in comparison with, for example, a 'game theory' approach to all-African intervention the qualitative nature of the research is self-evident. Where quantitative analysis is alluded to such as with the Solarz-O'Hanlon formula mentioned in Chapter Two the intention is to elicit meaning rather than proof. Undoubtedly the success or failure of African self-pacification will involve a synthesis of factors including such elements as funding and logistics more open to quantitative analysis. However, the basis of the research is the political/ethical nexus of all-African peacekeeping and core issues such as the universal/particular and cosmopolitan/communitarian dichotomies, the status of sovereignty, and the justification and conduct of interventions are prioritised. Nonetheless, such factors as finance and logistics clearly impinge on the political/ethical argument and they are discussed in that context when appropriate.

¹⁴ Silverman, David, *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook* (London: Sage, 2000), p.11.

CHAPTER ONE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEKEEPING AND THE RISE OF REGIONAL SUBSIDIARITY

The chapter defines and distinguishes core concepts, examines the development of the construct of peacekeeping and analyses the trend toward the regionalisation of conflict management and resolution. Section (a) appraises the extent to which African understanding of peacekeeping is based on the United Nations' model for peace and security as outlined in the relevant chapters of the UN Charter. Whilst recognising doctrinal inconsistencies inherent in the use of the words 'peacekeeping' and 'peace-enforcement', the thesis depends on isolating distinctive core characteristics of peacekeeping/peace-enforcement interventions in order to inhibit the ambit of the thesis.¹ Section (b) emphasises the centrality of regionalism to the study by distinguishing the neutral idea of regionalism from the prescriptive concept of regionalisation or subsidiarity. That African organisations and institutions presently frequently accept, and are expected to accept, responsibility for conflict management and resolution on the continent is the result of internal factors and external pressures. The section concludes by examining problems inherent to the regionalisation of conflict management and resolution.

(a) Definitions and distinctions: a genealogy of peacekeeping

Until recently few efforts were made to incorporate the act of deploying troops from another state/other states into a conflict in the context of an operation to keep or establish peace within a theoretical framework. As the frost of the Cold War melted and the restraints imposed by superpower allegiances dissolved, the international community was faced with the growth, both in number and character, of conflicts seemingly tractable to the interventionist remedies of a 'new world order' based on *Pax Universalis*.² The result

¹ See Berman, Eric G. and Katie E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2000), pp.23-25.

² Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states President George Bush identified an opportunity to build a new world order where 'the rule of law governs the conduct of nations' and 'in

was a taxonomic reclassification of the catch-all term 'peacekeeping'. Yet, the resulting definitions and qualifications were often produced by practitioners – diplomats and soldiers – and remained largely theory-free.

Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman and James Wall recognised that the recategorisation of 'peacekeeping' was leading to a 'morass of semantic muddles'.³ Their taxonomy of the functions of peacekeeping missions sought to construct a theoretical basis for policy decisions in future peacekeeping operations, as well as distinguishing the relevant tasks for which peacekeeping personnel should be trained. Diehl categorised specific mission types whilst working on the Committee on the Enhancement of Human Performance for the National Academy of Sciences.⁴ His report identified nineteen mission types spanning the spectrum of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) interventions - traditional peacekeeping; collective enforcement; election supervision; humanitarian assistance; disaster relief; state/nation building; pacification; preventive diplomacy; arms control verification; protective services; drug eradication; anti-terrorism; intervention in support of democracy; sanctions enforcement; human capital investment; public health assistance; rehabilitation of infrastructure; fire-fighting; and support of peacemaking and diplomatic services.

Most peacekeeping operations are multi-task. As previously stated, the ambit of this thesis is restricted to all-African interventions involving a significant military deployment under the rubrics of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. Any single intervention is likely to encompass a variety of the tasks outlined by Diehl. The accomplishment of some tasks, such as sanction implementation, might be intrinsic to a peace-enforcement operation, whilst others, such as state/nation building would be viable only within the consensual environment of a peacekeeping operation. Indeed, the aggregation of tasks in any intervention will aid analysis as to whether an operation should be properly seen as traditional peacekeeping or peace-enforcement. However,

which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfil the promise and vision of the UN's founders'. See, Kessler, Maj. Bart R., 'Bush's New World Order: the Meaning Behind the Words', paper presented to The Research Department, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Airforce Base, March 1997.

³ Diehl, Paul, 'International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42/1 (1998), p.53.

many of these tasks might equally be addressed as ends in themselves without recourse to a substantial armed deployment. In the African context, since 1992, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has sent Special Envoys, High-Level Delegations, Fact-finding Missions, Military Observers and Electoral Monitors to Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea/Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia. These 'interventions', not requiring significant numbers of African troops on the ground, will not be examined in detail in this research. The two case studies that will be examined in detail – the all-African operations in Chad and Guinea-Bissau – involved significant military deployments.

Definitions of the core constructs of the thesis – peacekeeping and peace-enforcement – have proved mutable. Moreover, definitions are not only nuanced from the perspective of the defining agencies, but also, in the post-Cold War era, prone to rapid temporal change. Peacekeeping is not rigid either as an idea or in practice. A political/military hybrid, peacekeeping/peace-enforcement has both in practice and culture been, in essence, nominalistic. As *The White Paper for South African Participation in International Peacekeeping Missions* recognises, 'each new peace operation bears little resemblance to its predecessor as the international community and regional organisations become involved in a succession of *intra*-state conflicts each with its own unique demands and dynamics'.⁵

The declaration of a putative 'new world order' encouraged a refashioning of traditional peacekeeping as powerful militaries, collective security agglomerations, regional organisations and the UN sought to refine doctrine and mechanisms for the more robust conflict resolution environment envisaged after the Gulf War. As the decade progressed the issues of national sovereignty and concomitant consent that underpinned traditional peacekeeping lost political ground to the contentious and unorthodox impulse for peace-enforcement. An amalgam of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement resulted in

⁴ Diehl, Paul, 'Operations Other Than War (OOTW): Mission Types and Performance', paper presented to the Committee on the Enhancement of Human Performance, National Academy of Sciences, 18 August 1994.

⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs [Pretoria], *The White Paper for South African Participation in International Peacekeeping Missions*, approved by cabinet 21 October 1998, tabled in parliament 24 February 1999.

new terminology that expressed a belief that if security was to be reestablished for the civilian population in a conflict then the full gamut of techniques from classical peacekeeping interposition to robust application of military force should be employed as necessary.

For the British Army, Peace Support Operations (PSO) is the blanket term used to cover three categories of intervention to secure peace – classical consensual peacekeeping, OOTW incorporating the related tasks typically categorised by Diehl designated ‘wider peacekeeping’, and peace-enforcement when only limited consent exists.⁶ Funmi Olonisakin uses the term ‘peace creation’ to express the same inclusive concept.⁷ These broad definitions are often flawed by apparent self-contradiction. In order to fulfil some elements of its wider peacekeeping mandate a peacekeeping intervention might be required to employ force commensurate with a peace-enforcement operation. Yet, for other aims of wider peacekeeping to be accomplished, the intervening military presence will often readopt the status of a traditional peacekeeping operation since the long-term constructive goals of peace creation depend on the consent of the warring parties.

Analysis of peacekeeping intervention in Africa under UN command, being international in composition, is beyond the scope of this research. Yet, although detailed analysis of individual UN operations in Africa is not undertaken, UN peacekeeping remains a phantom presence throughout the thesis. As post-Cold War optimism for wider and deeper peacekeeping interventions under UN auspices dissipated, the elaboration of salient distinctions along the peacekeeping continuum has become essentially the preserve of the membership of those regional security organisations, and their constituent militaries, charged with conducting interventions. Nonetheless, the UN, as the primogenitor of the concept, remains the starting point for any summary of how the definition of peacekeeping has developed. As former UN Secretary-General Boutros

⁶ Inspector General Doctrine and Training on Behalf of the Chief of the General Staff, *Army Field Manual: Wider Peacekeeping* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1995).

⁷ Olonisakin, Funmi, *Reinventing Peacekeeping: Conceptual and Legal lessons in ECOMOG Operations* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), pp.9-10.

Boutros-Ghali states, 'peacekeeping can rightly be called the invention of the United Nations.'⁸

The UN Charter's intent that member states provide troops and equipment for what would effectively be a stand-by force under UN command proved too ambitious.⁹ UN peacekeeping intervention thus evolved as an *ad hoc* conflict management strategy, reacting to the circumstances of the conflict as they bore upon the antagonisms of the Cold War. There remains no consistent peacekeeping doctrine and previous precedent is accepted, partially accepted or largely ignored according to context. Betts Fetherston makes the point that as a result of these historical roots peacekeeping has been largely defined in terms of function, rather than as an instrument for third-party intervention.¹⁰

Traditional peacekeeping operations are often referred to as being authorised under Chapter VI of the UN Charter – 'The Pacific Settlement of Disputes'. The key word is *pacific*. The relevant articles of Chapter VI call upon member states (and non-member states willing to accept UN arbitration) to bring insoluble disputes to the attention of the Security Council or General Assembly. Should the dispute remain intractable and continue to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council retains the option to 'recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment'.¹¹ Yet, the Charter is silent on what 'procedures and methods of adjustment' are to be employed to solve disputes peaceably. Chapter VI does not license the deployment of troops as part of a force regardless of consent, impartiality and avoidance of the use of force. Thus, Fetherston's functional jurists and analysts have defined traditional peacekeeping as 'a function in itself'.¹² Olonisakin, describes such peacekeeping as 'intended to keep a peace that has been arranged or about to be

⁸ UN Document A/47/277-S/24111, *An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992*, 17 June 1992, para. 46.

⁹ Charter of the United Nations, Article 43, para. 1. 'All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security'.

¹⁰ Fetherston, A.B., *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), p.124.

¹¹ UN Charter, Article 36, para.1.

¹² Fetherston, op.cit., p.125.

concluded...[and] to maintain an atmosphere in which settlement can be achieved'.¹³ The consensus amongst commentators is that peacekeeping undertaken with reference to Chapter VI, operating with the consent of the warring parties, is essentially intended to maintain the status quo allowing diplomacy and the integral dynamics of the conflict to yield a settlement.¹⁴

The UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Canadian statesman Lester Pearson laid down five tenets of traditional peacekeeping at the time of the creation of the UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I) during the Suez crisis – the principle of consent of the parties to the intervention; the principle of the use of force only for self-defence; the principle of impartiality and non-intervention in the conflict; the principle of voluntary contribution of contingents from member states and the principle of control of peacekeeping operations by the Secretary-General. These precepts remain at the core of the classical peacekeeping model. Even so, invariably they have been stretched or diluted to meet the specificities of particular interventions. Hammarskjöld recognised during the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC) between 1960 and 1964 that the deployment of peacekeeping troops was always liable to be more 'Chapter VI and a half' than pure Chapter VI. In fact, in the case of the Congo, given the partiality of the mission and the level of force employed, the intervention might have been better described as 'Chapter VI and seven-eighths'.

An intimately related issue is that of self-defence. If the international community had accepted the idea of peacekeeping intervention, the extent to which troops deployed could defend themselves remained moot. A first critical test of the Hammarskjöld/Pearson principles came with ONUC. The manner in which the UN employed force during the operation was unprecedented. Engagement in a *de facto* peace-enforcement mission left the UN divided.¹⁵ Two contradictory mandates left questions over the use of force by UN troops aimed at preventing the secession of Katanga province from the Congolese state. The UN isolated three conditions under

¹³ Olonisakin, *op.cit.*, p.6.

¹⁴ See Norton, Augustus R., and Weiss, Thomas G., *UN Peacekeepers: Soldiers with a Difference* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1990); Sherry, George, 'The United Nations, International Conflict and American Security', *Political Science Quarterly*, 101/5 (1986), pp.753-771.

¹⁵ The UN lost 145 killed in action or accidents and 39 from other causes. There were hundred of Congolese as well as significant numbers of mercenaries killed in engagements involving the UN force.

which force was justified: 'ultimate self-defence; as a last resort in the prevention of civil war; and as a last resort in the elimination of mercenaries'.¹⁶ However, Adam Roberts remarks that 'a curious feature of the Congo operation was that some military actions were dressed up as self-defence when in fact they were essentially pro-active'.¹⁷ As Trevor Findlay points out, the self-defence principle is 'infinitely maleable'.¹⁸ The self-defence principle underpins the peacekeeping ethos. In Congo, the fluctuating mandates left some contingents within the UN force accused of slavish adherence to non-belligerent mores, and other contingents of flouting the supposedly pacific aims of the operation.¹⁹

Beyond the issue of self-defence, the Congo experience illustrated the practical impossibility of retaining impartiality when peacekeeping crosses into peace-enforcement. The UN favoured, and was essentially deployed to uphold, Congolese sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet, as Findlay remarks, 'ONUC's opponents were expected to understand and accept the subtle and highly implausible notion that ONUC's use of force did not involve interference in the internal affairs of the country, but was an attempt to ensure ONUC's freedom of movement, prevent civil war and end external interference'.²⁰ Within this context a distinction should be made between the related concepts of impartiality and neutrality. The latter is still accepted as a basic tenet by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). However, the UN and sub-regional organisations (SROs) essentially have abandoned neutrality. Issues of self-defence aside, neutrality implies non-engagement or participation in the conflict regardless of the actions of the warring parties. Unlike strict neutrality, impartiality is based on 'the twin pillars of non-discrimination of person and proportionality of need'.²¹ As Hugo Slim notes, impartiality allows military action to be taken against people or

¹⁶ Anon., *The United Nations and the Congo: Some Salient Facts* (New York: United Nations Publications, 1963), p.7.

¹⁷ Roberts, Adam, 'From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force', *Survival* 37/4 (1995), p.15.

¹⁸ Findlay, Trevor, *The Use of Force by the UN in the Congo 1960-1964* (Clementsport: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1999), p.161.

¹⁹ The commander of the Guinean contingent stated that his sole mission was to fight the Belgians in Katanga and drive the whites into the sea.

²⁰ Findlay, op.cit., p.159.

²¹ Slim, Hugo, 'Positioning Humanitarianism in War : Principles of Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity', in Stuart Gordon and Francis Toase, *Aspects of Peacekeeping* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p.134.

groups on the basis of what they do, but not on the basis of who they are'.²² By these lights ONUC was clearly not neutral. Furthermore, whilst impartiality was claimed, ONUC was essentially partial.

The confusion of ONUC was followed by a hiatus in UN peacekeeping activity. In 1973, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim expanding on the resolution setting up UNEF II in response to the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War formulated a definition of self-defence as applicable during peace operations that would endure until the end of the Cold War – 'self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it [UNEF II] from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council'.²³

In the event, the UN's active participation in Congo proved anomalous. Prior to the end of the Cold War UN peacekeeping forces invariably erred on the side of caution when encountering armed opposition whilst attempting to implement a mandate. Indeed an historical emphasis on negotiation, mediation and conciliation engendered 'the idea that there is a UN culture which while not being explicitly pacifist, is opposed to associating the UN with the management of force'.²⁴ To this end peacekeeping as developed by UN institutions had moved away from the original Charter intention of a UN-led international force able to take 'urgent military measures'.²⁵

For Africa, the end of the Cold War proved traumatic. No longer courted by the rival superpowers, many African states succumbed to neglected or suppressed internal conflicts. Concomitant threats to regional stability through violent contagion and expanded refugee flows proliferated. Yet, ostensibly improved relations between the permanent members of the Security Council seemed to allow for the UN to widen the scope and design of missions in which the ultimate aim was not just the containment of conflict, but also the creation of a comprehensive and durable peace. The result was a greater willingness to consider moving beyond traditional peacekeeping towards peace-enforcement.

One result of the UN's newfound can-do ethos was an erosion of the Hammerskjold/Pearson principles. Security Council disharmony was no longer a brake

²² Ibid., p.135.

²³ UN Document S/11052/Rev.1, para 4 (a), 27 October 1973.

²⁴ Roberts, *op.cit.*, p.15.

²⁵ UN Charter, Article 45, para.1.

on resolve. Boutros-Ghali felt able to pronounce that ‘the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed; its theory was never matched by reality’.²⁶ Consent and the use of force only for self-defence seemed anachronistic restraints on the ultimate imperative to create peace.

Peace-enforcement signals a failure of diplomacy and as such should be a measure employed as a last resort. Enforcement can take economic, political or military forms. This research is concerned with *military* operations to enforce a peace between warring parties who do not all necessarily consent to intervention by an outside agency. Authorisation for peace-enforcement operations derives from a construction of explicit collective security arrangements prefigured in Chapter VII of the UN Charter – ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression’. The key word is *action*. In the event that the Security Council deems economic and diplomatic enforcement sanctions to be insufficient to force warring parties to abide by Security Council decisions, then the Charter authorises the use of military force. Article 42 states,

[S]hould the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.²⁷

Differentiating peacekeeping and peace-enforcement relies on distinguishing the degree of consent and impartiality. In peace-enforcement the consent of all the parties involved in the conflict is not necessarily obtained. Nonetheless, there is an assumption that intervention in a conflict using coercive force will be impartial and the use of coercive force will not influence the outcome of the conflict. Historically this has proved almost impossible to achieve. Olonisakin suggests that ‘this can be done by ensuring that the same rules apply to all sides’.²⁸ However, states involved in intervention in Africa, whether from the continent or beyond, invariably betray an interest. As Mats Berdal comments,

²⁶ ‘An Agenda for Peace’, op.cit., para.17.

²⁷ UN Charter, Article 42.

²⁸ Olonisakin, op.cit., p.10.

[T]hose who believe in the feasibility of disinterested and politically neutral ‘peace-enforcement’ may be overestimating the purity of motives of those charged with restoring the peace, while underestimating the variety of different motives alluded to – including power political and domestic ones – that influence and constrain governments in their decisions regarding the deployment and use of military force.²⁹

Yet, ultimately impartiality relies on the perception of the peacekept, as well as the peacekeepers. As the British Army peacekeeping doctrine recognises, ‘in practice it is likely that most factions will accuse the wider peacekeeping force of being prejudiced against them’.³⁰ Moreover, ‘it is [more] likely that a warring faction which is militarily and politically disadvantaged by the actions of a ‘peace restoration’ or a supposedly impartial peace enforcement mission, will take little comfort from having not been designated an *enemy*’.³¹

Limited consent is a further salient characteristic that distinguishes peace-enforcement from peacekeeping. It follows that in order to operate in a non-consensual environment, peace-enforcement interventions will exhibit a markedly different military profile to peacekeeping operations. A higher proportion of troops are likely to be sourced from elite infantry regiments and the force will be equipped with heavy armour and probably be able to call upon air strike support. It would be negligent to embark upon a peace-enforcement intervention unless such a robust force was assembled and bolstered by the political will of the intervening states. Yet, the composition and comportment of the force can equally undermine the fulfilment of a wider peacekeeping mandate. Force commanders tread a tightrope between conveying firm intent and intimidating the civilian population.³²

²⁹ Berdal, Mats, ‘Lessons Not learned: The Use of Force in ‘Peace Operations’ in the 1990s’, *International Peacekeeping*, 7/4 (2000), p.67.

³⁰ ‘Wider Peacekeeping’, op.cit., p.9.

³¹ Berdal, op.cit., p.68.

³² See Bowden, Mark, *Black Hawk Down* (London: Corgi Books, 2000), pp.114-117. During US involvement in the Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) the primary American shock troops, US Army Rangers, became hated by ordinary Somalis as a result of their threatening demeanour and cultural arrogance.

Olara Otunnu states that, 'enforcement action is war by another name'.³³

Although, the ultimate goals of war and peace-enforcement might differ – the ostensible aim of a third party intervention is to enforce peace rather than achieve victory - Otunnu's statement is essentially accurate. Olonisakin makes the point that by employing lethal force peace-enforcement cannot create sustained peace – 'its sole function is the termination of violence'.³⁴ Given the requisite force and political will, peace-enforcement might be considered a valid response to intractable conflicts with high human, material and regional security costs. However, problems occur when an intervention transits abruptly from a peacekeeping to a peace-enforcement posture.

A further distinction should be made. In November 1990 Security Council Resolution 678 authorised those member states already cooperating with the exiled government of Kuwait to use 'all necessary means' to secure Iraq's withdrawal from that state. This was a Chapter VII locution. However, *Operation Desert Storm* was not a peace-enforcement operation, but rather a return to a pure reading of the UN's collective security function.³⁵ One UN member, Iraq, had invaded the territory of another member, Kuwait. Its mandate to use military force to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty was an instance of UN-authorised war. The aim was not a settlement but an enforced return of Kuwaiti sovereignty. *Operation Desert Storm* was undertaken by an alliance of willing states authorised by the UN, but in essence under the control of the US. Blue helmets were not worn. Even so, the successful accomplishment of its mandate encouraged the organisation to resurrect its original aspiration to command its own operations to enforce peace.

Two conflicts that would test UN determination and capacity were the series of civil wars in the Balkans and state failure in Somalia. Both conflicts proved central to the development of the peacekeeping/peace-enforcement nexus in the post-Cold War era. Likewise, both cases involved resolutions that began by aiming to observe the tenets of

³³ Otunnu, Olara, 'Peacekeeping: From a Crossroads to the Future', in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills, *Peacekeeping in Africa* (Braamfontein: Institute for Defence Policy and South African Institute for International Affairs, 1995), p.53.

³⁴ Olonisakin, op.cit., p.10.

³⁵ Comparison might be made with the US-led intervention in Korea between 1950 and 1953 that was sanctioned during a boycott of the Security Council by the Soviet Union. Both intervention in Korea and Kuwait/Iraq went beyond peace-enforcement being war-fighting interventions to force the restoration of the *status quo ante*.

peacekeeping, but which through 'mission creep' drifted into peace-enforcement. The UN overreached itself, overestimating its capacity either to contain or fully understand the complexities of the conflicts.

In the Balkans the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) attempted to fulfil an ever-widening mandate first in the conflict between Croatia and Serbia and then in the tripartite conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only the latter intervention was sanctioned under Chapter VII. The use of force was limited with the most explicit enforcement action being infrequent air strikes on Serb artillery positions. Despite claims by Boutros-Ghali that UNPROFOR was deployed under the Hammerskjold/Pearson principles, the mission was dogged by claims of partiality. Consent was spurious since the warring parties continued fighting. The rules of engagement for UN troops under the Chapter VII mandate were incoherent. The UN was unable to unify its own strategic command. UN forces were frequently portrayed as unable or unwilling to intervene to stop massacres and gross violations of human rights. Following the Dayton Accords of November 1995 the UN authorised a regional organisation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), to enforce a peace.

From an African perspective, the debacle in Somalia coloured the way in which the international community would treat conflict on the continent for the rest of the decade. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) deployed under the principles of traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping between April 1992 and March 1993. Yet, the consent of the many parties involved in the conflict was tenuous and mutable. The UN command did not understand the dynamics of clan allegiance in the country and proved unable to fulfil its mandate of monitoring the ceasefire, securing the provision of humanitarian assistance and protecting UN personnel. As a result the Security Council authorised a coalition of willing states led by the US, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), to work alongside UNOSOM. With a Chapter VII mandate its aim was to radically improve the security environment in order to allow the distribution of humanitarian supplies.³⁶ Although conditions in the country improved, UNITAF failed to restore stability.

³⁶ See Diehl, Paul, 'With the Best of Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and II', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 19 (1996), p.158. Diehl describes the operation as 'the proverbial half-empty or half-full glass'

Already fearful of ‘mission creep’ the US had effectively disengaged and returned the initiative for the mission to the UN operating under a new mandate (UNOSOM II) when an ill-judged raid on the headquarters of a leading warlord by US Army Rangers resulted in a close combat engagement in which eighteen Americans and hundreds of Somalis died. The ‘Battle of Mogadishu’ led to an early reversal of policy for the new Clinton administration that had hitherto been advocating an aggressive multilateral approach to conflict management.

For the UN, the establishment of UNOSOM II meant crossing the Rubicon. Described as the first ever Chapter VII resolution that was explicit about enforcement, the new robust mandate placed greater emphasis than before on confronting the militia leaders and disarming their followers.³⁷ Indeed, Boutros-Ghali announced that the operation should be seen as ‘the first peace-enforcement operation carried out under UN command’.³⁸ Yet, the UN was justly accused of partiality by the main protagonist, Mohamed Farah Aideed. The new strategy resulted in a series of confrontations including a battle in which 24 Pakistani troops were killed, as well as the fateful raid by US troops. As Peter Woodward comments, ‘the use of violence was making the UN look like the biggest “warlord” of all.’³⁹ If the ‘small scale, lack of training and poor equipping’ of the UN force doomed UNOSOM from the start, the military, political and operational failure ensured a painful reappraisal of the UN’s peace-enforcement role.⁴⁰

François Debrix identifies the central fallacy at the heart of the US/UN impetus to realise Bush’s ‘new world order’, referred to by Jean Baudrillard as ‘that marvellous miscarriage’, at the time of the Somalian operations.⁴¹ The US/UN strategy, predicated on the sort of vitalised liberal internationalism articulated by Francis Fukuyama, saw the

with a marked amelioration of the humanitarian situation largely attributable to US military action, but failure in terms of conflict resolution.

³⁷ Laitin, David D., ‘Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention’, in Barbara F. Walters and Jack Snyder (eds), *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p.162.

³⁸ UN Document S/24992, *Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794* (1992), para.43, 19 December 1992.

³⁹ Woodward, Peter, ‘Somalia’, in Oliver Furley and Roy May, *Peacekeeping in Africa* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p.151.

⁴⁰ Bennis, Phyllis, ‘Blue Helmets: For What? Under Whom?’, in Erskine Childers, *Challenges to the UN: Building a Safer World* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994), p.157.

⁴¹ Debrix, François, *Re-envisioning Peacekeeping: The United Nations and the Mobilization of Ideology* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Baudrillard, Jean, *The Illusion of the End* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p.63.

collapse of command economies in communist eastern Europe and the continued economic growth of economies in the neo-liberal West in teleological terms. Economic liberalism was the ultimate model that the rest of the world needed and wanted to emulate.⁴² The UN's new interventionism would create space for global neo-liberal reform. This cosmopolitan standpoint contradicted the ultra-realism prevalent in the ranks of Bush's State Department. However, does this analysis misread the nature of contemporary conflicts and the intentions of combatants in Somalia? As Debrix points out, the majority of the Somalian population 'had a vengeful desire to stand alone rather than abide by the globalising dictates of neo-liberal policies'.⁴³

In considering the path taken by the posited 'new world order' at the end of the Cold War, Ian Martin alludes to a 'new liberal imperialism' and puts forward 'international bullying' as an alternative to 'international intervention'.⁴⁴ Yet, for Debrix the US and UN had contrived a particular idea of peacekeeping/peace-enforcement that proved incapable of constructing such a neo-liberal environment. In his postmodern analysis of intervention after the Cold War he presents the revitalisation of peacekeeping as a 'simulated ideology' – 'virtual peacekeeping'. By these lights the relevance or success of UN peacekeeping exists essentially within a simulated environment.⁴⁵ Within simulation, peacekeeping is seen as a visual force. As such, peacekeeping has the 'power to visually mobilise images and condition states into believing these images'.⁴⁶ Do dominant Western powers seek to manipulate images to reinforce their own ideology? Debrix believes that there is a need to re-constitute 'difference'.

In an era of global peacekeeping that aims at colonising international realities by means of visual illusions, by the force of the virtual, what must be re-established

⁴² Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992); Fukuyama, Francis, 'Reflections on *The End of History* Five Years Later' in Timothy Burns (ed.), *After History? Francis Fukuyama and His Critics* (London: Littlefield Adams, 1994) pp. 239-258. Fukuyama rejects claims that his original theory was specifically relevant to American foreign policy. However, this disclaimer underestimates the influence his original article and book had amongst practitioners within the Bush administration. Essentially based on an empirical reading of current commercial trends, Fukuyama's argument stresses the economic universal over the cultural particular.

⁴³ Debrix, op.cit, p.216.

⁴⁴ Martin, Ian, 'Humanitarianism or Imperialism?', paper presented at the Fabian Society New Year Conference – A New World Order?, London School of Economics, 9 February 2002.

⁴⁵ A clear distinction must be made between UN led operations UNOSOM, UNPROFOR etc. and UN sanctioned operations such as UNITAF, IFOR, SFOR etc.

⁴⁶ Debrix, op.cit, p.217.

is the difference, distinction and duality between us and them, between the virtual world of international peacekeeping in which claims to neo-liberal ideology are made and the real world of so-called disorganised, unstable and unsafe international realities where clans fight wars against each other, leaders are ruthless, violent crimes are committed and death occurs.⁴⁷

Whilst its experience in Somalia effectively put a halt to UN-led peace-enforcement actions in the immediate future, it might be argued that the retrogression of a stalled, unconvincing simulation merely forced the West to look elsewhere for more appropriate instruments, such as *Médecins sans Frontières* (MSF) in Rwanda, for manipulation.⁴⁸ If a pro-active lobby within the UN Secretariat retained faith in the organisation's ability to enforce peace, the UN could no longer sell this vision to its member states. For the US in particular UN-led interventionism was redundant. Yet, a former public relations agent for the UN, Ingrid Lehmann, stresses the 'continuing problems of collaboration between the political and information departments of the UN especially in evolving standards for information components, media strategies and educational campaigns in peacekeeping missions'.⁴⁹ It might be noted that as part of its peacekeeping capacity building programme in Africa, France teaches African militaries techniques in presentation and media manipulation.⁵⁰

During the post-mortem following the Somalia intervention questions were asked of the real agenda behind the new interventionism. Former UN Special Representative for Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun, reflected,

[I]s the UN supposed to intervene in internal conflicts to make peace between contending parties and preserve or restore national or even regional peace? Is it to put an end to human rights abuse? Or is it to check a humanitarian tragedy[?]... We are faced with the double standard issue and for the people concerned with what they perceive as a hidden agenda. These operations raise some very serious questions about the conditions in which they have been

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.219.

⁴⁸ Pascal, Valerie, 'Les Opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations unies en Afrique', *Relations internationales et stratégiques*, 23/3 (1996), p.174.

⁴⁹ Lehmann, Ingrid A., *Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p.151.

⁵⁰ Ministère de la Défense, 'Le carnet de route de Guidimakha' <<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualities/event/guidimakha/22/carnet.htm>> Dakar, posted 22 February 1998.

initiated, their management, the logistics, the elaboration of the overall political strategy and the role of the superpowers.⁵¹

Sahnoun is an African. His inclusive diplomacy during the Somalian conflict - he sought to treat equally with the clan leaders and legitimise local militias rather than pre-isolate antagonists - brought him into conflict with the US position and led to his resignation. In the light of this experience Sahnoun promoted decentralisation and regionalism, advocating that the UN should 'share its burden of peacemaking undertakings with regional institutions'.⁵² A central aim of this research is to assess how those involved with these African institutions have addressed the issues outlined by Sahnoun in the wake of Somalia.

(b) Regionalism or regionalisation of peacekeeping ?

The principle of subsidiarity evolved in an effort to make a clear separation of responsibility between layers of government – the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the governments of member states – within the *supra*-national European Union (EU). Whether subsidiarity has succeeded in this context remains moot. However, the concept might serve wider application. Within the context of conflict management, W. Andy Knight has noted that by seeking a 'more rigid' legalistic hierarchy of responsibility 'the utilisation of the principle has helped to paper over political discord and insurmountable ideological disagreements'.⁵³

Andrew Hurrell makes the point that regions are 'socially constructed and hence politically contested'.⁵⁴ With this in mind it is important 'to distinguish between regionalism as description and regionalism as prescription, that is, as a moral position or as a doctrine as to how international relations ought to be conducted'.⁵⁵ Are the dynamics of the region fundamental and/or organic or is there a prescriptive element that might be better described as regionalisation or, indeed, subsidiarity?

⁵¹ Sahnoun, Mohamed, 'Managing Conflict in the Post Cold War Era', *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* <www.jha.ac> posted 2 December 1995.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Knight, W. Andy, 'Towards a subsidiarity model for peacemaking and preventive diplomacy: making Chapter VIII of the UN Charter operational', *Third World Quarterly*, 17/1 (1996), p.44.

⁵⁴ Hurrell, Andrew, 'Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics', *Review of International Studies*, 21/4 (1995), p.334.

Definitions of both the terms 'region' and 'regionalism' are mutable and distinguishable according to differing circumstances in various parts of the world. Muthiah Alagappa has sought to formulate a definition that isolates fundamental characteristics of regionalism within the framework of international organisation theory – 'cooperation among governments or non-government organisations in three or more geographical proximate and interdependent countries for the pursuit of mutual gain in one or more issue areas'.⁵⁶ Post-independence Africa has generated a plethora of regional entities compliant with Alagappa's definition. Eight regional organisations that, to greater or lesser extent, pursue 'mutual gain' in the area of conflict management have either intervened in continental or regional conflict or might be deemed to have, or be developing, the potential to do so. The OAU is the continent-wide body and 'a broad framework within which several specific regimes and accompanying bureaucratic organisations in a number of issues and issue-areas can and do nest'.⁵⁷ Two SROs have deployed significant intervention forces – the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).⁵⁸ Another grouping, the *Accord de non-agression et d'assistance en matière de défense* (ANAD), has tackled one minor operation.⁵⁹ Four other SROs are in the process of expanding their ambit from economic development to encompass a security function – the *Union du Maghreb arabe* (UMA), the *Communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique centrale* (CEEAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the East African Cooperation (EAC).⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.334.

⁵⁶ Alagappa, Muthiah, 'Regionalism and Conflict management: A Framework for Analysis', *Review of International Studies*, 21/4 (1995), p.363.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.364.

⁵⁸ ECOWAS comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo; SADC comprises Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

⁵⁹ ANAD comprises Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo as members with Benin and Guinea accorded observer status.

⁶⁰ UMA comprises Algeria, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia; CEEAC comprises Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe; IGAD comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda; EAC comprises Kenya, United republic of Tanzania and Uganda.

Africa was not new to the practice of regional peacekeeping. However, the results of intervention were mixed. The OAU's experience in Chad in 1980-1982 was negative. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peace-enforcement action in Liberia since 1990 had achieved some success, but had become bogged down. Yet, the dereliction of the international community during the Rwandan genocide *forced* a reconceptualisation of existing *intra*-continental security structures. The downing of the aircraft carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 occurred in the midst of, and partially because of, vacillation and indecision on the part of the members of the UN Security Council over the performance of UNOSOM. The immediate response of the Security Council was to reduce the existing presence of the Chapter VI UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 2,548 to 270. In the ensuing four months upwards of a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu would be massacred. When the Security Council finally authorised a peace-enforcement intervention by a French force it was *faute de mieux*. Five out of ten Council members abstained from voting for the intervention.⁶¹ If the intervention succeeded in saving lives it was nonetheless instigated by French self-interest. A seriously deleterious consequence of the French intervention was the export of those responsible for genocide, and hence the seeds of future conflict, from Rwanda to the former eastern Zaire. In its avidity to preserve its influence in the region, Paris actively discouraged the proposed creation of a regional force to intervene in the conflict. Ironically, as a result of the criticism that followed its role in the conflicts in the Great Lakes, France embarked on a review of its African policy that would promote, on the face of it, the type of regional peacekeeping capacity that Paris frustrated during the Rwandan crisis.

In the wake of the failed action in Somalia and wilfully negligent inaction in Rwanda, the onus for intervention in Africa *necessarily* shifted in large part to African states themselves.⁶² The number of UN missions throughout the world, including Africa, diminished. A degree of UN involvement in African conflicts endured, but there was a

⁶¹ China, Brazil, New Zealand, Nigeria and Pakistan abstained. With the exception of China the other abstainers were so-called middle powers, the traditional core contributors to Chapter VI peacekeeping operations. There was continued alarm at the increase in sovereignty-defying Chapter VII interventions, especially when these operations were conducted by Security Council members with strategic interests in the area of intervention.

step back from the peace-enforcement posture employed by UNOSOM II.⁶³ The reluctance of the permanent members of the Security Council to authorise new peacekeeping operations in Africa has lifted twice since intervention in Somalia. On both occasions the UN intervened to replace faltering regional security operations. A small-scale operation was authorised by the Security Council - the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) - to take over from the Mission to Oversee the Bangui Accords (MISAB) an *ad hoc* all-African force that was reliant on France for funding and logistics. In October 1999, in response to a signalled withdrawal of Nigerian ECOMOG troops, the Security Council authorised the creation of a robust intervention force to ensure security in Sierra Leone. The United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was given a revised mandate and further personnel in February 2000. Its size was further increased in May 2000 and March 2001.

Until the mid-1990s African states and organisations accepted and participated in peacekeeping's conceptual evolution as seen through the prism of the Security Council. African conflict resolution mechanisms mirrored those of the UN. As with the UN Charter, the OAU Charter and the treaties establishing the SROs do not elaborate definitions or specifics of operations to keep or restore peace. The OAU Charter enjoins member states to the 'peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration'.⁶⁴ The treaties of the major SROs are also reticent about regional security aspirations. Fragile by nature, SROs are wary of delineating potentially divisive security issues in their founding documents. Explicit measures that impinge on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states are outlined in supplementary protocols. Scott Fisher of the US State Department notes that 'in ECOWAS, SADC, and EAC there is a security annex to what started as an economic sub-regional activity'.⁶⁵

⁶² Interview with Sergio Viera de Mello (Assistant High Commissioner, UN High Commission for Refugees), Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 1997.

⁶³ The scaling-down of the UN peacekeeping presence was not confined to Africa. In December 1994 there were 77,783 troops under UN command deployed in peacekeeping operations. In June 1999 this number had shrunk to 12,000 troops. In Africa existing UN observer missions continued in Western Sahara with the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, Liberia with the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), and Angola with the series of UN Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM) later to be replaced by the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA).

⁶⁴ OAU Charter, Article III, para. 4.

⁶⁵ Quoted in Albaugh, Ericka A., 'Preventing Conflict in Africa: Possibilities of Peace-enforcement', in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention* (Cambridge and Washington DC: World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.205.

Nonetheless, Africa's SROs became the *loci* for the reappraisal of regional and sub-regional security arrangements. The trend has been toward a 'layered response' or 'peace pyramid'.⁶⁶ The direction of flow in terms of military response to a crisis has become bottom-up. The current onus for command and control and troop provision lies with the SRO. The OAU together with *extra*-continental actors – for example the Commonwealth or *Francophonie*, together with Western powers involved in peacekeeping capacity support programmes - might assume a link between the bottom and top of the pyramid by adopting observer and/or logistical support roles. The UN might also provide international observers, although the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces remains a possibility. From a juridical standpoint the pyramid supposedly runs top-down. William Nhara, former Coordinator of Conflict Prevention and Research at the OAU's Conflict Management Division describes the UN at the apex of the pyramid as 'the supreme organ for ensuring peace and security, world-wide', whilst at the bottom sits the SROs with the OAU, and potentially other non-regional organisations, in the middle providing 'the critical linkage' as mediators.⁶⁷

Effective withdrawal by international agencies from conflict resolution underpins the hypothesis that Africa's leaders, the OAU and SROs are under a moral/political imperative to summon the will to develop a capacity to intervene in conflicts. Yet, much of the discourse emanating from the various Secretariats is hubris. Aspiration frequently exceeds achievability. The Zimbabwe Workshop on Peacekeeping held in January 1995 picked out obstacles facing increased OAU and SRO involvement including finance, logistics and political will.⁶⁸ Mark Malan questions whether by 'uncritically' accepting this primary role, African leaders and SROs have allowed themselves to be shunted into a political cul-de-sac with regional primacy for peacekeeping becoming the norm?

⁶⁶ See Malan, Mark, 'Treading Firmly on the Layered Response Ladder: From Peace Enforcement to Conflict Termination Operations in Africa?', *African Security Review*, 6/5 (1997), pp.1-18; Malan, Mark, 'The OAU and African Sub-regional Organisations – A closer look at the 'peace pyramid'', *ISS Occasional Paper*, 36 (1999), pp.1-12.

⁶⁷ Nhara, William, 'Conflict Management and Peace Operations: The Role of the Organisation of African Unity and Sub-regional Organisations', in Mark Malan (ed.), *Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: ISS Monograph Series, 1998), p.38.

⁶⁸ See Yorke, Edmund, 'Regional Initiatives and Non-UN Forms of Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa', in Stuart Gordon and Francis Toase, *Aspects of Peacekeeping* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp.85-86.

We have reached a stage in the debate where Africans are playing into the hands of those who would undermine the legitimacy and efficacy of the UN in the field of peace operations. This is obviously unintentional for placing the UN at the apex of the pyramid reflects the respect that Africans have for the world body.⁶⁹

The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution adopted by the OAU Summit in 1993, seeks to regenerate the OAU as institution of first resort for conflict resolution on the continent. It states that, 'in the event that situations of incipient conflict evolve into full-blown conflicts, it is the responsibility of the Mechanism to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions, in order to facilitate the resolution of those conflicts'.⁷⁰ In terms of sub-regional organisation, the 'ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security' signed in Lomé in 1999 expands ECOWAS' authority to engage in, amongst other tasks, 'peacekeeping and the restoration of peace'.⁷¹ SADC's Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, established in 1996, has proven controversial with its terms and relative status disputed by member states. The EAC's latest incarnation places more stress than its predecessor on regional security.⁷² A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on defence matters signed by the Ugandan, Tanzanian and Kenyan armed forces is signalled as the first step towards a comprehensive defence pact.⁷³ CEEAC and IGAD have also established embryonic security frameworks, although the logistical capacity and political will needed for their full operability is questionable. UMA has currently no specific defence or security framework. At the start of 2000 only ECOWAS and SADC were capable of engendering the political will to engage in peace operations.

The evolution from economic to security cooperation has generated problems for SROs. Richard Jackson submits that, 'extending economic cooperation to military cooperation leads to ambiguity and confusion about essential institutional purposes'.⁷⁴

⁶⁹ Malan, 'The OAU and African Sub-regional Organisations', p.5.

⁷⁰ OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Cairo, June 1993.

⁷¹ Protocol Relating to The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Lomé, 17-19 November 1999.

⁷² The original East African Community (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) existed between 1967 and 1984, although it was moribund after 1977.

⁷³ Berman and Sams, *op.cit.*, pp.198-201.

⁷⁴ Jackson, Richard, 'The Dangers of Regionalising International Conflict Management: The African Experience', *Political Science*, 52/1 (2000), p.57.

Pre-existing rivalries in both ECOWAS (francophone versus anglophone member states) and SADC (South Africa versus Zimbabwe) have been exacerbated by the promotion of a military dimension. The drafting of protocols appended to existing treaties does not surmount deeper contention already manifest in the pre-existing economic arrangement.

A unique African institution is ANAD.⁷⁵ This is the only regional security agreement on the continent not tied to an economic organisation. It was founded in 1977 by six West African francophone states. The ANAD Treaty allows for conflict management and collective defence mechanisms. In comparison with ECOWAS, linguistic homogeneity and the fact that the organisation restricted its ambit to security allowed ANAD to move ahead with implementing its Treaty with relative speed. ANAD deployed one small observer force in late 1985 and early 1986 to monitor an ANAD-brokered ceasefire during a territorial dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali. Both the mediation effort and the observer mission were successful in defusing the conflict. The ANAD observers were considered more acceptable to the belligerents than an alternative mission initiated by Libya and Nigeria. However, ANAD's coexistence alongside the emergent ECOWAS security protocols was always problematic for both organisations. ANAD has not authorised another peace intervention. The ECOWAS and ANAD overlap suggests that membership of a regional security organisation should be wider than that of any overlapping regional economic grouping – otherwise the economic grouping will tend to take the lead in conflict management initiatives. Even so, in April 1999, despite being considered moribund by many regional actors, ANAD agreed to a proposal to create a small standing peacekeeping force.⁷⁶ Lack of funding would almost certainly preclude this plan. Although an ANAD spokesman reportedly invited other states to apply to join the organisation, these new proposals underline the central anglophone/francophone rivalry within the region that has diluted ECOWAS' capacity to act. The terms of the 'ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security' foresees ANAD merging with a new ECOWAS Mechanism.

⁷⁵ See Adeniji, Olu, 'Mechanisms for Conflict Management in West Africa', *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* < <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a027.htm> > posted 15 October 1997.

⁷⁶ Berman and Sams, op.cit., p.213.

What does the acceptance of the primary peacekeeping role on the continent say about the motivations of Africa's regional organisations? Do the SROs demonstrate an authentic African agenda, whether humanitarian or not, or are they acting, *pace* Debrix, as proxies manipulated for the promotion of a Western neo-liberal agenda? The discourse of the 1990s generation of African leaders (albeit allowing a significant number of leaders that have survived from previous decades) has shown a gradual, but marked trend towards the reinvigoration of a pan-African ideal. In large part such rhetoric has remained within the political/cultural sphere rather than the political/economic sphere. At the same time as *intra*-African solutions to conflict were being mooted, economic development was left to the exogenous solutions of the Bretton Woods institutions. Moreover, although African SROs address self-pacification, indigenous means and methods of conflict management/resolution are merely eluded to, whilst the recognised norms of international conflict resolution are prioritised.⁷⁷ African SROs accept the definitions and distinctions along the peacekeeping/peace-enforcement continuum as they have developed within the UN system.

As the American impulse to intervene waned after Mogadishu and the number of UN operations drastically decreased so a clear trend developed towards the authorisation of non-UN-led interventions by regional organisations or 'coalitions of the willing' under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The relevant articles state that,

[N]othing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations... The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.⁷⁸

The series of interventions by NATO in the Balkans crises demonstrated an important conceptual shift in the hierarchy of the 'peace pyramid' with ramifications for

⁷⁷ Zartman, I William, 'Introduction: African Traditional Conflict "Medicine"', in I. William Zartman (ed.), *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict Medicine* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp.1-11.

African conflict resolution.⁷⁹ Despite French wariness, bordering on opposition, the US and Britain have been encouraging NATO to move beyond its function as a multinational alliance for self-defence and adopt a stronger crisis response function in areas outside the boundaries of its own member states. This requires a reinterpretation of NATO as seen both from the perspective of its own treaty and the restrictions of international law. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty demarcates NATO's intended scope and intent.⁸⁰ NATO's operations in the Balkans have been non-Article 5 interventions. International law differentiates between an alliance for collective defence and a regional organisation with a collective security component. The former is an alliance between two or more states involving an agreement to assist a member state of the collective who comes under attack from outside the alliance. The latter is an agreement between two or more states to renounce the use of force in the settlement of disputes, whilst agreeing to the potential use of force against a member state that breaks this rule. *Prima facie*, interventions such as that undertaken by NATO in Kosovo, as well as moving beyond the organisation's own remit, also break international law by failing to obtain a specific mandate from the UN Security Council for intervention. The fact that, despite murmurings in some quarters, NATO's membership and the international community in general have soft-pedalled the legal problems facing non-Article 5 interventions implies tacit acceptance of a shift to regional and sub-regional conflict.

It should be added that several commentators with reservations over the efficacy of regional military intervention hold the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), rather than NATO, to be a more effective model for African SROs. Malan notes that the OSCE 'has taken a comprehensive but realistic view of security, to include issues of arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence building, human rights and election monitoring'.⁸¹ From this standpoint the OSCE's long-term, diplomatic

⁷⁸ UN Charter, Article 52, para.1; UN Charter Article 53, para.1.

⁷⁹ The Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

⁸⁰ The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, para 1. 'The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area'.

⁸¹ Malan, 'The OAU and African Subregional Organisations', p.8.

agenda is seen as a more sensible model for African SROs not yet politically or militarily fit to embark on interventions. In Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk's words, 'instead of developing grand and expensive security designs, the communities under review [ECOWAS and SADC] should rather concentrate on the goal of constraining the option of military force in conflict management'.⁸²

Within the African context there is a move, albeit lacking enthusiasm, towards subsidiarity – 'regions accepting co-responsibility and sharing the burden to police themselves and a dilution of the central role that many had hoped the UN would play in this regard'.⁸³ Yet, the OAU and the SROs were initially never intended to fulfil a collective defence function. The OAU had only a tenuous security profile until the Cairo Declaration of 1993 that established the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Since the Cairo Declaration it should be held to be a 'regional' collective security arrangement recognised under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. As previously discussed African SROs have also sought to establish security structures by adding protocols to their founding treaties and thus legitimising intervention or potential intervention. Seen in the light of this new role they should be seen as sub-regional collective security arrangements recognised under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and cooperating with the OAU. To this end, one document with strong African institutional input that addresses regional subsidiarity in African conflict resolution is the *Report of the Joint OAU/International Peacekeeping Academy (IPA) Task Force on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*.⁸⁴ The report resulted from a collaboration to assess the OAU's fitness to remain the primary institution for addressing conflict on the continent. In its most recent research, the IPA has emphasised the OAU's essentially coordinating role in conflict resolution and the potential capacity of SROs to construct medium to large-scale peace operations. From the perspective of the OSCE and NATO models, the OAU/IPA report appears to commend the OSCE role to the OAU and leaves the possibility of a NATO-style interventionist capacity to SROs.

⁸² Nieuwkerk, Anthoni van, 'Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS Compared', *African Security Review*, 10/2 (2001), p.10.

⁸³ Cilliers, Jakkie, 'Regional African peacekeeping capacity: mythical construct or essential tool', *African Security Review*, 8/4 (1999), p.2.

⁸⁴ Jan, Ameen [Rapporteur], *Report of the Joint OAU/International Peacekeeping Academy (IPA) Task Force on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* <www.ipacademy.org/Publications/

The rise of regionalism in conflict resolution was born of necessity. Given the level of conflict together with American and UN unwillingness and/or inability to intervene Africans 'will inevitably have to fend for themselves'.⁸⁵ Yet, despite upbeat assessments from those empowered to make the concept work, regional conflict management remains a construct more honoured in the breach than the observance. From an institutional perspective Nhara makes the point that,

[D]ue to their cultural affinity and common social and historical configuration, the people of a region normally have more intimate knowledge of the evolution and political sensitivities of the conflict in question...Moreover, their general sense of solidarity, arising from common histories, experiences, geographic contiguity and cultural compatibility, can play a central role in the crucial process of consensus-building in times of crisis.⁸⁶

Many commentators are less sanguine. Cilliers is sceptical of the received wisdom in favour of subsidiarity - 'despite the well-established principles of impartiality within the peacekeeping debate, the underlying assumption when it comes to the new enthusiasm for a greater role for sub-regional organisations, is that they are closer to a conflict and therefore more familiar with local conditions'.⁸⁷ Jackson also emphasises partiality stemming from affinity noting that 'the corollary to the advantages that regional organisations possess...is that they are liable to be too close to the issues and too interested in the outcomes'.⁸⁸

Can regional conflict resolution succeed in the face of the fragility of the African state given the solidly statist nature of African regional organisations? The principle of maintaining pre-existing colonial borders as a means to prevent *inter*-state conflict has become totemic in the OAU and devolved to the treaties of most SROs. However, the large majority of conflicts that these organisations have addressed have been *intra*-state conflicts. Nonetheless, the underlying doctrine endures. Thus, when intervention occurs, whether consensual or otherwise, it is *de facto* partial, in support of the incumbent

Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfriPP98Print.htm>, posted 1998.

⁸⁵ Cilliers, op.cit., p.15.

⁸⁶ Nhara, William, 'The OAU and the Potential Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Organisations', in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills, *Peacekeeping in Africa* (Braamfontein: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p.101.

⁸⁷ Cilliers, op.cit., p.9.

⁸⁸ Jackson, op.cit., p.55.

government against the encroachment of non-state actors.⁸⁹ This trait has been emphasised, not without irony, by venerable members of the OAU. Julius Nyerere commented that 'the OAU exists only for the protection of the African Heads of State'.⁹⁰ More recently Yoweri Museveni made the same point with greater emphasis when calling the OAU 'a trade union for criminals'.⁹¹ Jackson invokes 'states of dubious legitimacy fighting to preserve similarly dubious regimes'.⁹² If this is an inevitable consequence of *realpolitik*, one result of peacekeeping intervention in Africa is often the artificial bolstering of an illegitimate regime, the strengthening of the resolve of those opposing the regime and the prolongation of the conflict.

Jackson's remark concerning the legitimacy of the intervening states is particularly relevant in the light of the apparent ascendancy of empirical sovereignty rather than juridical sovereignty as the basis for security. In the post-Cold War environment notions of 'good governance' promoted by the Clinton administration prompted a majority of UN member states to supposedly prioritise stability at home as the foundation for international security. Michael Barnett argues that 'the shift from deterrence to assurance begins by emphasising the institutional arrangements that might be constructed to minimise suspicions and fears and realise joint gains and ends with the idea that the best assurance is for states to exhibit a modicum of domestic stability'.⁹³ Does the idea of peacekeeping/peace-enforcement, especially within a regional framework, fit with this aspiration? The brief history of regional peacekeeping intervention in Africa is replete with bitter ironies – military governments intervening to reverse military coups d'état in other countries, returning peacekeepers instigating coups d'état, and states suffering coups d'état whilst their troops are engaged in a regional peacekeeping operation.⁹⁴

⁸⁹ The OAU intervention in Chad was, at least ostensibly, on behalf of the incumbent government of national unity. MISAB in CAR, ECOWAS interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, and SADC in Lesotho and DRC have all aimed to preserve the incumbent regimes.

⁹⁰ Quoted in El-Ayouty, Yassin, 'An OAU for the Future: An Assessment', in Yassin El-Ayouty (ed.), *The Organisation of African Unity After Thirty Years* (Westport: Praeger Publishing, 1994), p.179.

⁹¹ Quoted in *Sunday Independent* [London], 1 June 1997.

⁹² Jackson, op.cit., p.56.

⁹³ Barnett, Michael, 'Partners in Peace: the UN, Regional Organisations, and Peace-keeping', *Review of International Studies*, 21/4 (1995), p.416.

⁹⁴ For example, and *inter alia* - the Nigerian dominated ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone in 1997 to reinstate the government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah overthrown in a coup d'état by Major Johnny Paul Koromah; the 1994 coup d'état in Gambia led by Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh formerly with ECOMOG in

As noted, political realists argue that partiality is assured when an SRO intervenes in a civil war in a proximate country in which the intervening troop-contributing states, as well as the organisation itself must inherently have a vested interest. Van Nieuwkerk observes that ‘two realities inhibit the emergence of true regional security cooperation’, the first reality is ‘old fashioned power politics, where national decisions (with regional implications) are mostly based on the seductive appeal of the “national interest” or alternatively on “sovereignty”’.⁹⁵ To this end regionalism might be seen as a balance of power in which states ‘align themselves with others to promote their own interest or enhance their security’.⁹⁶ As Clapham points out - ‘where regionalism amounted to anything more than a formality, it did so because it helped to serve the cause of state and regime preservation’.⁹⁷

Yet, an imperative for regime and/or state survival does not guarantee cohesion or unanimity of all member states during an intervention. Van Nieuwkerk’s second reality inhibiting authentic regional security cooperation is ‘greed’.⁹⁸ States pursue their own agenda not only as part of a balance of power strategy, but also for the profits that can be made by exploiting internal conflicts by such as illegal mining and arms trafficking.

If civil wars are inherently complex, African civil wars are unusually Gordian in character. Each all-African intervention has, to a greater or lesser extent, suffered from questionable authorisation and hence legitimacy. As Jackson points out, the moral and legal bases for intervention are oftentimes ‘murky’ and ‘one is left, therefore, with regional intervention without a clear normative framework’.⁹⁹ As a result there exists scope for overt or covert dissent by some member states to the aims of the intervention. Nigerian opposition to the mainly francophone peacekeeping mission in Guinea-Bissau followed francophone opposition to the Nigerian-led operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Intervention by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the DRC conflict has brought

Liberia; the 1999 coup d’etat in Niger in which President Ibrahim Baré Mainassara was shot by his own Presidential Guard whilst Nigerien troops were on service with ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau.

⁹⁵ Van Nieuwkerk, op.cit., p.9.

⁹⁶ Spegele, Roger D., *Political Realism in International Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1996), p.87.

⁹⁷ Clapham, Christopher, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.121.

⁹⁸ Van Nieuwkerk, op.cit., p.9.

⁹⁹ Jackson, op.cit., p.56.

into question SADC's Organ for Politics, Defence and Security and has undermined South African mediation in the civil war.

Variance in power within organisations raises questions over the position of the regional hegemon in relation to the other members and the organisation itself. Cilliers contends that 'in contrast even to NATO, sub-regional peacekeeping and intervention in Africa is often dependent upon the dominance of a single powerful country as opposed to the combined efforts of a number of consolidated nation-states'.¹⁰⁰ In the same vein Jackson states that, '[African] peacekeeping operations are liable to become overwhelmingly dependent on one regional power who can use power asymmetries to dominate regional or sub-regional organisations to achieve their own self-interested objectives'.¹⁰¹ This begs questions of consentient intent and leadership. Clearly the Nigerian-dominated forays into Chad, Liberia and Sierra Leone and the South African-led operation in Lesotho were motivated *au fond* by the geopolitical ambitions and interests of the regional hegemons. In all three cases the supposed juridical pyramid of authorisation – UN → OAU → SRO – proved muddled, fudged and legally questionable. If the hegemon used the regional organisation as a vehicle for intervention, it did not enjoy unanimous support for its actions. For the most part Nigeria and South Africa provided the manpower and maintained control over these interventions. In the case of the Liberian intervention, Nigeria was undermined by the continued support from fellow ECOWAS' members Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire for the anti-government forces. These operations would not have taken place or endured without the backing of the regional hegemons. However, they were not instances of a hegemon cowing junior members of a SRO into supporting an intervention against their national interests.

Indeed the problem is not the existence of a regional hegemon *per se*, but the *lack* of effective hegemons. As Clapham states,

[I]t is extremely difficult to develop effective mandates for intervention unless one state – and one leader – is prepared to take the initiative, commit the necessary resources, accept the inevitable costs, and put together a coalition of like-minded states that are prepared to devote some of their own resources to the physical capacity of the operation and (often more important) its diplomatic

¹⁰⁰ Cilliers, *op.cit.*, p.9.

¹⁰¹ Jackson, Richard, 'African Solutions to African Problems? Conflict-Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era', paper presented to the AFSAAP Conference, Perth, Australia, 26-28 November 1999.

acceptability...The problem is that leadership is inseparable from power and, indeed, from hegemony'.¹⁰²

For African regional hegemony leadership has proven elusive. One reason has been the ethos of an OAU that privileged juridical sovereign equality over hegemony. Moreover, putative hegemony – invariably the largest and most populous states in a region – have been prone to domestic instability. Civil strife has been a brake on ambition for Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Zaire/DRC and Sudan. Small and middle-ranking states have often preferred to treat with external powers rather than defer to the regional hegemon. Prior to the lifting of *apartheid*, Mozambique and Angola used alliances with Cuba and the USSR in the first instance and the West in the second instance to stave off South African coercion. France has regularly intervened on behalf of the francophone states in ECOWAS to frustrate Nigerian aspirations, both economic and political.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping has not been heavily theorised. Only limited efforts have been made to frame principles and inculcate precedent - individual operations have invariably set rules commensurate with the context of the intervention. The chapter examined the development of the constructs of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement and defined central concepts, as well as analysing the trend toward the regionalisation of conflict management, in particular the promotion of African states, militaries and organisations as the prime agents for intervention on the continent.

The hypothesis proposes that that Africa's leaders are under a moral/political imperative to summon the will to develop a capacity to intervene in conflicts, possibly with external assistance, but without direct *extra*-continental intervention. That the world is divided into regions – regardless of composition – is a given. However, regionalisation of international affairs is prescriptive. The impetus for the regionalisation of conflict resolution in Africa in the mid-1990s had two bases, endogenous and exogenous, often running parallel, but sometimes interconnecting. Underpinning both strands has been the increasing marginalisation of the continent. To a large part, the short-lived

¹⁰² Clapham, Christopher, 'Peacekeeping and the Peacekept: Developing Mandates for Potential Interveners', in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement in Africa: Methods of*

interventionism of the post-Cold War 'new world order' was arrogant and cynical. Civil wars proliferated in Africa as the artificial brakes on *intra*-state conflict applied by Cold War rivalries were released. However, reversals suffered by American and UN peacekeepers in Somalia resulted in an about-face in interventionist policy, especially in the African context, by the US and therefore the UN. The ensuing vacuum provided an enabling environment for genocide in Rwanda, as well as a proliferation of conflict on the continent. African experience of the 'new world order' engendered scepticism, manifest in a reborn pan-African vigour, questioning the motives of the erstwhile interventionist policy and sensing a hidden agenda.

However, pan-African pride was subordinate to necessity as the basis for the regionalisation of conflict management in Africa. Yet, Africa remains poorly placed, politically and militarily, to address conflict in an effective manner. The way in which Africa has approached the notion of intervention to maintain or bring about peace has not, in the main, been innovative. Peculiar African remedies for conflict management and resolution have been very much subordinate to the norms of peacekeeping developed through the UN model. Previous experience of all-African intervention, in Chad and Liberia, proved far from positive. The ineffectiveness of the OAU as the continental body, the reasons for which will be examined in Chapter Three, has led to the full implications of Chapter VIII subsidiarity being tested. However, the assumption of responsibility for peace intervention by African sub-regional organisations has been inherently problematic. These organisations were economic constructs. Whilst accepting stability as a prerequisite for authentic and sustained economic development, the extension of these organisations into the exacting arena of conflict resolution has threatened to dilute their fundamental purpose, as well as exacerbate pre-existing tensions between individual members and allied blocs.

If the hypothesis is to stand then the most effective militaries in Africa must assume a hegemonic role. However, regional powers such as Nigeria and South Africa are often resented by regional rivals. It is the inability or unwillingness of these assumptive hegemons to fulfil an effective leadership role that has undermined the interventionist capacity of SROs. Peace operations have also been marked by a variance

Conflict Prevention (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.40.

in purpose between the members of the intervening SRO. Advocates of subsidiarity emphasise proximity and cultural affinity as goods. However, proximity to a conflict invariably invokes issues of 'national interest'. Intervention is rarely, if ever, impartial. Whilst different members might support different combatants, SROs are disposed to support a sitting Head of State regardless of his legitimacy or the nature of the regime. The construction of a sub-regional framework for conflict management or the capacity to undertake peace operations is important, but no substitute for – and in some circumstances can be a brake on – domestic stability built on good governance.

Is Africa right to develop the capacity for self-pacification? The dignity of self-help aside, the fact that Africa remains a low priority for intervention by the UN or the traditional intervening powers dictates that they must. Should the rest of the world, in particular the UN supported by the US, France and Britain, promote self-help? The push towards regionalisation has solid provenance in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. However, the process has been far from organic. After Somalia and Rwanda the majority of African conflicts were deemed too dangerous and intractable for Western intervention. Yet, Africa, as the world's poorest continent, remains ill equipped to construct effective interventions. Large-scale support for the self-pacification project is a moral minimum for the leading powers. Direct intervention should remain an option in the short to medium term. The next chapter will consider why and how all-African intervention became the norm.

CHAPTER TWO

CONTEXTUALISING ALL-AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

What ideas underlie the contention that African leaders have a moral/political imperative to summon the will to develop a capacity to intervene in conflict on the continent? As discussed in the previous chapter, *extra*-African engagement with conflict resolution in Africa in the wake of the Cold War proved brief. Within the context of conflict management, Africa was frequently regarded as distinct both by Africans and non-Africans. The chapter contextualises the shift toward the promotion and acceptance of African self-pacification by both Africans and non-Africans by reviewing the literature and assessing and analysing theoretical bases underpinning the concept.

Section (a) considers the universalist and particularist positions in international relations and the inherent consequences these relative positions have on the treatment of Africa as a case apart. Following on, section (b) looks at the competing theories of the inter-paradigm debate in a post-Cold War world reconceptualising the debate as a dichotomy between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism themselves deriving their intellectual force from the universalist/particularist debate. Regardless of where the imperative for intervention lies – at global, continental or sub-regional level – the thorny issue of the status of state sovereignty needs to be addressed. Section (c) assesses the current understanding and continued validity of sovereignty in Africa. The final section moves away from discussion of *why* or *whether* the onus for developing a capacity for self-pacification should lie with Africans. Section (d) examines ethical questions surrounding the justification for, and conduct of, peace operations to ask *when* and *how* should African organisations intervene? It looks at norms of conduct for peace operations and the justification for intervention by extrapolating from the just war tradition.

(a) The universal and the particular

As discussed in the previous chapter, advocates of the regionalisation of peacekeeping stress the assumed benefits of proximity – common history and experience, geographical contiguity and cultural compatability. Underlying these assumptions is an acceptance of

the particularity of regions and sub-regions. Thus, beyond the constraints of funding and capacity, a retreat from the assumptive universalism of the United Nations (UN) is defensible on broadly utilitarian terms. This position stresses the enduring ascendancy of realism over liberal internationalism, or to use the preferred paradigms of this research, the communitarian standpoint over the cosmopolitan. Particularism also acknowledges relativism, often presented as postmodernism, as underpinning contemporary international relations. By these lights, and given its multi-faceted diversity and recent history of cultural and political emancipation, Africa would seem to well fit postmodern interpretation. Thus, all-African interventions might be held to 'be more politically acceptable than external interventions ...and to avoid accusations of neo-colonialism'.¹

The communitarian versus cosmopolitan debate reconceptualises the arguments of the realist and liberal traditions in International Relations (IR) theory. Realism, as the dominant tradition, has avoided the normative and pursued the positivist. Questions of aspiration and agency are replaced by an amoral, detached scientific analysis of problems in the international sphere. However, the post-war international environment created problems that proved intractable to positivist reasoning. Issues of distributive justice, human rights and mechanisms for conflict resolution have been most pertinent in Africa.

Cosmopolitan and communitarian theories are distinguishable by their 'unbounded' and 'bounded' orbits.² Thus cosmopolitan theories are unbounded 'since the domain of obligation is in principle all humans'.³ Communitarian theories are bounded since the 'relationship rather than the independent character of the humans to whom one might relate, is central and bears the theoretical weight'.⁴ Fundamental to the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate is the modern conception of the universal and the particular within political and IR theory. Molly Cochran sees the question at the heart of this dichotomy as 'whether there is a standard by which ethical judgments can be made across plural conceptions of the good'?⁵

¹ Ginifer, Jeremy, 'Emergent African Peacekeeping: Self-help and External Assistance', in PRIO/NUPI Report 'Humanitarian Force' <<http://www.nupi.no/UN/Chap5.html>> posted 24 March 1999.

² Dower, Nigel, *World Ethics: The New Agenda* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), pp.22-23.

³ Ibid., p.23.

⁴ Ibid., p.23.

⁵ Cochran, Molly, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.12.

On a political level cosmopolitans stress the moral equivalence of individuals. In IR theory this translates as a rejection of a state's absolute right to autonomy. Mark Hoffman asserts that, 'the important question is not the inherent moral qualities of particular political arrangements but whether or not they serve to promote the realisation of universal values such as justice and human dignity...universal rights necessarily override state autonomy'.⁶ For the communitarian it is held that 'the state is the framework which founds and enables ethical discourse', with the universal residing within the particularity of community where tradition, value and goods are fostered.⁷

The debates over the universal and the particular within Africa and between the proponents and opponents of all-African peacekeeping in the international community are wide-ranging. The failures of international intervention in Africa in the 1990s have seen a resurrection of a certain pan-African particularism, although many African politicians and scholars, mindful of the practical and political constraints on self-pacification on the continent, remain faithful to the universalism of a UN that proved the prime weapon against residual colonialism in Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. Beyond Africa there exist universalists defending the imperative to intervene based on the commonality of human values, and particularists who seek to demonstrate that value distinction and variety between the regions of the world does not compel a global response to a regional conflict. Andrew Linklater notes that both these points of view engender fears. One fear is that 'universalisation will incorporate the 'other' within an essentially Western framework'. On the other hand, 'regionalism [particularism] raises the fear that new boundaries will be drawn between the regional community and outsiders'.⁸

Beyond the poles of the universal/particular debate as it concerns intervention in African conflicts, advocates of the two positions remain susceptible to arguments specific to individual cases. In the West, formerly ardent champions of the right to intervene such as *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) have acknowledged that not all conflicts should attract the same urgency of action. Likewise, many pan-African proponents of all-African

⁶ Hoffman, Mark, 'Normative international theory: approaches and issues', in AJR Groom and Margot Light (eds.), *Contemporary International Theory: A Guide to Theory* (London: Pinter Publishers 1994), pp.30-31.

⁷ Cochran, op.cit., pp.12-13.

interventions recognise a continued role for the UN as legitimiser, observer and, *in extremis*, contributor to peacekeeping operations on the continent. Even so, there has been a perceptible swing away from the universalist position and a gradual concretisation of the particularist stance.

Is advocacy of intervention global ethics in practice? Do the disparate legal systems, mores and levels of development that exist throughout the world mitigate against a universal approach to intervention? More germane to this thesis, do the expansion of fundamentalist Islam and the continued relevance of ethnicity in Africa dictate that cultural particularism should be the default position when addressing conflict on the continent?

Universalism is significantly more permissive than particularism regarding the justification, or the requirement, for intervention. The increasing prevalence of peace-enforcement rather than orthodox peacekeeping operations has seen an accompanying dissection of the moral bases for intervention often falling under the rubric of 'global ethics'. If the restoration or the maintenance of peace remains the stated aim of intervention, the new orthodoxy often admits an element of justice. In this respect, human rights discourse has progressively become the *lingua franca* of global ethics and impinges on the debate between international as against regional peacekeeping.

Two key, interconnected, considerations are which rights should be universalised and who should, or does, make that decision? The way in which a peacekeeping intervention addresses the rights of the peacekept raises issues of ethnocentrism. In terms of the corpus of international legislation, authorial voice lies at the heart of the notion of human rights. Historically, expressions of universalism, whether theological or secular, have reflected the dogma and ideologies of their originators. Hence, many commentators argue that the edifice of international human rights law has been built on the foundation of post-Enlightenment Western thought.⁹ Moreover, the majority of the international elite (including bureaucrats and technocrats from Africa) responsible for the drafting of human

⁸ Linklater, Andrew, 'The achievements of critical theory', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.295.

⁹ See Tibi, Bassam, 'The European Conception of Human Rights and the Culture of Islam', in A.A. An-Naim and Francis Deng (eds.), *Human Rights in Africa: Cross Cultural Perspectives* (Washington DC; Brookings Institution, 1990), pp.104-132.

rights law are products of the Western tradition through education and upbringing. A process of institutionalisation within international organisations ensures homogeneity of thought and a graduality of change.

Thus, international fora, including the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and African sub-regional organisations (SROs), invariably prioritise negative rights countering political restraint of the individual over positive socio-economic rights. Whilst violation of the sanctity of human life and dignity might stimulate calls for intervention, issues of distributive justice do not. Moreover, Moha Ennaji stresses that, ‘a distinction is to be drawn between the morals of “human dignity”, shared by all cultures, and human rights which are enforceable by individuals against the state’.¹⁰ Post-Cold War intervention has often been, at least partially, initially justified by the alleged denial of human *dignity*. However, more recently, the scope of justification often widens to include infringement of human *rights* in order to legitimise an extended intervention, whilst the restoration or construction of a rights framework and the punishment of the original violators becomes part of the post-conflict peace-building process. Contradicting the view that this wider rights agenda promotes an imperialist Western conception of legally enforceable universal rights, some African analysts emphasise the problems inherent in the articulation of the development of rights outside the Western tradition. From this perspective,

[A] more historical approach to the study of the evolution of the contemporary concept of human rights will find no difficulty in drawing the link between traditional notions of human dignity or distributive justice and the modern idea of human rights which are in fact merely contextual reinterpretations of the age-long notions defining human worth and value...the rights and obligations that derived from religious, moral and cultural values associated with human dignity in traditional society can validly be considered the contextual equivalents of the modern concept of legal rights.¹¹

Despite the argument that different apprehensions of the notion of rights, and the quality and extent of those rights if they exist, are based essentially on semantic

¹⁰ Ennaji, Moha, ‘Cultural Relativism and Human Rights: Evidence from North Africa’, *Al-Ittihad Al-Ishtiraki* [Morocco], April (2000), p.2.

¹¹ Ibhawoh, Bonny, ‘Cultural Relativism and Human Rights: Reconsidering the African Discourse’, *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights*, 19/1 (2001), pp.45-46.

misunderstanding of the relative meaning of labels, the durability of these perceived distinctions consistently trammels universalism. Peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement in particular, might be seen as global ethics militant. Yet universalist jubilation at the spate of interventions in the early 1990s was soon replaced by disillusionment. Complex internal conflicts were not malleable to short-term interventions. In Michael Ignatieff's words,

[W]e [the West] consistently overestimated our moral prestige and consistently underestimated the resolve of those bent on war... Moreover, when policy was driven by moral motives it was often driven by narcissism. We intervened not only to save others, but to save ourselves, or rather an image of ourselves as defenders of universal decencies. Very often in these liberal interventions the moral reflex – 'something must be done' – was sustained by the unexamined assumption that we had the power to do anything.¹²

In the case of Africa, the apparent intractability of violence in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes, Liberia and Sierra Leone engendered a sense of, what Ignatieff has called, 'moral disgust' in the West.¹³ Compassion fatigue extended to those charged with responding to conflict – 'in Burundi and Rwanda, the secretary-general's [Boutros-Ghali] rhetoric was a hair's breadth from such disillusion and disgust'.¹⁴

Within a rights discourse, Bonny Ibhawoh argues for a *via media* between universalism and particularism. He doubts the validity of the extreme pan-African position that there exists a discrete African communitarian tradition that contrasts with a Western concept of rights based on the individual, and the reverse argument that human rights are concepts that have found expression only in the context of a post-feudal or post-colonial state. For Ibhawoh the battle for rights by different peoples in different times have equal validity – 'these struggles and victories should combine to give our contemporary understanding of human rights its essence and universal validity'.¹⁵ He also questions whether the effective ubiquity of the Western model of rights, and the extent of its perfusion into the post-colonial African polity, makes the Western conception of rights

¹² Ignatieff, Michael, *The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Moral Conscience* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1998), pp.94-96.

¹³ Ibid., pp.72-108.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.96; see also Shawcross, William, *Deliver Us From Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), pp.104-125.

¹⁵ Ibhawoh, op.cit., p.57.

irreversibly superior to indigenous conceptions. Ibhawoh recognises that ‘cultural differences may justify some deviations from universal human rights standards’, but warns that ‘cultural relativism must function as an expression and guarantee of local self-determination, rather than as an excuse for arbitrary rule and despotism’.¹⁶

Kwasi Wiredu follows Ibhawoh in arguing that ‘human beings cannot live by particulars or universals alone, but by some combination of both’.¹⁷ Furthermore, he argues that failures of intercultural communication have exacerbated the trend toward fundamental particularism. Certain Western normative practices confused, and continue to confuse, morality with custom in Africa. He urges both sides of the supposed ethical divide to reconsider how intelligibly customs and practice formulated in their relative languages translate into the other’s language.

So, is Africa a case apart? One Western commentator whose reading of conflict in Africa during the 1990s has led to his adopting a particularist position is Robert Kaplan. His analysis of the growing gap between the developed world and the developing world, especially Africa, is notoriously apocalyptic. Striking a quasi-teleological note reminiscent of Fukuyama, albeit considerably less comforting in its assumptions, Kaplan envisages a ‘last map’ as an ‘ever-mutating representation of chaos’.¹⁸ His position is amoral. For Kaplan, Africa will follow its own chaotic course regardless of the best intentions of the UN, the US or the international community.

Kaplan accepts that Afrocentrists are right in one regard – ‘that we ignore this dying region at our [the West’s] own risk’.¹⁹ However, the scope for international intervention is discounted since, ‘*we are not in control...as societies grow more populous and complex, the idea that a global elite like the UN can engineer reality from above is just as absurd as the idea that political ‘scientists’ can reduce any of this to a science*’.²⁰ One solution – benevolent recolonisation - is put forward as a possible solution for the problems of states along the Gulf of Guinea, ‘if only the Portuguese, the Dutch and the

¹⁶ Ibid., pp.58-59.

¹⁷ Wiredu, Kwasi, *Cultural Universals and Particulars: an African Perspective* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), p.9.

¹⁸ Kaplan, Robert, ‘The Coming Anarchy’, *The Atlantic Monthly*, February (1994), p.75.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.79.

²⁰ Kaplan, Robert, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (London: Papermac, 1997), p.463.

English would agree to come back with their money'.²¹ Yet, Kaplan's underlying conclusion is particularist – 'the rules by which diplomats and other policy making elites have ordered the world for the past few hundred years will apply less and less...solutions, in the main will have to come from within the affected cultures themselves'.²²

As a journalist Kaplan has become the target of criticism for many within the scholarly community of which he is so dismissive. Paul Richards has called his work the 'New Barbarism' or 'Malthus-with-guns' attacking the association of environmental determinism with cultural essentialism.²³ For Richards, Kaplan's vision of Africa panders to enduring fears in the West of Africa as the 'heart of darkness'. For many Westerners the primordial horror engendered by Africa and African conflict has not much dwindled since Joseph Conrad wrote his novel at the end of the nineteenth century. Stephan Maninger notes that,

'Dark' not only referred to the impenetrable, disease infested jungles, vast grasslands and the seemingly endless rivers of the scantily explored sub-Saharan continent, but also to the encounters with a population which, in many areas, seemed savage and warlike to the extreme... For Westerners, the Africa of one or two centuries later remains a political abyss of endemic conflict.²⁴

Intellectual irritation over Kaplan's perceived recourse to primordial determinism has been further exacerbated and disquieted by the extent to which Kaplan's analysis has apparently resonated within the highest echelons of American government.

Another equally controversial particularist tract is Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations*.²⁵ Given his standing as a distinguished political scientist, Huntington's work cannot be dismissed by the scholastic community as misread journalistic observation. The thrust of Huntington's argument is that conflict is becoming civilisational rather than statist and/or ideological in character.²⁶ It should be noted that whilst he recognises seven distinct civilisations – Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic,

²¹ Ibid., p.80; see also Cooper, Robert, 'The New Liberal Imperialism', *Observer* [London], 7 April 2002.

²² Kaplan, 'The Ends of the Earth', op.cit., p.337.

²³ See Richards, Paul, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (London: Heinemann, 1996), pp. 36-37.

²⁴ Maninger Stephan, 'Heart of Darkness: Western Policy of Non-interventionism in Africa' *African Security Review*, 8/6 (1999), p.1.

²⁵ Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Touchstone Books, 1997).

Orthodox, Western and Latin American – Huntington is uncertain as to the standing of sub-Saharan Africa as a discrete civilisation. He concedes that ‘conceivably sub-Saharan Africa could cohere into a distinct civilisation’.²⁷ As well as a traditional reliance on local ethnic ties, the extent, growth and assertiveness of Islam is a civilisational issue in Africa. Nonetheless, regardless of the perceived status of Africa as a civilisation, Huntington’s contentions go a long way toward a statement of a Western particularist perspective of African self-pacification.

Accepting the classical realist position of an anarchical world in which states are sovereign actors, Huntington contends that integrative, universalist, forces are reaffirming cultural consciousness and assertion amongst civilisations. At present the clearest fault line is between the hitherto dominant Western civilisation and the rest of the non-Western civilisations. He cites favourably Michael Walzer’s distinction between the ‘thick’ maximalist morality found within cultures and the ‘thin’ minimalist morality that is shared by all ‘thick’ moralities.²⁸ Huntington objurgates those Americans (and by extension all those in the West) who promote multiculturalism at home and universalism abroad.

Multiculturalism at home threatens the United States and the West; universalism abroad threatens the West and the world. The preservation of the United States and the West requires the renewal of Western identity. The security of the world requires acceptance of global multiculturality... Instead of promoting the supposedly universal features of one civilisation, the requisites for cultural coexistence demand a search for what is common in most civilisations. In a multicivilisational world, the constructive course is to renounce universalism, accept diversity, and seek commonalities.²⁹

How does this position bear upon a putative *Pax Africana*? Strict adherence to Huntington’s position would limit external intervention to cases in which ‘thin’ morality was clearly violated with the Rwandan genocide providing an unambiguous example. In the main, *intra*-civilisational conflict, whether *intra*-state such as in Chad, Sierra Leone

²⁶ Huntington sees civilisations as marked by, *inter alia*, historical, religious and linguistic distinctions.

²⁷ Huntington, op.cit., p.47.

²⁸ See Walzer, Michael, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (New York: Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp.1-11.

²⁹ Huntington, op.cit., p.318.

or Guinea-Bissau or *inter*-state, as between Ethiopia and Eritrea, should not attract direct intervention from outside Africa, but should be addressed from within the continent.

Indeed a cardinal feature of Huntington's approach is the primacy it attributes conflicts *between* civilisations over conflicts *within* civilisations. In terms of intervention strategy, 'the civilisational perspective would lead the UN Secretary-General and the US Secretary of State to concentrate their peacemaking efforts on those conflicts which have much greater potential than others to escalate into broader wars'.³⁰ In Africa this form of triage would presumably apply along a fluid and tenuous fault line that splits Africa into Islamic and non-Islamic regions. This line would currently intersect several states prone to conflict including Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan and Chad.

Huntington, however, does not dwell on bi-civilisational or multi-civilisational states. His position ascribes superior weight to the pull of civilisation over the dynamics of state power and survival. In criticising Huntington, Fouad Ajami echoes the archetypal universalist, Fukuyama, in believing in the 'tenacity of modernism and secularism' as global driving forces. For Ajami, 'civilisations do not control states, states control civilisations...states avert their gaze from blood ties when they need to; they see brotherhood and faith and kin when it is in their interest to do so'.³¹ He detects little proof of *intra*-civilisational military assistance in times of conflict based solely on bonds of cultural affinity. He cites the case of Bosnia in which a small number of foreign Muslim volunteers came to the aid of the Bosnian Muslims. However, it was clear that, 'no Muslim cavalry was ever going to ride to the rescue'.³² In the absence of civilisational allies the international community determined intervention. Thus, from Ajami's standpoint, and questions of capacity aside, Africa should not look to fellow Africans to intervene in crises based on civilisational ties. If individual African *states* choose to intervene this will be essentially based, as elsewhere in the world, on the dictates of self-interest or altruism.

Particularism as expressed by Africans is, in essence, the history of pan-Africanism. Yet, Africa's continued marginalisation has obscured the distinction between those Africans calling for an absolute political, economic and cultural autarchy, those

³⁰ Ibid., p.37.

³¹ Ajami, Fouad, 'The Summoning', *Foreign Affairs*, September/October (1993), p.9.

³² Ibid., p.7.

seeking to recapture an autonomy of thought and action lost in the perceived neo-colonialism of the four decades since independence and those recognising that, in the absence of Western engagement, Africa must formulate its own survival strategies. Indeed, Africa's vulnerable position vis-à-vis colonial powers and former slave-owning states has shaped, limited and fractionated pan-Africanism throughout its long evolution.

Each reinvigoration of the idea of pan-Africanism has given rise to a dichotomy of tone and emphasis in its key proponents. The first half of the twentieth century, when the pan-African movement comprised largely people of African descent, witnessed a debate, albeit far from rancorous, between the particularist 'back to Africa' position of Marcus Garvey and the internationalism of W.E.B. Du Bois.

Following World War II an indigenous pan-African movement emerged. Two main intellectual positions developed – African unity and African nationalism. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was the most ardent defender of particularism within the context of continental unity – 'the African "nations" of today, created artificially by foreigners for their own purposes, neither originate from ancient African civilisation, nor do they fit in with our African way of life or habits of exchange'.³³ Together with Sékou Touré of Guinea and Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria he called for political and economic institutionalisation of 'our African way of life'. At the heart of the project lay plans for the creation of an 'African High Command'. In the turmoil of early independence, and in the face of external pressure, many of Nkrumah's erstwhile supporters, and it might be argued Nkrumah himself, opted for a gradualist approach to African unity. With the newly founded OAU clearly more a talking shop than a step to continental unity, he lamented that, 'the lack of provision for an All-African High Command to give teeth to the organisation, meant that the OAU suffered from the start from inherent weaknesses'.³⁴

Whilst former advocates of unity adopted nationalism, most former French colonies had already confirmed adherence to colonial boundaries and continued close relations with the metropole. In September 1958 all French African territories with the exception of Touré's Guinea voted to accept diluted sovereignty within an abortive

³³ Nkrumah, Kwame, *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: a guide to the armed phase of the African revolution* (London: Humanities Press International, 1968), p.25.

³⁴ Quoted in *Al-Ahram Weekly* [Cairo], 19-25 July 2001.

French Community.³⁵ This willingness to accept a continued leadership role for France reflected a pan-Africanism in French Africa that had developed within a schizoid intellectual environment in which the particularity of Africa was asserted within a distinct French philosophical tradition. The construct of *négritude* as developed by Leopold Senghor incorporated all members of the black race and privileged emotion over reason. The Cartesian 'I think therefore I am', becomes 'I feel therefore I am'. As such Senghor has 'sometimes been accused of reducing the African genius to the poetic concept of the Noble Savage'.³⁶ Although much more sceptical than Senghor of the continued value of an *idée française* (Senghor was the first black member of the *Académie française*), Aimé Césaire who coined the word *négritude* is loth to entirely abandon Western liberal notions of universalism.

I'm not going to entomb myself in some strait particularism. But I don't intend either to become lost in a fleshless universalism . . . I have a different idea of a universal. It is of a universal rich with all that is particular, rich with all the particulars there are, the deepening of each particular, the coexistence of them all'.³⁷

Former French colonies, with Senegal's new President Senghor leading the way, became, and arguably remain, wedded to France for their security. Likewise, these historical relations continue to affect the conduct of peacekeeping/interventionist policy and practice in the metropole and francophone Africa.

The OAU Charter uses the word 'unity' three times and the word 'state' 59 times. Nationalism became the norm. From the OAU's inception, 'African states jettisoned the spirit of pan-Africanism and followed their seemingly individual ways'.³⁸ Calls for unity by African leaders became formulaic and aspirational. The rhetoric of unity persisted insofar as it, 'papered over the extreme reluctance of any but a small number of African

³⁵ The French Community would have granted wider autonomy to the territories, but would have left key portfolios (foreign, fiscal, judicial, mining, international transport and higher education) under effective control of the metropole; see Krasner, Stephen, *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.199.

³⁶ Mazrui, Ali, *The Africans: A Triple Heritage* (London: BBC Publications, 1986), p.74.

³⁷ Césaire, Aimé, *Lettre à Maurice Thorez* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1957), pp.6-7, pp.14-15.

³⁸ Ihonvbere, Julius O., 'Pan-Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in the 1990s', keynote address at the All-African Students' Conference, University of Guelph, Ontario, May 27, 1994.

rulers to sacrifice any of their power in the interests of any continental grouping'.³⁹ Julius Nyerere, originally an advocate of a gradual process of unification, warned of the danger of developing 'a national pride which could easily be inimical to the development of pride in Africa'.⁴⁰

Nkrumah's notion of an African High Command was largely predicated on two necessities – 'the desire to safeguard newly won independence from alleged agents of external aggression and subversion as well as the desire to rid the continent of the last vestiges of colonialism and imperialism'.⁴¹ *Intra*-state conflict was given little weight. Ali Mazrui, originally from East Africa, recognised that conflict resolution within the state would pose a greater threat to African security than external menace or conflict between states. His outlook was coloured by Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya being forced to request British military support to contain a series of army mutinies in East Africa in 1964. Mazrui saw at an early stage that the 'security' of Africans would fall within the orbit of the Cold War and the self-serving requisites of contending ideologies. Commenting on Mazrui's undogmatic stance, James Smoot Coleman refers to 'his abiding quest for a fusion of African and Western ideas in a universality that is truly equal in its origins'.⁴² Yet, Mazrui's abiding advocacy of African self-pacification is distinctly pan-African and particularist.

In the wake of the Rwandan civil war, Mazrui resuscitated the idea of an African High Command – 'Africans need institutions for pacifying each other ...in this direction I ascribe to Nkrumah's vision for a sort of pan-African emergency force which can be deployed swiftly to avert the kind of genocide we are helplessly witnessing in Africa today'.⁴³ Mazrui draws upon a set of specific mores that underpin African potential for self-pacification.⁴⁴ Yet, it is questionable whether any of these 'traditions' are particular

³⁹ Clapham, Christopher, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.106-107.

⁴⁰ Nyerere, Julius, *Freedom and Socialism! Uhuru na Ujamaa: a selection of writings and speeches, 1965-1967* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.211.

⁴¹ Zack-Williams, 'Peacekeeping and an "African High Command": Plus Ça Change, C'Est La Même Chose', *Review of African Political Economy*, 71 (1997), p.133.

⁴² Coleman, James Smoot, 'American Political Science and Tropical Africa: Universalism vs. Relativism', in Richard L. Sklar, *Nationalism and Development in Africa: Selected Essays* (London: University of California Press, 1994), p.236.

⁴³ Panafican News Agency, 'Mazrui Urges Pan-African Emergency Force for Africa', 6 November 1996.

⁴⁴ See Mazrui, Ali, 'Africa: In Search of Self-pacification', *African Affairs*, 93/ 370 (1994), pp.39-42.

to Africa. Their efficacy in the African context is equally debatable. The first is Africa's 'short memory of hate'. He cites the relative calm that followed the conclusion of the Nigerian civil war and the absence of rancour that characterises such former political prisoners as Mandela. Yet, Nigeria remains far from stable, whilst conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi is an egregious example of persistent ethnic hatred. Secondly he promotes the 'elder tradition' intimating that former leaders might play a leading role in conflict mediation following their peaceful retirement. However, few African leaders are tempted into retirement by the prospect of playing the elder statesman. Thirdly he commends Africa's 'ecumenical spirit', yet as many states suffer religious animosity, such as Nigeria, Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire as benefit from religious tolerance. Finally Mazrui applauds 'Africa's female wisdom', despite the fact that on a continental scale Africa is notable for a dearth of women politicians and diplomats.

Throughout the 1990s conflicts in Africa segued into one another undermining successive development initiatives. Calls for radical action became more insistent. African unity, long considered an idea whose time had passed was forced back on to the agenda. The impetus for change came from Libya's Muammar Qadafi. After two decades of diplomatic reversals in the Arab world, Qadafi recreated himself as a pan-Africanist. The rhetoric is suitably uplifting.

We would like to unite one thousand tribes. We should turn them into the United States of Africa. It is stupid to set up borders inside Africa. This is like going to an ocean and establishing borders. Who can erect borders on the surface of the ocean amidst the pounding waves?⁴⁵

Qadafi's strategic use of financial aid and military support throughout the continent has resulted in the OAU reinventing itself as the African Union (AU) with the apparent aim of replicating the *supra*-national status of the European Union. On 26 May 2001 the Constitutive Act of the African Union entered into force. Certainly many African leaders supported change on the presumption that the OAU, in diplomatic, economic and security terms, was effectively moribund and any new entity could do no worse. Indeed behind the paeans to African unity sung at international conferences there remains a reflexive reaction based on bitter experience that authentic union is unattainable. As early as

Nkrumah's time pan-Africanism was variously described as a 'nightmare', 'plainly chimerical' and 'the myth of Eden'.⁴⁶ As for Mazrui, Adekeye Adebajo, having attended one of his horatory lectures at Oxford University, remarked that his ideas,

[W]ould most likely be declared dead on arrival in their transmission from the theoretical walls of the Ivory Tower to African State Houses. The struggle for daily survival has an unfortunate way of forcing African leaders to be wary of visionaries. It was difficult to discern which was the more dreamy: Oxford's famous spires or Professor Ali Mazrui.⁴⁷

The most compelling case for unity is the apparent absence of a viable alternative. For ardent pan-Africanists an all-African capacity to intervene to alleviate the suffering of fellow Africans re-establishes a lost dignity. For many others it is a project born out of necessity as conflicts proliferate and the international community retreats from intervention. Beyond the fine words of pan-African orators, at the start of the twenty-first century, Benjamin Franklin's warning seems apposite - 'we must all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately'.

(b) Cosmopolitan and communitarian theories: postmodernism and the ethics of peacekeeping in Africa

The question of ethics in IR theory is controversial. Cochran contends that 'all theory in International Relations is normative theory' in that even strict positivist approaches 'cannot avoid normative assumptions in the selection of what data is important, in interpreting that data, and in articulating why such research is significant'.⁴⁸ Whilst not explicitly disagreeing with Cochran, Mervyn Frost regards IR scholars as hesitant to address ethical problems.⁴⁹ He argues that this hesitancy is itself based on two ethical positions – firstly that it is wrong to coerce people to follow an ethical code and secondly that people's autonomy should be respected. Frost considers both rationales dubious. He makes the point that 'as things presently stand, for the most part, ethical arguments about

⁴⁵ Quoted in *New Internationalist* [London], 326, August 2000.

⁴⁶ See Agyman, Opoku, 'The Osagyefo, the Mwalimu and Pan-Africanism: a Study in the Growth of a Dynamic Concept', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 13/4 (1975), p.653.

⁴⁷ *West Africa* [London], 22-28 January 1996, p.107.

⁴⁸ Cochran, op.cit., p.1.

matters pertaining to the international realm are carried out by scholars outside the discipline of IR'.⁵⁰ With this in mind it should be restated that this research is not framed within a denotive IR model. Nonetheless, international theory, and especially contemporary critical theory as applied to IR, helps order the discourse of African and non-African leaders and commentators both for and against all-African peacekeeping.

Whilst the universalist/particularist dichotomy underscores the development of thought in normative international theory, scholars have long sought to categorise traditions that inform international theory. Thomas Kuhn's theory of epochal 'paradigms' within scientific thought, and from a postmodern perspective Michel Foucault's theory of 'epistemes' underlying and limiting intellection within each historical period, assisted the process of recognising discrete and competing traditions in international theory.⁵¹ By the 1970s the debate between competing theories was widely held to have assumed a triangular configuration – the 'inter-paradigm debate' - with 'realism' at the apex and 'liberal internationalism' and 'Marxism' at the base.⁵²

Relations within Africa and between Africa and the rest of the world seemingly fitted the triangular model of the inter-paradigm debate. Even so, the *intra*-African experience *per se* was rarely used as an exemplar within IR literature. Africa's contribution to the debate was to act as a stick for dissenting theorists with which to beat the dominant realist tradition.

⁴⁹ Frost, Mervyn, 'A Turn Not Taken: Ethics in IR at the Millennium', *Review of International Studies*, 24 (1998), pp.119-132.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.132.

⁵¹ Kuhn, Thomas S., *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Foucault, Michel, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1990).

⁵² See Evans, Graham, and Newnham, Jeffrey, *Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin, 1998); realism 'focuses on the nation-state as the principal actor in international relations and its central proposition is that since the purpose of statecraft is national survival in a hostile environment the acquisition of power is the proper, rational and inevitable goal of foreign policy...stability and order are the result of skilful manipulation of flexible alliance systems: they do not stem from the authoritative force of international law or organisation which in any case is minimal', pp.465-466; liberalism holds that 'peace can best be secured through the spread of democratic institutions on a world-wide basis...if disputes continue to occur these would be settled by established judicial procedures since the rule of law is just as applicable to states as it is to individuals...collective security would replace notions of self-help', p.305; Marxism holds that 'a peaceful world order can only be achieved through attacking the domestic economic systems of the states...capitalist states will not "wither away" overnight so socialist states are created in the interim, and the conviction is that an international system of socialist states would be free of conflict since socialists agree on basic questions of resource allocation and are not tainted by the militarism which characterised the old order', p.317.

Realism, as an intuitive, 'natural view' of international relations has traditionally been held to stand in counterpoint to ideological liberal internationalism and Marxism. Nonetheless all three traditions are political theories co-opted by IR theory. They make poor paradigms in the strict sense of the term with each tradition leaking into the other semantically, theoretically, and practically. It should be noted that much contemporary thought sees the inter-paradigm debate as essentially flawed. One key objection points out that the competing 'paradigms' in international theory do not follow the rigour of Kuhn's delimitations between one self-contained paradigm and another and are merely 'schools of thought'.⁵³ In terms of intervention, and specifically peacekeeping/peace-enforcement intervention, all three traditions start from a position of non-intervention, but have historically been ambivalent about circumstances in which peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations might be sanctioned whether on grounds of self-interest, moral imperative or human emancipation. Support for regional subsidiarity in the area of peacekeeping has increased amongst advocates of all three traditions.

The collapse of the Soviet Union eviscerated Marxism as a viable position in IR theory and in so doing compromised the capacity of liberal internationalism to maintain a middle position between idealism and classical realism. Does this leave realism as the dominant and default position within theoretical IR? Scott Burchill notes that realists and neo-realists imply that 'in its present form the nation-state is a permanent feature in the international system and that the prospects for alternative expressions of political community are limited'.⁵⁴ As Barry Buzan remarks, 'the good dyed-in-the-wool realist would argue that power politics is a permanent condition of human existence'.⁵⁵ Yet Buzan, commenting from a realist perspective, recognises that whilst 'the state is still there, and to some extent, therefore, the realist logic still applies...other things have become more important and one has to judge realism in relation to the importance of

⁵³ See, Nicholson, Michael, 'Imaginary Paradigms: A sceptical view of the inter-paradigm debate in international relations', *Kent Papers in Politics and International Relations* <www.ukc.ac.uk/politics/publications/journals/kentpapers/Nicholson> accessed June 2000; see also, Waever, Ole, 'Rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate', in Smith, Booth and Zalewski, op.cit., pp.149-185.

⁵⁴ Realism is based on a certain understanding of human nature whereas neo-realism treats the international system as a separate arena that conditions the action of states within it. See, Burchill Scott, 'Realism and Neo-Realism' in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, *Theories of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1996), p.90.

⁵⁵ Buzan, Barry, Held, David and McGrew, Anthony, 'Realism vs cosmopolitanism: A debate between Barry Buzan, David Held, conducted by Anthony McGrew', *Review of International Studies*, 24 (1998), p.392.

these other areas'.⁵⁶ 'Other things' broadly refers to the increased international interconnectedness of trade, finance, migration and information often called 'globalisation', but in the African context also the phenomenon of the failed state.

The erosion of assurance amongst competing theoretical traditions and the growing complexity of the globalised environment has led to some IR scholars analysing individual autonomy and political community within the framework of postmodern or critical theory. Thus, the 'inter-paradigm debate' is reconceptualised as the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate. Of course, realism, liberal internationalism and even Marxism retain their adherents within the discipline. The debate continues. However, new ideas generated by looking at the problems of intervention from a cosmopolitan/communitarian perspective warrant attention.

For Janna Thompson the cosmopolitan position involves 'the idea that a social order must be justified in terms of how it effects the entitlements of individuals or their general welfare...independent to any commitment to any particular social relations'.⁵⁷ And again from Cochran, 'for cosmopolitans, the person is a pre-social individual born with the capacity to form a conception of the good and free to choose that conception, unencumbered by social attachments'.⁵⁸

On the other hand, the basis of the communitarian position is that 'value stems from the community, that the individual finds meaning in life by virtue of his or her membership of a political community'.⁵⁹ Mark Hoffman expands that a communitarian standpoint 'shapes our understanding of who has what legitimate rights claims and against whom those claims can be made - because the individual is constituted by the community, the demands of concrete, socially located ethics override the demands of abstract cosmopolitan morality'.⁶⁰

Africa and African sub-regions are often held to be intrinsically communitarian. Scant infrastructure restricts the ability of many Africans to travel within their own country, still less abroad. As a result, the locus of community – the village or

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.390.

⁵⁷ Thompson, Janna, *Justice and World Order: A Philosophical Enquiry* (London: Routledge, 1992), p.21.

⁵⁸ Cochran, Molly, 'Postmodernism, ethics and international theory', *Review of International Studies*, 21/3 (1995), p.243.

⁵⁹ Brown, Chris, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p.55.

neighbourhood – retains a fundamental importance in the worldview of many Africans. As previously mentioned, African cultural mores are also often taken as particular with tension between the Western liberal outlook of NGOs and donor institutions and the perspective of African recipients cited as reasons for the failure of many assistance programmes. Whilst there is some validity to these observations it should be noted that the depiction of an African attachment to community is made invariably by Western advocates of communitarianism. Clearly the isolation of many African individuals is the result of historical processes. Recent advances in information technology have deepened greatly the ability of many Africans to place themselves within a regional, continental and global setting and make judgments accordingly.

The cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches to peacekeeping intervention are not definitive. However, mirroring universalism, the cosmopolitan position is usually more admitting of intervention whereas communitarians stress the community (state/civilisation/region) as the locus of morality and thus emphasise the norm of non-intervention as the primary principle underpinning international order. The communitarian position follows the particularist stance in that ‘it embraces a moral relativism masked as prudentialism which leaves open the prospect that the mistreatment by states of their own population will trigger no external response’.⁶¹ On the other hand, ‘cosmopolitanism recognises that there may be prudential reasons which mitigate against intervention in particular circumstances’, however, ‘what differentiates it from communitarianism is that it would not be a prudentialism grounded in state autonomy’.⁶²

Where do the various organisations and states involved in African self-pacification stand along the cosmopolitan/communitarian continuum? A generalised schema of the relative cosmopolitan/communitarian outlooks of important actors as they evolved through the 1990s is illustrated in Table 1. The schema looks at relative cosmopolitan/communitarian positions from a global perspective rather than from *within* Africa. This is the perspective adopted by this research. Also, the outline applies to intervention in Africa. The attitudes of the non-African actors often differ in the case of intervention elsewhere in the world.

⁶⁰ Hoffman, op.cit., pp.29-30.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.33.

⁶² Ibid., p.34.




TABLE 1

From an institutional standpoint the UN has drifted from the professed interventionism of the Boutros-Ghali years adumbrated in *An Agenda for Peace* to a cosmopolitan prudentialism that acknowledges the reality and validity of all-African intervention. Lack of salience, as well as funding, has seen the OAU abandon its efforts to assert 'African solutions for African problems' on a consistent, continent-wide basis. The OAU has reverted to approaching individual conflicts in an *ad hoc* manner. Throughout the 1990s ECOWAS, or rather ECOWAS acting as a sub-regional collective security arrangement, has adopted an assertive communitarian position. ECOWAS, established as an economic body, has embarked on a series of peace-enforcement and peacekeeping interventions in West Africa under the designation of the ECOWAS Monitoring group (ECOMOG), albeit with mixed results. The same parallel development applies to SADC. However, the reluctance of the presumptive hegemon – South Africa – to take a lead in sub-regional conflict resolution, and the willingness of other member states to act before the ratification of a regional security framework, has undermined unity of purpose to such an extent that SADC as a body cannot be said to have evolved a strong communitarian stance.

The espoused hope for *Pax Universalis* evidenced by the commitment to peace operations in Somalia marked the Bush presidency as distinctively cosmopolitan. This

trend seemed likely to continue under the avowedly cosmopolitan Clinton. However, the reversals suffered in Somalia resulted in a volte-face by the Clinton administration. The communitarianism of the Clinton era was evidenced by the support given to enhancing African peacekeeping capacity. France, the ubiquitous *extra*-continental intervenor faced its own Somalia in Rwanda in 1994. France's role in training the *génocidaires* and its part in allowing perpetrators of genocide to escape Rwanda, as well as an economic need to lessen its military commitments in Africa has led France to support peacekeeping capacity enhancement efforts in Africa. However, French interests on the continent run deep and Paris maintains the capacity to reverse policy and revert to a cosmopolitan posture. Britain, despite its ties with Africa, has traditionally been unwilling to intervene directly in conflict on the continent, instead offering bilateral and regional training and support in peacekeeping techniques. Britain has joined the US and France in supporting peacekeeping capacity building programmes. Even so, the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair has been willing to adopt a cosmopolitan stance on occasion as demonstrated by the unilateral intervention of British troops in the Sierra Leone civil war. The succeeding chapters will consider in greater depth the moral and political bases underpinning the policies of these key actors.

(c) Sovereignty and intervention

The previous section addressed argument *between* cosmopolitans and communitarians and *within* these scholarly schools of thought as to the ambit and orbit of peace intervention. These disputes are built upon and informed by debate over the current status of state sovereignty as the basis for international relations. Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations are inextricably linked with the idea of sovereignty. For Cynthia Weber, 'discourses of intervention always imply discourses of sovereignty'.⁶³

The UN Charter, in Article 2 (7) states bluntly that nothing contained in it shall authorise the UN to intervene in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. However, as argued in the previous chapter, the idea of external intervention in a conflict to secure peace is nonetheless widely admitted within the current international

⁶³ Weber, Cynthia, 'Reconsidering statehood: examining the sovereignty/intervention boundary', *Review of International Studies* 18/3 (1992), p.201.

environment. Indeed, the UN Charter half-contradicts itself by saying that this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The terms intervention and sovereignty and the concepts and realities that they represent have proved temporally and geographically mutable. Jens Bartelson asserts that sovereignty is historically open, contingent and unstable.⁶⁴ As critical theoreticians and relativists both Weber and Bartelson argue that given its inherent contingency, the concept of sovereignty is indefinable.⁶⁵ From this point of view, cultural norms obtaining at different times and places in pre-colonial Africa produced distinctive conceptions of state, territory and frontier. Africa was not *terra nullius*. Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce demonstrates that, given pre-colonial Africa's many sophisticated political units, the Eurocentric view that Africa was devoid of state organisation and in a legal vacuum is not supported by evidence.⁶⁶ Several pre-colonial states had *extra*-African diplomatic relations. In the sixteenth century Benin exchanged Ambassadors with Portugal, Bornu with Turkey and Kongo with Portugal and Italy. However, a vital element of the international system as it developed in Europe, fixed *inter*-state borders, was largely absent in Africa. Although a few states evolved a permeable demarcation of territory, such as between the Yoruba state and Dahomey and between Buganda and its neighbours, the norm was for contiguous territories to develop a fluid frontier or buffer zone. Referring to pre-colonial borders, Derek Fay submits that 'the map would need to be drawn not with straight lines, but with an airbrush, to reflect gradations in population density and hence the scope of power'.⁶⁷ Other communities fell within the spreading Dar el-Islam, within which the concept of territorial sovereignty and Islamic precepts loosely resembled the *supra*-national reach of Christianity in medieval Europe. These structures were effectively eradicated by the 'scramble for Africa' in the late nineteenth century. The subsequent dismemberment of the continent amongst the colonising powers that followed the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 superimposed a cracked patina of

⁶⁴ Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

⁶⁵ For a critique of this position see Hoffman, John, 'Can We Define Sovereignty?', *Politics* 17/1 (1997), pp.53-58.

⁶⁶ Wallace-Bruce, Nii Lante, *Claims to Statehood in International Law* (New York: Carleton Press, 1994).

⁶⁷ Fay, Derek, 'Reconfiguring African maps', H-Africa Discussion Network <www2.h-net.msu.edu/~africa> 23 October 1997.

administrative cantons over the map of Africa with scarcely any thought given to their ethnic composition.

The ensuing search for independence from foreign domination was through necessity conducted within the bounds of the system of international relations as it had developed in the West. One strand of Western thought was the notion of Westphalian sovereignty.⁶⁸ The model rests on the norm that states exist within their own specific territories and that the domestic authorities remain the sole arbiters of affairs within those boundaries. A further strand was the idea of self-determination. This doctrine that the Versailles Treaty had endorsed for European national minorities, but which the League of Nations had avoided, was resuscitated with the inception of the UN Charter in 1945. Post-war dominance of anti-imperial thought – ‘the dual legacy of Wilsonian and Marxist ideas and of the latent force of incipient decolonisation’ - saw a melding of the contradictory elements of self-determination with state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention.⁶⁹ Open-ended political and moral ideals found the necessary and practical bounds of legal codification. Africa’s anti-colonial leaders took Article 73 of the Charter and its supplements as an ineluctable opportunity to oust their imperial masters. However, by embracing the international rules of the game, Africa’s new leaders were accepting two potential brakes on future continental security. Firstly, an inherent impulse for stability within the international system dictates that new states created by the dissolution of empire should not be allowed to descend into chronic self-deterministic reduction. Yet almost every new state was ethnically heterogeneous. Secondly, given the parlous state of institutional and infrastructural capacity bequeathed to Africa by the colonial powers, many new states could neither effectively control their territory and populace, nor defend the territory against external attack. In Robert Jackson’s terms, they could not exert ‘positive sovereignty’.⁷⁰

Initially, security concerns seemed overstated. Westphalian sovereignty and UN-sponsored collective security seemed to provide a measure of stability in Africa. There was little serious *inter*-state conflict. However, as previously argued, the UN’s response to *intra*-

⁶⁸ Named after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) although historically inaccurate since the precepts of the model were not articulated until the end of the eighteenth century. The term, nonetheless, remains in common usage.

⁶⁹ Osterud, Oyvind, ‘The narrow gate: entry to the club of sovereign states’, *Review of International Studies* 23/2 (1997), p.175.

state conflict was incoherent. The use of enforcement in Congo in 1961 clearly contravened the principle of non-intervention. However, it emphasised a consensus within the UN that existing boundaries should be preserved. Legal codification of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states within their borders was given by the OAU Charter. The political background for this codification and the ramifications for the organisation will be considered in Chapter Three.

For its time, sovereign statehood in Africa served as a convenient myth. Stephen Krasner argues that historically the acceptance of the idea of sovereignty has *always* been part of an 'organised hypocrisy' – that 'there has never been some ideal time during which all, or even most, political entities conformed with all of the characteristics associated with sovereignty'.⁷¹ Yet the myth endured. However, throughout the 1980s, the continent was increasingly economically and politically marginalised, exacerbating the bases of conflict, especially *within* the state.⁷² As Clapham observes, 'it was only when the gap between the myth and the reality started to have very damaging consequences for large numbers of people, and when the structure of international power which upheld that myth collapsed, that it came to be seriously questioned'.⁷³

Although an enduring caution continues to colour the discussion of sovereignty in Africa, many African scholars and practitioners are increasingly willing to accept, at least in an abstract sense, that issues of good governance and human rights bear upon the legal construct of absolute sovereignty. Solomon Gomes, a former Special Affairs Officer for the OAU mission at the UN, recognises a growing willingness for African leaders to reconsider the idea of sovereignty.⁷⁴ Francis Deng, a Sudanese scholar, politician and diplomat, is more direct stating that, 'absolute sovereignty is clearly no longer defensible;

⁷⁰ Jackson, Robert, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.25.

⁷¹ Krasner, op.cit., p.238.

⁷² Obasanjo, Olusegun, 'A Balance Sheet of the African Region and the Cold War', in Edmund J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp.15-25.

⁷³ Clapham, 'Africa and the International System', op.cit., p.19.

⁷⁴ Gomes, Solomon, 'The OAU, State Sovereignty and Regional Security', in Edmund J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp.37-51.

it never was'.⁷⁵ Deng emphasises that it is responsible government that legitimises claims to sovereignty, both domestically and internationally. Failure or incapacity of a national authority to safeguard the well-being of its population might trigger external or regional intervention.⁷⁶ Moreover, both Gomes and Deng tacitly accept that levels of internal conflict in Africa coupled with unilateral intervention by states for selfish gain with resulting pressure on, or collapse of, *de facto* sovereignty, has also corroded the status of *de jure* sovereignty. Thus, continent-specific pressures, as well as the global trend toward *supra*-nationality foreshadowed by the EU and the end of the Cold War, have subverted the claim to sovereign territorial inviolability by African states.

(d) Humanitarian intervention and the just war tradition

Growing acceptance of the limitations of *de jure* sovereignty seemingly advantages the cosmopolitan position. Kurt Mills asserts that 'the focus of discussion needs to move from states as objects of intervention and their right not to be intervened in, toward the subjects of humanitarian action – people – and their rights outside any narrow view of state sovereignty as well as their place within the broader international community'.⁷⁷ If this humanitarian *right*, or even *duty*, to intervene does exist, how does it fit within extant legal and ethical norms?

The importance of legal and moral boundaries is brought into relief by the assumed political nature of peacekeeping intervention in Africa. Despite claims, usually by external intervenors, that peacekeeping in Africa is inherently altruistic, it is always possible to discern some self-serving motivation for intervention. Alain Destexhe emphasises that, 'with the exception of natural disasters, humanitarian action is always deployed on political battlefields'.⁷⁸ This pronouncement, from a supporter of the *droit d'ingérence*, echoes Carl von Clausewitz' celebrated aphorism that war is 'a continuation

⁷⁵ Deng, Francis M., 'Reconciling Sovereignty with Responsibility: A Basis for International Humanitarian Action', in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, *Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges* (Boulder: Westview, 1995), p.301.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.307.

⁷⁷ Mills, Kurt, 'Sovereignty Eclipsed?: The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Access and Intervention', *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* <www.jha.ac/articles/a019> posted 3 June 2000.

⁷⁸ Destexhe, Alain, 'Holding Humanitarianism Hostage: The Politics of Rescue', in Joel H. Rosenthal, *Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1999), p.346.

of political commerce...by other means'.⁷⁹ The comparison between the regulation of war and the regulation of peacekeeping, or more specifically peace-enforcement, has been made.⁸⁰ To what extent is the application of traditional laws and mores of war as a pattern for the evolving rules of peacekeeping/peace-enforcement valid?

Laws of war and the morality of war are distinct categories and remain distinct when applied to peace operations. International law comprises customary law and law based on treaties and conventions. Clearly international law operates in a less distinct environment than most national legal systems. Treaties and conventions lack sovereign authority and are often challenged. Likewise the judicial system set up to determine compliance in international law is underdeveloped and often disesteemed. Even so, Christopher Greenwood commends international law as 'not something that has been thought up in ivory towers', but is 'essentially based on the practice of states'.⁸¹ Burke Hendrix notes that despite its difficulties as an integral moral theory, international law 'does provide some principles of organisation for an otherwise amorphous international political environment, meaning that the pragmatic considerations in its favour may be quite strong'.⁸² Hendrix, however, argues that ethical demands far exceed the current legal disposition with its competing principles of self-determination and territorial integrity. In this he echoes Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith who remark that 'ethical concepts of justice reach further than legal concepts of justice'.⁸³ Moreover, operations such as the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the French intervention in Rwanda created precedents for justifying a humanitarian right of intervention that 'over-inflated international humanitarian law to a point where the law has been brought into disrepute'.⁸⁴ Moral debate, which can inform the law, but springs from deeper ethical,

⁷⁹ Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War* (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1997), p.22.

⁸⁰ Crevel, Martin van, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Macmillan, 1991); Smith, Dan, 'Interventionist Dilemmas and Justice' in Anthony McDermott, *Humanitarian Force*, PRIO Report, 4 (1997); De Jonge Oudraat, Chantal, 'Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Legal and Political Conundrums', *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Papers*, 15 (2000).

⁸¹ Quoted in the *Telegraph* [London] 6 December 2001.

⁸² Hendrix, Burke A., 'International Law as a Moral Theory of State Territory', *Geopolitics*, 6/2 (2001), p.158.

⁸³ Fixdal Mona, and Smith, Dan, 'Humanitarian Intervention and Just War', *Mershon International Studies Review*, 42 (1998), p.298.

⁸⁴ De Waal, Alex (ed.), *Who Fights? Who Cares?: War and Humanitarian Action in Africa* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2000), p.210.

indeed theological, roots offers less restrictive criteria for when and how intervention might take place.

Orthodox peacekeeping operations that uphold the Hammerskjold-Pearson principles, especially consent, impartiality and the use of force only for self-defence, are usually held to be less ethically and legally contentious than peace-enforcement operations. Canadian Colonel James Allen emphasises that,

[O]nce violence erupts the peacekeeper must often wait until the smoke of battle clears and the parties have agreed to their first steps toward conflict resolution. In cases where the fighting does not stop and a decision is taken to intervene regardless, we are no longer talking about peacekeeping, but rather enforcement, intervention or plain old war. Whatever, we call it we are in a totally different province from peacekeeping.⁸⁵

Nonetheless, Michael Doyle's observation that 'consent is not a simple "bright line" demarcating the safe and acceptable from the dangerous and illegitimate' is well taken.⁸⁶ As Doyle points out, in an environment of 'partisan violence and "failed states" even consent-based agreements fall apart'.⁸⁷ Berdal comments that, 'quite clearly consent is not an absolute quality...the margin of consent that does exist in "messy" or "grey" operational environments can be enlarged and built upon by an enterprising outside force'.⁸⁸

The plausibility of orthodox peacekeeping *per se* has been questioned. Writing in 1997, Thomas Baines argued that 'based on the UN's recent record of peacekeeping missions nearly all of the stated elements of a peacekeeping operation will be non-attainable in any actual circumstances'.⁸⁹ Yet, whilst accepting that a pristine peacekeeping intervention is unrealisable, it is worth preserving the distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement for the sake of clarity. Although the ECOMOG operation in Guinea-Bissau stretched the principles of orthodox peacekeeping, there is a

⁸⁵ Allen, James H., *Peacekeeping: Outspoken Observations by a Field Officer* (Westport: Praeger, 1996), p.

⁸⁶ Doyle, Michael W., 'The New Interventionism', *Metaphilosophy* 32/1-2 (2001), p.225.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.226.

⁸⁸ Berdal, *op.cit.*, p.70.

⁸⁹ Baines, Thomas, 'The Laws of War and the Rules of Peacekeeping', paper presented to The Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, National Defence University, Washington DC, 30 January 1997, p.5.

qualitative difference between that intervention and the same organisation's intent and practice during the operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

When intervention oversteps the strictures of the Hammerskjold-Pearson principles can the traditional criteria invoked to justify war be used to justify peace-enforcement? In attempting to explain the connection between war and politics traditional criteria encompass both ethical notions and legal principles. Nicholas Rengger classes three 'ideal' positions governing this relationship – pacificism (that war is never legitimate), necessity (that any act is permissible in war) and the just war tradition (that war and the conduct of war requires legitimisation).⁹⁰ Rengger recognises that these traditions have been formulated largely within Western experience, but argues that non-Western traditions are similarly framed.

The dominant position, largely developed by Christian scholars of later antiquity and the late scholastics of the seventeenth century, is the just war tradition. The tradition re-emerged as the basis for debate during the second half of the twentieth century as a response to political upheavals and military/technological advances.⁹¹ Just war tradition comprises two standards of action – the *jus ad bellum* or the just initiation of combat and the *jus in bello* or the just prosecution of war. These criteria stand independently. A just war may be fought using unjust methods, whilst an unjust war might be conducted under the rules of war.

Dan Smith notes that whilst efforts have been made to introduce just war criteria into the peacekeeping debate, its suitability remains moot. Nonetheless he acknowledges three reasons why war and intervention to establish peace stand close comparison. Firstly both war and intervention are 'inescapably ethical'; secondly both 'can have harmful consequences'; and thirdly by recognising the imperfection of the human world they both acknowledge 'politics and the reality of power'.⁹²

Modern conceptions of the *jus in bello* concentrate on two norms. *Discrimination* dictates that non-combatants be given immunity and protection. *Proportionality* dictates

⁹⁰ Rengger, Nicholas, 'On the just war tradition in the twenty-first century', *International Affairs* 78/2 (2002), p.354.

⁹¹ The use of just war tradition to determine the justification for enforcing peace follows debates over, *inter alia*, the destruction of cities during World War II and whether the US was right to intervene in the Vietnam war.

⁹² Smith, op.cit., p.28.

that military action should do more good than harm. The standards of the *jus in bello* when applied to peace operations have a bearing on the classification of those operations. In particular they help to discern the crucial nexus between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, but also to pick out the point at which a peace-enforcement intervention becomes outright war. Yet, current practice of the *jus in bello* within the context of humanitarian intervention also ‘threatens to occlude the important distinction between the laws of war’.⁹³ As Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar comment, ‘military intervention has its own logic, which is difficult to reconcile with the demands of peacemaking and construction’.⁹⁴ As Chapter VII intervention increasingly becomes the norm commanders of peace-enforcement operations are tempted by the doctrine of ‘military necessity’ to use all available means to achieve a ‘victory’ regardless of the constraints of the *jus in bello*. The UN operation in Somalia set a precedent by granting itself exemption from the Geneva Conventions. Indeed one UN lawyer at the time unofficially suggested that it might be illegal for a Somali national to fire on UN troops even in self-defence.⁹⁵ The resulting tendency for multilateral interventions acting under a Security Council mandate to use that mandate to disregard international conventions and customary law has not yet been tested by an international tribunal.

Assessing the *jus in bello* as applied to UN operations, Amnesty International also detects a growing assumption of impunity by UN forces. AI strongly recommends that it is made explicit to force commanders that proportionality in the context of a humanitarian intervention, even acting under a Chapter VII mandate, means using force only to avert immediate danger. In particular, ‘it [the use of force] cannot relate to the mission’s overall military objectives, as the peacekeeping soldiers are not fighting a war with military aims’.⁹⁶ In the context of UNOSOM, issues of both *proportionality* and *discrimination* were clearly involved when the Security Council authorised ‘all necessary measures’ to deal with those responsible for attacks on UN troops. Similar issues apply in the case of the conduct of ECOMOG troops in Liberia and Sierra Leone. These cases

⁹³ De Waal, Alex, ‘Humanitarian Juggernaut’, *London Review of Books*, 22 June 1995, p.10.

⁹⁴ De Waal, Alex and Omaar, Rakiya, ‘Can Military Intervention Be Humanitarian?’, *Middle East Report*, March-June (1994), p.3.

⁹⁵ De Waal, ‘Humanitarian Juggernaut’, p.11.

⁹⁶ Amnesty International, ‘Peacekeeping and Human Rights’, AI Index: IOR 40/01/04, 1 January 1994, p.21.

emphasise the need for independence in verifying the just conduct of a peace operation. The UN, and one step removed, the OAU and other African SROs involved in peace operations have, or are in the process of developing, commissions on human rights, as well as wider judicial competence. There is the trenchant question of *quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* There are calls for an ‘independent body made up of the international and local community to monitor the neutrality of and respect for human rights by the intervention forces’.⁹⁷ Ian Martin, a former Secretary-General of AI commends the human rights movement as having ‘the principles and the impartiality to contribute to the definition of criteria for legitimate intervention...it must work to develop the effectiveness of the UN and regional organisations in mounting and fully controlling such interventions’.⁹⁸

The *jus in bello* criteria when applied to peacekeeping, in general, have been given less prominence in the literature than *jus ad bellum* criteria.⁹⁹ Rengger makes the point that the codification of just war criteria in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ‘concentrated on what it was permissible to do in war rather than under what circumstances war should be waged’.¹⁰⁰ However, since then, international treaties and conventions governing the conduct of war have led to ‘legal instantiation and military habituation’.¹⁰¹ The founding of the UN and the proliferation of international human rights legislation after World War II ignited debate within an ambivalent political culture as to when it was just to *initiate* ‘humane’ war. The issue of humanitarian intervention both resuscitated and has become subsumed by the *jus ad bellum*. Walzer outlines the conundrum.

Massacre, rape, ethnic cleansing, state terrorism, contemporary versions of “bastard feudalism”, complete with ruthless warlords and lawless bands of armed men: these are the acts and occasions that invite us, or require us, to override the presumption against moving armies across borders and using force inside countries that have not threatened or attacked their neighbours... When should the world’s agents and powers merely watch and protest? When should they protest and then intervene?¹⁰²

⁹⁷ De Waal and Omaar, op.cit., p.8.

⁹⁸ Martin, Ian, ‘The New World Order: Opportunity or Threat to Human Rights?’, the Edward A. Smith Lecture, Harvard Law School, September 1997.

⁹⁹ Fixdal and Smith, op.cit., p.294.

¹⁰⁰ Rengger, op.cit., p.356.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.358.

¹⁰² Walzer, Michael, ‘The Politics of Rescue’, *Social Research*, 62/1 (1995), p.58.

Chantal de Jonge Oudraat argues that ‘just war theories and their criteria provide a useful analytical framework for thinking about conditions under which interventions should be allowed.’¹⁰³ Following other scholars of just war theory she outlines seven established criteria by which war might be considered just.

- *Right authority* – which actor has the authority to decide on war?
- *Just cause* – is the cause legitimate?
- *Right intention* – what are the motives behind the launching of the war?
- *Last resort* – have other actions been considered?
- *Open declaration* – did war start with a declaration?
- *Proportionality* – is the act of war proportional to the harm inflicted?
- *Reasonable hope* – is there a reasonable chance for a successful conclusion?¹⁰⁴

The translation of four just war principles – *right intention*, *open declaration*, *proportionality* and *reasonable hope* - to intervention criteria is straightforward insofar as transgression within the context of a peace-enforcement operation mirrors that within the context of war. *Right intention* is designed to guarantee clarity of motive when initiating war. The object of a peace-enforcement intervention is always seemingly clear – the attainment of peace. As previously argued, however, all such operations have secondary motives. Even so, a clear distinction should be made between a hidden agenda that acts as the intervenor’s primary motivation such as the French intervention in Rwanda in 1994 and to a lesser extent Nigerian intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone as part of ECOMOG and secondary motivations that are less urgent and more opportunistic such as the behaviour of some of the contingents during the ECOMOG operation in Guinea-Bissau. These cases pose questions of regional/state security and/or hegemonic interest. Mills holds that ‘as long as the humanitarian motives are still primary and not ancillary or used as a pretext for intervention, security interests, such as regional stability, may be present’.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ De Jonge Oudraat, op.cit., p.9.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p.9; see also Smith, op.cit., pp.28-32; Fixdal and Smith, op.cit., pp.283-312; Dower, op.cit., pp.115-136; Coates, Anthony, *The Ethics of War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp.123-223.

¹⁰⁵ Mills, op.cit.

Open declaration developed in the just war tradition to signal the transition from a state of affairs in which lethal aggression was prohibited to one in which it was permissible. In the context of this research, there is a presumption that intervention follows political discussion in the UN Security Council and/or within the security mechanisms of regional organisations involved. As such the status of the intervention and the broad rules of engagement *should* be transparent. Rapid escalation from an ambiguous peacekeeping mandate to a peace-enforcement stance such as during ONUC or the ECOMOG operation in Liberia could be held to be a breach of *open declaration*. The principle of *open declaration* becomes a key issue in unilateral interventions with avowedly primary humanitarian motivation such as the Tanzanian intervention into Uganda in 1978-1979.

Proportionality and *reasonable hope* in the context of peace-enforcement are connected. Smith notes that both principles 'are – or should be – an integral part of the planning of any humanitarian intervention...their absence in planning portends, if not disaster, at least ineffectuality'.¹⁰⁶ Distinctively utilitarian, *proportionality* in the resort to war reaffirms in a wider sense the same precept as in the conduct of war - that interventions should do more good than harm. Fixdal and Smith remark that 'arguments about intervention often dispute the size of canvas on which the picture of an action and its consequences should be painted'.¹⁰⁷ They note that the central problem of consequentialism, one which quantitative analysis aims to solve, is that assessment is generally 'more a matter of speculation than calculation'.¹⁰⁸ The UNOSOM operation stands as a case in point with some commentators commending the alleviation of suffering and others emphasising both the entrenchment of clan enmity in Somalia and the damage done to the standing of the UN, the US and the concept of humanitarian intervention. Nigerian General E. A. Erskine has argued that the 'the cumulative effect of this massive international intervention by humanitarian and relief agencies has been the total eradication of starvation and suffering among the Somali people...due credit should go to UNITAF and the international humanitarian and relief organisations for restoring

¹⁰⁶ Smith, op.cit., p.32.

¹⁰⁷ Fixdal and Smith, op.cit., p.306.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.307.

sanity and life back to Somalia',¹⁰⁹ Taking a contrary position Gérard Dive concludes that 'where UNOSOM was able to establish itself, the humanitarian object was reached, but of the other three main objectives, re-establishing security, national reconciliation and the repatriation of refugee and displaced persons, only the last one was satisfactorily achieved'.¹¹⁰

Reasonable hope in a just war context concerns feasibility of military action. This translates in the context of peace operations to the tenability of mandate, the strength of political resolve and the capacity both to see through the intervention militarily and withstand potential failure. Inappropriate mandates have hobbled many interventions. In the African context, the OAU intervention in Chad and the ECOMOG intervention discussed in later chapters are cases in point. Several commentators have warned against optimistic intervention, emphasising that, given the high cost of failure for both peacekeeper and peacekept, calculations concerning intervention should always err on the side of caution.¹¹¹

The principle of *right authority* centres on state sovereignty and much of the argument has been covered in the previous section. The principle also rekindles the argument as to the right and/or duty of states to intervene to meliorate suffering and/or persecution in other states. Debate over the right of a sovereign power to wage war on another sovereign power has a long history predating the Peace of Westphalia. Francisco Suarez argued against the right of a sovereign 'to punish injuries over the whole world', whilst Hugo Grotius supported a right, but not a duty, to intervene in the face of injustice and aggression.¹¹² Smith recognises that the 1990s saw a distinct switch within the international community from Saurez' position toward that of Grotius.¹¹³ However,

¹⁰⁹ Erskine, E.A., *Peacekeeping Techniques for Africa's Conflict Management* (Accra: Afram Publications, 2000), p.194;

¹¹⁰ Dive, Gérard, 'An Analysis of UN Operations: Objectives, Means and Implementation, and Results' in King Baudouin Foundation/MSF, *Conflicts in Africa: An Analysis of Crisis and Crisis Prevention Measures* (Brussels: GRIP, 1997), pp178-182.

¹¹¹ Barnett, op.cit., pp.411-433.

¹¹² See Smith, op.cit, p.31.

¹¹³ Two types of humanitarian intervention in which *right authority* is, arguably, not applicable are cases where governments or leaders have accepted UN intervention in the context of a ceasefire agreement and in the case of a failed state, such as Somalia during UNOSOM, where there is no government and no sovereignty to be breached. See, Lyons, Gene and Mastanduno, Michael., 'State Sovereignty and International Intervention: Reflections on the Present and Prospects for the Future', in G.Lyons and M.Mastanduno (eds.), *Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International Intervention* (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore,

unlike Deng and Gomes, Smith does not perceive incremental interventionism as 'marking a fundamental historical shift', at least not in the short to medium term.¹¹⁴ He makes the point that there is scope for an *ad hoc* approach – 'while the just war tradition indicates the lasting sensitivity of the issue of sovereignty and intervention, it warns against attempting to tackle the issue on the basis of large, abstract principles...the political injunction not to abuse sovereignty is important, but like the moral commandment not to kill, it does not resolve everything'.¹¹⁵ This stance is supported, from an explicitly legalistic position, by Greenwood.

To accept that humanitarian intervention can be lawful in some circumstances does not address the practical problems that may arise...it is easier to embark upon intervention than to end it. The scope for abuse of a right of humanitarian intervention remains as large today as in the past.¹¹⁶

From Deng and Gomes' perspective as African practitioners experiencing the failed state and civil conflict *in extremis* a majority of cases might seem amenable to *right authority*. However, the question of who should be the agent or agents of intervention poses further questions. In the context of all-African peace operations, with unilateral interventions set aside, the agent would be either the OAU or a SRO. Logistical and financial constraints notwithstanding, if the norm of sovereignty has been diluted to such an extent that the majority of civil wars become susceptible to intervention then clearly intervening organisations will include members who themselves will be objects or potential objects of intervention. There are several examples of this discrepancy occurring during all-African interventions.¹¹⁷ Given the level of instability on the continent this problem seems insurmountable in the medium term.

The criterion of *last resort* tends to be the most controversial just war principle when applied to peace operations. The use of force only after other methods have failed is

1995), p264; Zartman, I. William, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p.32; Deng, op.cit.; Gomes, op.cit.

¹¹⁵ Smith, op.cit., p.32.

¹¹⁶ Greenwood, Christopher, 'Is there a right of humanitarian intervention?' *The World Today*, February (1993), p.40.

¹¹⁷ *Inter alia*, there was a coup d'état in Niger whilst a Nigerien contingent was serving with ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau, Chad sent a contingent to serve with MISAB whilst a serious rebellion was taking place in northern Chad.

a moral imperative. Nonetheless, it is arguable that on a prudential and utilitarian level, as well as in terms of international law, force might be used prior to exhausting all other alternatives. Mills stresses that ‘there might be instances where, because the threat is so massive and the situation is evolving so rapidly, that there might not be time to implement a wide array of other measures before resorting to more forceful action’.¹¹⁸ The cases of the several Balkans conflicts and the Rwandan genocide have led many scholars to advocate early intervention as a means to prevent escalation.¹¹⁹ Once more the issue of sovereignty is relevant insofar as early intervention would clearly take place prior to state collapse and whilst the government of the conflictual state maintains a measure of control. If preventive intervention becomes the norm then *last resort*, by definition, ceases to apply. Smith suggests *best available means* as a more accurate contemporary description of principle.¹²⁰ Moreover, *last resort* whether applied to war or peace operations is not strictly chronological – it is possible to negotiate whilst still preparing for military intervention. In essence, a current reading of the *last resort* principle urges contemplation of alternatives before recourse to arms.

Just cause as a criterion in the just war tradition is based on a response to harm committed. Moreover, ‘the classical tradition stresses defence of the innocent as a just cause’.¹²¹ The principle of *just cause* questions the bases for the frequent calls for ‘something to be done’ about conflict, and conflicts, in Africa. A sense of anger often clouds relative justice beneath condemnatory rhetoric. Yet, ‘moral anger cannot itself furnish a sense of *just cause*...an action based on a just cause must itself be just, relevant and effective’.¹²² Genocide clearly falls under the *just cause* principle. Other atrocities, whether imminent or ongoing, are also increasingly being accepted as just cause for intervention both on a moral basis and within customary international law. Walzer stresses the moral convictions of ordinary people rather than national leaders or international bureaucrats when assessing justification for intervention. In particular he returns to the phraseology of the UN Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the reference to acts ‘that shock the conscience of mankind’.

¹¹⁸ Mills, op.cit.

¹¹⁹ See Destexhe, op.cit., p.347.

¹²⁰ Smith, op.cit., p.32.

¹²¹ Fixdal and Smith, op.cit., p.298.

I don't think that there is any moral reason to adopt that posture of passivity that might be called waiting for the UN (waiting for the universal state, waiting for the messiah)...Any state capable of stopping the slaughter has a right at least to try to do so. The legalist paradigm indeed rules out such efforts, but that only suggests that the paradigm, unrevised, cannot account for the moral realities of military intervention.¹²³

Michael O'Hanlon makes the point that 'given the highly political and case-specific nature of military interventions, only a case-by-case analysis can resolve the question of when and how to intervene'.¹²⁴ He expands,

[I]t is not appropriate to use force to settle every conflict in the world. Some conflicts might even be exacerbated by external involvement. Some might be so intractable as not to justify the investment in effort, dollars and the blood of international peacekeepers that would be required to stop them. Others are not severe enough to warrant forcible intervention. While they might merit international diplomatic attention, and possibly the deployment of peacekeepers if ceasefires can be established, they cannot justify deployment of many thousands of troops in a muscular mission. However, the international community can generally do something about the world's worst wars.¹²⁵

At what point should a crisis trigger intervention? Codifying a minimum mortality rate for intervention is fraught with problems. Such codification might encourage an increase in violence by one or other combatant to induce intervention. Moreover, such international legislation circumscribes a universal moral imperative to intervene to address human suffering. Nonetheless, O'Hanlon and former US Congressman Stephen Solarz have addressed the issue on a hypothetical basis with reference to the ethical foundations of US intervention and non-intervention throughout the 1990s. The Solarz-O'Hanlon formula proposes US intervention when the mortality rate in the target state significantly exceeds the US murder rate. The premise is based on the rationales that resources should be used where most lives can be saved and that the US has no moral

¹²² Ibid., p.233.

¹²³ Walzer, Michael, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (London: Allen Lane, 1977), pp.107-108.

¹²⁴ O'Hanlon, Michael, 'Saving Lives with Force: An Agenda for Expanding the ACRI', *Journal of International Affairs*, 55/2 (2002), p.293.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p.292.

duty to make other countries' societies safer than its own.¹²⁶ Applying the formula, O'Hanlon concludes that the US, and its allies, were right to have participated in interventions in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, albeit belatedly and with limited success, and should have intervened in Rwanda, Sudan and Liberia. Intervention in Chechnya and North Korea although justified by application of the formula are deemed inappropriate on prudential grounds. Thus, by O'Hanlon's reckoning, the US was intervening in half the conflicts as would have been ideal – 'part of the reason for this mediocre track record was lack of international political will, and part was the lack of military capacity among those states that did have the political will'.¹²⁷ That the three conflicts isolated by O'Hanlon as neglected by the US were located in Africa is a persuasive argument for African leaders to develop the capacity for intervention.

Conclusion

There is an implication in the hypothesis that if Africans do not intervene in African conflicts then it is unlikely that anyone else will. Why should this be so? Further, if this imperative exists when and how should all-African intervention occur? The chapter has examined some of the ideas that inform the current trend toward all-African intervention, as well as considering justification for intervention.

Fundamental to the argument is the distinction between the universal and the particular. Advocates of both positions exist in Africa and beyond Africa. Dialogue in the universalist-particularist debate is often framed within human rights discourse. Much discussion concerns distinctions such as the difference between human *rights* and human *dignity* and the related dichotomy between the 'thick' morality found within cultures and the 'thin' morality shared by all 'thick' moralities. The universalist position is more allowing of intervention, whilst particularism is more cautious.

Disengagement by the traditional intervening powers has been influenced by, and in turn influenced, the ascendancy of the particularist position. The end of the Cold War saw the end of Africa's strategic leverage. The 'new world order' proved highly fragile.

¹²⁶ Solarz, Stephen J., and O'Hanlon, Michael E., 'Humanitarian Intervention: When Is Force Justified?' *The Washington Quarterly* Autumn (1997) pp. 3–14.

¹²⁷ O'Hanlon. *op cit* p 295.

UN/US reversals in Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda have re-enforced the notion, especially in the US, of the particular, intractable nature of African conflict. Even so, the relative positions of those involved with conflict resolution – African or non-African – are rarely absolute. Political expediency and unforeseen circumstances often dictate action. By these lights, Kwasi Wiredu's point that 'human beings cannot live by particulars or universals alone, but by some combination of both' is well taken.¹²⁸

A universal impulse for international intervention to alleviate suffering and create security and stability has scarcely disappeared. It has advocates within the UN, African international and regional organisations, individual governments and NGOs. Yet, it is telling that a champion of the universalist cause such as Michael Ignatieff is concerned about the current environment of 'moral disgust'. It is within this environment that the particularist argument has flourished. Certainly the pan-African movement has retained its own adherents keen to stress the dignity of self-help, emphasising Africa's 'difference' and ready to revive Nkrumah's notion of an 'African High Command'. Yet should any such institution see the light of day it will more likely be the result of the West's neglect constraining African leaders to assume the onus for self-policing. This neglect results from the concretisation of the particularist position in the West, notably in the US. The apocalyptic prose of Kaplan and the more measured but equally pessimistic analysis of Huntington have influenced governments of both political persuasions in Washington.

How do the universalist/particularist beliefs translate into political or IR 'paradigms', probably best understood as 'points of view'? The implosion of the Soviet Union devalued Marxism as an idea in IR and thus compromised the continued validity of a one-sided 'debate' between a triumphalist realism and liberal democracy. Critical theory working within a postmodern global environment reconceptualised the debate as between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. These positions are related to the notions of universalism and particularism. The cosmopolitan stresses the entitlements of individuals, whereas communitarianism understands value to lie within the 'community' which might be regional, sub-regional, linguistic, ethnic etc. When applied to peace operations, the cosmopolitan will usually accept broader criteria, for example the

¹²⁸ Wiredu, *op.cit.*, p.9.

subversion of human *rights* rather than the demolition of human *dignity*, as justification for intervention. The communitarian often adopts a relativist position preferring to privilege the 'thick' morality of discrete 'communities'. In the context of this research this has translated into a growing acceptance by the traditional intervening powers, and in turn by African leaders and organisations, that the logic of Chapter VIII subsidiarity should be accepted and promoted. The US has 'come round' to the Nkrumahist notion that Africa is indeed 'different' and therefore is best placed to address its own problems within its own cultural milieu. The marked shift from the avowedly cosmopolitan stance of the Bush and early Clinton administrations to post-Somalia communitarianism was a juncture in the shift toward African leaders being impelled to develop the capacity for all-African peace operations.

If regionalisation of conflict resolution – African states consistently taking the lead in intervention on the continent – is to move beyond the *ad hoc* and become the norm then the principle of state sovereignty must be reformulated in law and practice. In Africa the principle of absolute sovereignty – in particular the notion of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state - has been inviolable since the establishment of the OAU. Fear of border confrontation destroying independent Africa at birth saw African states solemnly abide by existing colonial boundaries. State sovereignty became the cornerstone of the OAU Charter. This ensured the *de jure* survival of the artificial, multi-ethnic states created during the colonial period. During the Cold War sovereignty remained a convenient myth. At its end the loss of geopolitical leverage combined with the growing economic and political marginalisation of Africa to loose a welter of *intra*-state conflicts and crises. The hypothesis states that African leaders are under a moral/political imperative to summon the will to develop a capacity to intervene in these conflicts. Yet African leaders, many of whom ruled undemocratic states or states of dubious legitimacy, continue to uphold *de jure* sovereignty lest their own rule be threatened. To date, all multinational all-African interventions have been consensual or invited by the sitting Head of State. The will to develop a capacity for self-pacification must include collective action to reappraise the boundaries of sovereignty. The newly established African Union has granted itself the right – as oppose to a duty - to intervene in extreme cases of crimes against humanity. The AU has also robustly restated the

inviolability of state sovereignty. The current status of sovereignty and the non-intervention principle in Africa await test cases and the creation of precedent.

The chapter ends by shifting from *why* and *whether* African leaders should pursue self-pacification to *how* and *when* intervention should take place. The research extends the traditional 'just war' criteria into the field of peace operations to construct moral bases for intervention. With peace-enforcement increasingly the norm and impunity for intervening forces often claimed or assumed the conduct of peace operations has become a global issue. In the African context indiscipline and deliberate misconduct by intervening troops, notably in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC, has undermined the legitimacy and hence effectiveness of these operations. The second set of 'just war' criteria concern the initiation of war. These seven criteria when applied to peace operations in Africa suggest that the majority of African *intra*-state conflicts warrant all-African solutions, although each case must be assessed on an individual basis.

Is Africa right to develop a capacity for all-African intervention? There is a growing acceptance of the particularity of Africa in general and its 'distinctive' conflicts, specifically in the West, especially the US. This has led to the ascendance of the communitarian position whereby regional 'communities', with Africa as a notable example, are encouraged to take control of their own policing in lieu of effective international action. By these lights African leaders are constrained to summon the will to build capacity for intervention. Should the rest of the world help? If so, should that help be direct or indirect? The current predominance of the particularist/communitarian lobby is not irreversible. The debate continues within international fora, as well as within national governments and NGOs. Cosmopolitanism as an idea might yet resurface, but it needs to be restated that it would be immoral to require an impoverished continent to embark on self-pacification without significant external assistance. If these resources were of a scale several times larger than the current peacekeeping capacity enhancement budget it is possible that effective all-African peace operations might be possible in the medium term.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The previous chapter considered some of the ideas underpinning the shift towards the regionalisation of conflict resolution in Africa. In many respects, African self-pacification begins with the Organisation of African Union (OAU). If African leaders are to summon the will to develop the capacity for all-African intervention intuitively the continental body should play a central role. Throughout its forty-year history much faith has been placed in the continent-wide security role of the OAU. Has this faith been misplaced? The chapter considers the evolution of the organisation's conflict management and resolution functions. Section (a) looks at the development of the OAU and, in particular, the way in which the question of inviolability of state sovereignty has affected the organisation's capability to effectively intervene in conflict. Section (b) analyses the process of amending the OAU's anti-interventionist ethos in the face of increased levels of insecurity on the continent. Section (c) considers the effectiveness of more recent OAU efforts to address conflict in Africa, in particular the elaboration of the Mechanism for Conflict Management, Prevention and Resolution.

(a) The establishment and development of the OAU – sovereignty and security

Belief in an authentic *Pax Africana* has been a recurrent theme in the discourse of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) since its establishment. Yet, the organisation is infused with twin creeds. For radical pan-Africanists there persists a conviction that a solidarity forged during the independence struggle requires OAU intervention to prevent internecine bloodshed. Rhetoric at the annual meeting of the organisation's supreme body, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHG), routinely supports African self-pacification with calls for the construction of a standby peacekeeping force. However, relations between the OAU and African states have been for the most part shaped by specific Charter clauses proscribing interference in the internal affairs of member states and requiring mutual respect for the principles of sovereign equality, non-interference in the

internal affairs of member states and territorial integrity. This variance at the heart of the organisation has resulted in disillusionment amongst the political, military and scholarly communities in Africa and beyond toward the continental body. A typical response, made by African political economist Austin Chakaodza is that the OAU never moved beyond a 'talking shop', remains 'an amorphous organisation of African Heads of State', and is 'inadequate' to deal with the level of conflict on the continent.¹

For radicals amongst the independence generation, notably Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Sékou Touré in Guinea and Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, acceptance of existing boundaries and the sovereignty principle were steps toward liberation, yet ultimately subordinate to the inclusive ideals of a future, continent-wide, aggregation. As discussed in Chapter Two, for these radicals Africa as a continent was distinct and particular. A common continent-wide African culture was a reality. As such, important issues - especially security issues - should be addressed at a continental level. These pan-Africans explicitly accepted the notion of the continent of Africa as a 'community'.

However, the debate that informed the construction of the OAU polarised political opinion amongst Africa's emerging leaders. Sovereignty lay at its core. By the time of the OAU's inaugural summit at Addis Ababa on 22 May 1963, conflict generated during the transition to independence, particularly in Algeria and Congo-Leopoldville, had supplied both the radicals of the Casablanca group and the conservative Monrovia bloc with substance for their respective images of Africa's future. The question was whether Africa would acquiesce to the inviolability of the Berlin Conference boundaries or concertina history by circumventing the imposition of state sovereignty as it had developed in the West on the continent and accepting the intrinsic limitations to sovereignty of a continental *supra*-national authority?

Fear that a reappraisal of boundaries along ethnic lines could lead to secessionist and irredentist chaos, together with an impulse to legitimise states that were not coterminous with their many nations proved potent stimuli. The conservatives triumphed. African unity was relegated from a concrete, albeit putative, institutional entity to a mere aspiration. Nkrumah was isolated. His grand pan-African project – 'political union based on Defence, Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy...a Common Citizenship, an African Currency, an African

¹ Interview with Austin M. Chakaodza, Africa Centre, London, 16 February 2000.

Monetary Zone, an African Central Bank...*a Common Defence System with an African High Command*² was rejected.² Without wholly dismissing the ideal of African unity, a majority of Africa's emerging leaders had effectively buttressed international norms governing sovereign equality and non-interference. Unity was reduced to cooperation and action was replaced by consultation. The unequal compromise earned the OAU condemnation from both sides of the ideological divide. A potential for *any* pan-African interventionist response to *intra*-African crises was derided by conservatives such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire as manifestly chimerical. Amongst the radicals the new organisation was, 'a toothless, clawless lion in a decorated cage'.³

Thus, from a political standpoint, the OAU was hamstrung as an effective regional institution for conflict resolution from the onset. Far from diluting the sovereignty principle, the OAU Charter had reinforced Westphalian norms, especially the proscription against intervention in the affairs of another state. The exercise in self-emasculation was given standing in international law through Article III (2) of the Charter of the OAU and subsequent resolutions of the organisation's AHG.⁴ The preamble to AHG/Res.16 (1) in accepting that, 'the borders of African states on independence constituted a *tangible reality*', implicitly adopted the legal concept of *uti possidetis juris*.⁵ This doctrine, which had underpinned state formation in Latin America, aimed to preclude a welter of post-independence boundary disputes. AHG/Res.16 (1) reinforced Article III of the Charter in that it emphasised the sovereign equality of member states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states and respect for the territorial integrity of states.

The accomplishment of *uti possidetis juris* opened the OAU to criticism from African (and non-African) radicals. In response to this criticism Chris Lowe emphasises the communitarian environment that surrounded the final drafting of the Charter by stressing

² Kwame Nkrumah, quoted in Esedebe, P.O., *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement 1776-1963* (Washington DC: Howard University Press, 1982), pp.223-224.

³ Ihonvbere, Julius O., 'Pan-Africanism: Agenda for African Unity', op.cit.

⁴ It should be noted that the OAU Charter has been the most salient piece of international law created by the OAU.

⁵ Shaw, Malcolm, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), p.185.

that rather than being 'arbitrary', today's map of Africa 'has been *arbitrated* by history, a history of the international and imperialist exercise of power'.⁶ Thus,

[O]ne may be quite critical of history and the power exercises involved. Yet the decision by the OAU to proceed on that basis recognised it as a fact. Coming on 40 years later, perhaps we see the OAU decision as a further arbitration of power in history that also is open to criticism and debate. Even so, any redrawing of the map would also have the same character...The arbitration process would be based on power as much or more than reason, or perhaps on reasoning about the facts and assertions of power as much as reasoning about principles and ideals.⁷

Undoubtedly *uti possidetis juris*, to a large extent, left *intra*-state conflict 'as the business of each individual member state'.⁸ It had been accepted in Africa and beyond that the relative competence of the OAU and the UN in conflict management was delineated by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which calls upon states to 'make every effort' to use regional conflict mechanisms before reference to the Security Council.⁹ Even so, the OAU Charter proved as equivocal as the UN Charter over the issue of intervention in a member state's internal affairs. Whilst the UN Charter leaves the specifics of peacekeeping or peace-enforcement intervention open to future interpretation, the OAU Charter makes no mention of military remedies to civil strife.

Having asserted its primacy amongst African regional organisations as the motor for conflict management, albeit in the context of *inter*-state conflict, the OAU affirmed the right in an international context to 'try Africa first'.¹⁰ Chris Bakwesegha, the former head of the OAU's Conflict Management Division (CMD), argues that 'issues of peace, security and stability have been a major concern of the OAU from its inception'.¹¹ However, given that the architects of the Charter anticipated the mass of conflicts to be between states, explicit proposals for conflict resolution modalities concentrated on peacemaking through

⁶ Lowe, Chris, 'Reconfiguring African maps', H-Africa Discussion Network <www2.h-net.msu.edu/~africa> 23 October 1997.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Bakwesegha, Chris, 'Conflict Resolution in Africa – A New Role for the OAU?' in Gunnar M. Sorbo and Peter Vale (eds.), *Out of Conflict: From War to Peace in Africa* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), p.81.

⁹ UN Charter, Article 52, para 2.

¹⁰ Andemicael, Berhanykun, and Nicol, Davidson, 'The OAU: Primacy in Seeking African Solutions Within the OAU Charter', in Yassin El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman (eds.), *The OAU After Twenty Years* (New York: Praeger, 1984), p.102; Wallerstein, Immanuel, 'The Early Years of the OAU: The Search for Organisational Preeminence', *International Organisation*, 20/4 (1966), pp.774-787.

diplomacy. Taslim Elias claimed at the time of the establishment of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration instituted by Article XIX of the Charter that it 'in large part supplies the *raison d'être* of the organisation itself'.¹² Yet, the Commission never operated in an *inter-state* conflict, still less in more contentious *intra-state* conflicts. Indeed, the *Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment, within the OAU, of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution*, adopted at the Cairo AHG in 1993 emphasises that the Commission's jurisdiction was restricted to *inter-state* disputes.¹³

In response to these institutional flaws, OAU conflict management practice was forced to react to events, rather than take the initiative. In the years up to the unprecedented, abortive intervention in the Chadian civil war, the OAU's approach to conflict was typified by mediation undertaken by heads of state acting collectively, *ad hoc* committees in which individual initiatives were subject to ratification by the whole committee and conference diplomacy.¹⁴

Unsurprisingly, the most successful interventions by African forces were undertaken outside the aegis of the organisation. The OAU intervention in Chad between 1981 and 1982 was deemed by many commentators an aberration and by many in the OAU Secretariat a salutary lesson in the perils of peacekeeping.¹⁵ The operation will be examined in detail as a case study in Chapter Six. Despite the tacit approval of many member states, the OAU as an entity was compelled to condemn the unilateral intervention by Tanzania in 1979 that ousted the Idi Amin Dada regime in Uganda. However, for Henry Wiseman writing in 1984, Tanzania's audacity stood in contrast to the OAU's impotence, setting 'a precedent defying the principle of non-intervention that could, in the future, again challenge

¹¹ Bakwesegha, *op.cit.*, p.81.

¹² Elias, Taslim, 'The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of the Organisation of African Unity', *British Yearbook of International Law*, 40 (1964), p.348.

¹³ 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment Within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution', in OAU Information Services Publications – Series (II), *Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options* (1993), pp.5-6, para11.

¹⁴ Mwagiru, M., 'Who Will Bell the Cat? Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter and the Crisis of OAU Conflict Management' <<http://snipe.ukc.ac.uk/international/papers.dir/mwagiru.html>> posted 25 July 1996.

¹⁵ Interview with Colonel Gustave Zoula (Senior Military Officer, OAU Conflict Management Division) and Commodore Binega Mesfin (Military Consultant, OAU Conflict Management Division), OAU Conflict Management Centre, Addis Ababa, April 1998. Col. Zoula and Comm. Mesfin stressed the trauma felt by the OAU secretariat at the time of the operation in Chad. They emphasized the strength of feeling that the OAU should only attempt an operation of similar size if all the faults of the Chad operation had been effectively addressed.

the OAU with similar situations'.¹⁶ Indeed, eleven years later, ECOWAS' justification for intervention in Liberia was based less on international law and more on the OAU's history of failure in peacekeeping.¹⁷ Unable, both logistically and institutionally, to intervene militarily in the conflict, the OAU Council of Ministers could do no more than 'express its support for ECOWAS' initiatives'.¹⁸

Did the draughtsmen of the OAU Charter designedly frame a document with less scope for robust conflict resolution than its precursor, the UN Charter? One of their number has asserted that whilst the OAU Charter sought to prevent interference by member states in other member states' internal affairs during a period of state formation, there was no intention to limit the range of measures open to the organisation in addressing conflict in the long term.¹⁹ This potential for modification or reinterpretation of the Charter has exercised the minds of African idealists since 1963. However, only since the post-Cold War escalation of *intra*-state conflict has the idea gained wider currency. Makumi Mwagiru contends that African conflict management is doomed to failure without a radical reevaluation of Article III of the Charter and the insular and anachronistic attitudes it enshrines. Mwagiru is uncompromising in his cosmopolitanism damning the OAU with, *inter alia*, 'missing the pace of developments internationally...articulating the heresy that there are peculiarly African systems of democracy and human rights...insisting against the face of evidence, that there are some of its affairs which are peculiarly internal'.²⁰

(b) The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

In the face of criticism and as a response to the prevalence of *intra*-state conflict in Africa, the OAU felt compelled - if it was to retain any influence in conflict management - to attempt to move beyond rhetoric. The African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) that came into effect in 1986 was a step towards recognition that certain domestic policies of African states were answerable to universal values and principles. Yet, as one

¹⁶ Wiseman, Henry, 'The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution' in El-Ayouty and Zartman, op.cit., p.130.

¹⁷ Ofodile, Anthony Chukwuka, 'The Legality of ECOWAS' Intervention in Liberia', *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 32 (1994), pp.381-419

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Elias, Taslim O., *Africa and the Development of International Law* (Dobbs Ferry Press, New York, 1972), p.127.

²⁰ Mwagiru, op.cit.

commentator notes succinctly, ‘that was about as far as it went’.²¹ The ACHPR accepts a need for Africa as a whole to engage with the internal affairs of states, whilst obviating any direct remedy for human rights abuse. Likewise the OAU’s lack of salience has been a manifest brake on its conflict resolution ambitions. The UN and the OAU are international rather than *supra*-national bodies. Such authority as the UN can be said to wield is dependent on its most powerful members enforcing mandatory Security Council resolutions. However, as Tiyanjana Maluwa notes, ‘in the case of the OAU the authority is totally lacking’.²²

In the early 1990s the International Peace Academy (IPA) undertook a series of consultations, in cooperation with the OAU, within the framework of the IPA’s Programme on Conflict Management in Africa.²³ The objectives were to:

- Encourage the acceptance by African governments and the broader African community of the legitimacy of a multilateral role in the settlement of internal conflicts in Africa.
- Enhance the capacity of the OAU itself to avert, control and resolve conflicts, especially *intra*-state conflicts.
- Develop the capacity of African civil society to contribute to peacemaking and conflict resolution in Africa, and impact positively on the conflicts in the region.

In 1993, 200 key actors involved in conflict management on the continent, from over 40 African countries, met in Addis Ababa. This meeting played a central role in the development of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution that was established by the Cairo Declaration in June 1993. This groundbreaking initiative was heralded as a juncture in the evolution of African self-pacification. The optimism was misplaced.

The signing of the Cairo Declaration came at the same time as the UN and US operations in Somalia. Given that UNOSOM and UNITAF were widely held to have failed there was an expectation that there would be a return to the principle of ‘try Africa first’.

²¹ Clapham, Christopher, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.190.

²² Maluwa, Tiyanjana, ‘International Law-making in the Organisation of African Unity: An Overview’, *African Journal of International Law*, 12/2 (2000), p.201.

²³ See, Jan, Ameen [Rapporteur], *Report of the Joint OAU/International Peacekeeping Academy (IPA) Task Force on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* <www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfrIPP98Print.htm>, posted 1998.

Yet the OAU remained ill equipped in terms of funds and logistics, as well as unable to afford the political will to supply manpower and leadership for full-scale peace operations. Pierre-François Gonidec describes this material and intellectual exiguity as having at least marginalised, and arguably excluded, the organisation from conflict resolution in Africa.²⁴

A Central Organ composed of the Bureau of the AHG runs the Mechanism. The Bureau is an arrangement of sixteen countries elected each year on the basis of geographical representation in order to assist the Chairman of the Assembly. In choosing to use the Bureau as a model, rather than a special committee dedicated to solving conflicts, the member states indicated either a reluctance to allow the Mechanism too much leeway or a frank acceptance of the Mechanism's capacity to deliver. Indeed, Bakwesegha noted in 1997 that 'the organisation cannot assume that it has achieved much in its efforts to operationalise the Mechanism since its adoption'.²⁵

As constituted, the Mechanism is a dilution of a proposal, previously endorsed by former OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, for the creation of an upper level of authority within the OAU that would mirror the UN Security Council. Scott Fisher of the US State Department has referred to 'a forward-leaning Secretary-General [Salim Salim] against a more reticent Central Organ'.²⁶ Indeed, the *Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment, within the OAU, of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution* notes that the creation of an African Security Council had been opposed by the majority of member states. In particular, 'there was, among other reasons, opposition to the idea of according permanent status to certain member states to the exclusion of others...that, it was felt, would erode the principle of sovereign equality of all member states'.²⁷ The limited scope of the enterprise could charitably be described as achievable. Prevention and management are stressed at the expense of resolution. As Eric Berman and Katie Sams point out 'given many African rulers' tenuous grip on power, this outcome is not

²⁴ Gonidec, Pierre-François, *L'OUA Trente Ans Après* (Paris: Karthala, 1993), p.126.

²⁵ Bakwesegha, Chris, 'The Role of the Organisation of African Unity in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in The Context of the Political Evolution of Africa', *African Journal on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution*, 1/1 (1997), p.73.

²⁶ Quoted in Albaugh, Ericka, A., 'Preventing Conflict in Africa: Possibilities of Peace Enforcement', in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention* (Cambridge and Washington DC: World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.125.

²⁷ *Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options*, op.cit., para. 139.

surprising...governments rarely endorse policies or enact laws likely to result in their ouster'.²⁸ Moreover, 'the OAU is managed and controlled by the state elite, many of whom were and are responsible for the conflicts their "club" is supposed to address'.²⁹

Amendment of Article III is not so much fudged, as not mentioned. The principles that underpin the Mechanism merely recognise 'the *need* for [Africa] to take primary ownership of its own problems', and accept that 'the UN together with regional and sub-regional organisations and arrangements *should*...[frame] new approaches to crisis prevention, management and resolution'.³⁰ In this regard,

[T]he Mechanism will have as its primary objective, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it will be its responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration may be mounted and deployed by the OAU.³¹

Despite regular meetings of the Central Organ and the establishment of a Joint OAU/IPA Task Force, the crucial, and enduring, insufficiency of Charter mandate and funding continues to stymie the Mechanism. Echoing the position taken by the AHG, the Central Organ has re-emphasised that the prime responsibility of the OAU, as it stands, lies with conflict prevention. Whilst recommending the commissioning of a study with a view to clarifying and making recommendations on the certain exceptional circumstances in which the OAU might deploy troops within the Mechanism, it makes clear that the responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security remains with the UN Security Council.

²⁸ Berman, Eric G. and Sams, Katie E., *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva: UN Publications, 2000), p.62.

²⁹ Nieuwkerk, Anthoni van, 'Wanted – Capacity to Intervene: The Evolution of Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa', in Diane Philander (ed.), *Franco-South African Dialogue: Sustainable Security in Africa*, (Pretoria: ISS Monograph Series, 2000).

³⁰ Bakwesegha, op.cit.

³¹ 'Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment Within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution', in *Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options*, op.cit., Annex, pp.62-63, para. 15.

(c) A limited implementation of the Mechanism

To further its limited ambitions the Central Organ has authorized the OAU's Field Operations Unit to organise three civil cum military missions - the Neutral Military Observer Group in Rwanda (NMOG), the OAU Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB) and the OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros (OMIC).

NMOG II was the second incarnation of an observer mission set up to monitor and supervise compliance with the ceasefire agreement between the Rwandan government forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).³² It comprised 70 officers and 60 men.³³ Although the mission took place only a year before the genocidal massacres of 1994, it was successful in averting hostilities during its period of deployment. No major incidents were reported until the withdrawal of NMOG II and its replacement by UN peacekeeping forces on 1 November 1993.

The OAU deemed NMOG II to have established a useful precedent. On 21 October 1993 the Burundian President, Melchior Ndadaye, was assassinated, aggravating an already tense political environment. The OAU's CMD was convinced that if the OAU could persuade the Burundian government to accept an all-African observer mission then potential problems of finance and troop contribution could be overcome. As part of the process of persuasion the mission was euphemistically described as 'preventive diplomacy' rather than 'peacekeeping'.³⁴ Moreover, in response to objections from the Burundian army the mission's size was reduced from a proposed 180 members to just 47 of which a high proportion were doctors tasked with helping the local population.³⁵ In March 1995 OMIB was augmented by twenty further officers indicating that parties to the conflict and the wider international community saw the mission as valuable. The UN reported four main achievements of the mission.

The OMIB military teams have, among other things, (a) established a dialogue between local administrative and military authorities; (b) reactivated provincial and district-level security committees that had not been in use; (c) established security committees in all districts where they did not exist before; and (d) within

³² NMOG II operated between 1 August 1993 and 31 October 1993.

³³ NMOG II was made up of soldiers from Congo-Brazzaville, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia.

³⁴ Berman and Sams, *op.cit.*, p.69.

³⁵ OMIB was made up of soldiers from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Tunisia at a cost \$300,000 a month.

the framework of the pacification campaign, participated in all field outings carried out by the national and regional authorities.³⁶

Although OMIB 'did not serve as a catalyst to Security Council action' as some members of the OAU Secretariat intended, it was held to have succeeded in its stated aims.³⁷ As Julia Harrington and Alpha Fall note, 'even though it was grossly inadequate for the huge task of rebuilding political stability in Burundi, OMIB was seen by many as being effective in tempering political tensions by the simple fact of its presence'.³⁸

In August 1997 a Military Observer Team (MOT) was deployed in the Comoros Islands with a mandate to monitor events and attempt to build confidence amongst the conflicting parties following an attempt by the island of Anjouan to secede from Comoros and appeal for recolonisation by France. The small Observer Mission to the Comoros Islands (OMIC) comprised just twenty military observers.³⁹ There was mistrust between the secessionists and the MOT which was not allowed to deploy on Anjouan. A referendum held in Anjouan in October 1997 saw a clear majority for independence. Despite this result the OAU's policy remained one of encouraging the secessionists to accept greater autonomy rather than to continue to press for independence. As Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg remark, 'the OAU's reflexive support for the territorial status quo of the Comoran archipelago, even in the face of evidence of popular support for independence, demonstrated the continuing strength of the commitment of its members to the inviolability of Africa's colonially-inherited borders'.⁴⁰

The three observer missions established since the inception of the Mechanism, whilst far from a revolution in OAU thought and practice, have signalled a desire and capacity for change. The procedures for administration, finance and operational

³⁶ United Nations, 'Report of the Secretary General into the Situation in Burundi', A50/541, 11 October 1995.

³⁷ Berman and Sams, *op.cit.*, p.70.

³⁸ Harrington, Julia, and Fall, Alpha, 'Mapping Relevant Inter-Governmental And Regional Institutions: Powers And Responsibilities', paper presented at a workshop organised by Alliances for Africa in collaboration with the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS), Banjul, Gambia, 1-8 March 2000.

³⁹ OMIC was made up of soldiers from Egypt, Niger, Senegal and Tunisia.

⁴⁰ Adebajo, Adekeye, and Landsberg, Chris, 'The Heirs of Nkrumah: Africa's New Investments', *Pugwash Online*, <http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/como_africa.htm> posted January 2001; see also Naldi, G.J., 'Separatism in the Comoros: Some Legal Aspects', *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 11/2 (1998), pp.247-256.

command and control have worked.⁴¹ Rules of engagement have been developed to address the fact that, unlike their UN counterparts, OAU military observers carry side arms. The, admittedly, small number of troops serving with the MOTs have been properly fitted out with essential equipment including basic communications gear. Issues of personal finance such as regular, reasonable and structured pay for observers, as well as life insurance, have been addressed. These practical developments indicate a willingness to learn from past errors. Could these new structures underpin larger interventions?

Funding and logistics remain underlying and perennial problems for all-African peace operations. Both have attendant political ramifications. A peacekeeping workshop held in Harare in 1995 isolated the OAU's consistent account arrears and continued wariness over accepting outside funding as key impediments to constructing all-African missions.⁴² The same workshop also emphasised the dearth of essential logistics equipment including ground transport, airlift capacity and advanced communications equipment and the ensuing, and undignified, 'begging syndrome' and 'humiliating reliance on other countries'.⁴³

In an attempt to remedy this impediment a Peace Fund was established 'as a permanent organ for the purpose of providing financial resources on a regular and continuous basis to support exclusively OAU operational activities relating to conflict management and resolution'.⁴⁴ It received \$35m between its creation in June 1993 and the end of May 2000.⁴⁵ The Fund is divided into a General Peace Fund which is discretionary and a Special Contributions Fund that is conditional. Although the intended contribution to the Fund from the OAU's own budget was raised from five to six per cent in the 1998-1999 fiscal year, the fundamental question of budget arrears meant that less

⁴¹ See Berman and Sams, *op.cit.*, p.72.

⁴² *International efforts to establish collective security mechanisms for Africa*, Zimbabwe Peacekeeping Workshop, Harare, 23-27 January 1995. The accounts arrears have been running at approximately twice the annual budget of the organization currently standing at about \$31m. A financial report tabled at the a meeting of OAU Ambassadors in Tripoli showed that as at January 2001 more than 39 million dollars was still pending in arrears of unpaid contributions, in addition to the 22 million dollars still outstanding for current budget (2000-2001).

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.12.

⁴⁴ Bakwesegha, Chris, 'Conflict Resolution in Africa – A New Role for the OAU?', *op.cit.*, p.86.

⁴⁵ Torp, Jens Erik, 'Sub-regional organisations, Conflict Prevention and Donor Funding: Lessons to be Learned by SADC from OAU, IGAD and ECOWAS Experience', paper presented at the Donor Funding Workshop, Natal University, October 2001.

than the target of \$2m per annum directed to the Fund has been realised. In its first five years the Fund received a scant \$1.4m from voluntary donations, coming from nine OAU members, with South Africa donating over half of the total amount. Once more underlining the financial dependency that cums OAU conflict resolution capacity around two-thirds of the Fund comes from Western donors. Ninety per cent of *extra-*continental donations are to the Special Contributions Fund and are pre-assigned to specific projects – invariably military observer missions.

The Mechanism's accent on conflict prevention resulted in raised support from the Fund for the work of the CMD. Created in March 1992; the CMD was reconstituted as the Conflict Management Centre (CMC) in March 1999. The CMC includes a Situation Room that forms the basis of a rudimentary Early Warning System (EWS). The Situation Room incorporates Internet connection, satellite television, computers, and communications links.⁴⁶ The CMC is understaffed. It is impossible for the present staff of nineteen, which including secretaries and receptionists, to maintain 24-hour vigilance. The complexity and ubiquity of conflict in Africa requires lengthy data analysis. The OAU estimates that efficient running of the CMC will require 49 staff members, of which 30 are analysts.

Joseph Essombe Edimo links the narrow scope of the new Mechanism, and its stress on conflict prevention, with the intrinsic limitations of its parent body. He points out that throughout its existence the OAU has engendered an optimism way beyond its capacity to deliver.⁴⁷ Finance and logistics aside, a continued OAU failure to surmount the institutional inhibitions stalling action has led to the organisation becoming marginalised as the primary instrument for conflict management on the continent. The humanitarian crisis in the former eastern Zaire that erupted in late 1996 emphasised the gulf between rhetoric and reality in African conflict resolution discourse. Apart from formulaic expressions of 'grave concern' and appeals for 'an immediate cessation of hostilities and for restraint', the OAU was most concerned over the composition of a mooted intervention force under *extra-*African leadership, most particularly the supposedly 'pivotal' participation of a strong African

⁴⁶ The Situation Room contains basic technology and is frequently unmanned. Personal observation.

⁴⁷ Edimo, Essombe, 'Le rôle des états membres de l'OUA et le défi du nouveau mécanisme sur la prévention, la gestion et le règlement des conflits', *Afrique 2000*, 27/28 (1997), pp.89-102.

contingent.⁴⁸ The OAU has since signally failed to address the crippling war in what is now the DRC. Undoubtedly, critical obstacles of finance and logistics exist. However, as Michel Cyr Djiena Wembou points out, if the OAU is serious about addressing conflict on the continent, it cannot rule out the possibility of peacekeeping interventions, and even limited peace-enforcement operations. On both a political and legal basis, if the OAU intends to take a leading role in such missions, then there exists a prerequisite to modify the Cairo Declaration and revise the OAU Charter.⁴⁹

Yet questions remain as to the political efficacy and ethical propriety of the OAU's potential to act as the primary institution for conflict resolution in Africa. Are advocates of 'try Africa first' undermining, perhaps unwittingly, the UN's 'legitimacy' and thus bolstering the Western policy of disengagement?⁵⁰ These issues were discussed by African and non-African commentators and practitioners at a meeting of the World Peace Foundation (WPF) in Tanzania in June 1999. Scott Fisher, presumably articulating the US State Department's point of view, proved to be an unabashed champion of the OAU.⁵¹ Although he acknowledges that 'the emphasis has moved away from the OAU' he prefers 'to look at the half-full part of the glass, not the half-empty'.⁵² He recommends continued financial support from the US as well as increased direct person-to-person collaboration with the CMC.⁵³ Fisher further commends the OAU's political authority, the fact that the CMC is already established and the potential for the OAU to take responsibility in regions without a viable and competent SRO. Finance and training are cited as surmountable difficulties. In sum, Fisher is positive and prescriptive in his conception of the OAU's future status.

The OAU Mechanism itself must be exercised, as should its observer capacity. Linkages to sub-regionals must be created and expanded. As the sub-regionals are accorded status, there must be communication and regular information exchange.

⁴⁸ See Massey, Simon, 'Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention that Never Happened', *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* <www.jha.ac/articles/a036> posted 15 October 1997.

⁴⁹ Djiena Wembou, Michel-Cyr, 'A Propos du Nouveau Mécanisme de l'OUA sur les Conflits', *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 98/2 (1994), p.383.

⁵⁰ Malan, Mark, 'The OAU and African Sub-regional Organisations – A Closer Look at the 'Peace Pyramid'', *ISS Occasional Paper*, 36 (1999), pp.1-12.

⁵¹ Quoted in Albaugh, op.cit., p.126.

⁵² Ibid., p.125.

⁵³ Fisher commends the British initiative to supply and fund staff in an attempt to operationalise the early warning system.

This could be done at the OAU and would have great influence on the issues we're here discussing.⁵⁴

Given that France and the US are partners in enhancing African peacekeeping capacity it is worth noting that French General Alain Faupin expressly supports this position – 'I am absolutely in line with Fisher regarding the need to reinforce and give the OAU stronger international weight'.⁵⁵

The response of the African contingent at the WPF meeting was broadly supportive of an enhanced role in conflict management for the OAU, but somewhat more nuanced, if not wearily sceptical. General Michael Nyanbuya of Zimbabwe remarks that,

[T]he OAU, to a large extent is responsible for incapacitating itself. It starts and doesn't follow up...I believe we should have a sustained approach to the issue of sub-regional security. Sub-regionally we should accept that the UN is sluggish. So let's have something to help us.⁵⁶

General Ishola Williams of Nigeria advances the need for a sub-regional hegemon to take the lead in the case of a crisis such as the Rwandan genocide. The UN and the OAU, constrained by bureaucracy, 'cannot take care of the problems we have in Africa'.⁵⁷ For Williams the UN and OAU's role is to legitimise intervention and offer whatever diplomatic help they can once a hegemon-led force has addressed the initial emergency. Yet, he recognises that the current standing of the OAU is such that it is unable to act without UN, and hence American, French and British support. Williams states that 'frameworks [the OAU and SROs] exist', but that 'the new African agenda is to strengthen these frameworks to try African solutions first before shouting to others for help'.⁵⁸

Although it falls beyond the time frame of this research it should be noted that at the OAU Summit in Lusaka on 9-11 July 2001, the member states accepted a proposal to dissolve the OAU and re-establish themselves as the African Union (AU). The model for this ambitious plan is the EU. In so doing the member states like their European counterparts will hand over a measure of sovereignty to the institutions of a *supra-*

⁵⁴ Quoted in Albaugh, op.cit., p.126.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.128.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.127.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.119.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.128.

national body. Institutions will include an African Commission, an African Parliament and an African Court of Justice. As yet the emphasis has been on the economic aspects of union including common tax and tariffs. The issue of immigration will also be settled within a common framework. As has been the case in Europe, the security and defence arrangements are proving harder to put together. Nonetheless, it was decided at Lusaka to incorporate the Central Organ of the Mechanism as one of the organs of the AU. Another feature of the AU will be the establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent. Although the Commission was intended to be in place by July 2001, it is assumed that the process will take considerably longer. The OAU General Secretariat will act as a transition secretariat in the short term.

Conclusion

General Williams recognises that although an OAU/AU security framework exists on paper it is essentially inoperable. He sends a mixed message that typifies the response of many African political and military leaders consistently disillusioned by the performance of the continental body.⁵⁹ The chapter has examined the development of the OAU's security framework from pre-independence optimism to post-independence fudge to the stasis of recent years.

The organisation has shown a marked inability to change ethos or build upon past experience. Much effort by the OAU Conflict Management Division and innumerable speeches by the Ministers and Heads of State and Government have been devoted to the idea of developing a capacity for effective all-African intervention. Clearly, finance and logistics continue to dictate what is possible and are bound to colour political calculation. The scale and diversity of conflict on the continent is vast. These factors alone will ensure that, at least in the short to medium term, priority will be given to conflict prevention rather than resolution. Yet, the most fundamental checks on action remain the want of political will on the part of individual members and the organisation as a body, as well as the OAU's lack of salience. These factors can only be remedied within the

⁵⁹ This hybrid afro-pessimism/afro-realism is also discernible amongst the staff members of the CMC. Interview with Colonel Gustave Zoula (Senior Military Officer, OAU Conflict Management Division) and Commodore Binega Mesfin (Military Consultant, OAU Conflict Management Division), OAU Conflict Management Centre, Addis Ababa, April 1998.

context of continental and international juridical reconceptualisation and a subsequent willingness to effectuate those changes. Only a thoroughgoing re-evaluation of the status of state sovereignty in Africa as seen through the prism of the OAU Charter and an authentic desire to conceive a dilution of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, underpinned by the requisite juridical instruments will allow a move away from the *ad hoc* arrangements that have characterised conflict resolution policy and process to date. The institutional obstacles and shortcomings of the OAU have limited its effectiveness as the primary body for addressing conflict on the continent. With subsidiarity a given in the current geopolitical climate this role has been performed assumed by sub-regional organisations.

The OAU as a body intervened once. The Inter-African intervention in Chad will be examined in Chapter Six. Following the frustrations encountered in Chad the OAU has concentrated on small-scale observer missions. However, these missions – in Rwanda, Burundi and Comoros Islands - might be interpreted as sending ambiguous signals. They fall well short of the medium to large-scale interventions foreseen by previous generations of OAU leaders. Their size also puts them outside detailed study as part of this research. Nonetheless, they pose useful questions as to the potential for the new AU to act not only as facilitator and/or legitimiser, but also as the key actor in future peace operations. The observer missions proved a qualified success – achievable and affordable. Conceivably prevention, mediation and observation could become the *modi operandi* of the organisation. The AU could become reconciled with its current intermediate status on the peace pyramid. Yet the dissolution of the OAU and the establishment of the AU surely raise the prospect of a revived security role. Should the membership grasp this opportunity in the light of the failure of the OAU to create the juridical space needed to enable the construction of viable all-African interventions? The record is not propitious. Far from acting as a community, the membership of the organisation has more often privileged national interest over African solidarity. Moreover, structures put in place to deal with conflict management and resolution from the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution remained moribund or under utilised. The AU is not currently capable structurally or infra-structurally of assuming the primary role for conflict resolution in Africa.

Should the outside world encourage the AU to assume a wider role in conflict resolution? To date the peacekeeping capacity building programmes of the US, France and Britain have operated at a sub-regional level. However, based on Fisher and Faupin's comments above it seems that none of these traditional intervening powers wish to see the continental body excised from the peace pyramid. Direct intervention under the aegis of the AU should not be discounted. Yet, articulating the US position, Fisher's analysis smacks of expediency and disregard. The US is currently wedded to the notion of communitarianism. The *locus* of that 'community' seems of secondary importance.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLE OF SUB-REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The moral/political imperative to summon the will to develop a peacekeeping capacity currently rests at sub-regional level. The shift towards regionalisation of conflict management and resolution has been discussed in Chapter One. Within the period covered by this research, two sub-regional organisations (SROs) have embarked on medium to large-scale peace operations - the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). These interventions suffered from questionable standing in international law. None of these operations sought or received UN Security Council authorisation prior to intervention. In the case of ECOWAS the interventions were sanctioned, albeit with dissension from some member states, and in the case of the intervention in Sierra Leone *post facto*, by the sub-regional authority. In the case of SADC there was no unanimity of purpose amongst the member states, whilst the authority had yet to become operational. The *Accord de non-agression et d'assistance en matière de défense* (ANAD) is a mutual defence mechanism consisting of entirely West African francophone states. As such it operates as a parallel security structure, sporadically operational, within ECOWAS. ANAD sent a small force to monitor the settlement of the 'Christmas War' between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1985. Four other SROs are developing security dimensions of varying degrees – the *Union du Maghreb arabe* (UMA), the *Communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique centrale* (CEEAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the East African Cooperation (EAC).

The chapter concentrates on the two SROs that have deployed significant intervention forces within the definition employed by the research. Section (a) will examine the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution in West Africa including a brief analysis of its involvement in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the effect that involvement has had on security in the sub-region. Section (b) will examine SADC including the controversial intervention by some of its members purporting to act as a

SADC intervention force in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as well as the operation led by South Africa, also purporting to act as a SADC force, to quell unrest in Lesotho.

(a) The Economic Community of West African States

ECOWAS was established in 1975 as an organisation designed to meliorate economic development in the West African sub-region. The supreme decision-making and approving body is the Authority of Heads of State and Government known as the Authority. There are sixteen members.¹ Article 2 of the ECOWAS Treaty outlines the prime aim of the organisation – ‘to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the living standards of its peoples’.² However, since its inception the organisation has been beset by layered rivalries. A basic schism sets the five anglophone members against the nine francophone members. There are two lusophone members, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. ECOWAS involvement in the Guinea-Bissau civil war of 1998-1999 will be analysed as a case study in Chapter Seven. The francophone axis also sets apart Nigeria, the sub-regional hegemon, as a specific rival, although Ghana has also objected to Abuja’s assumption that Nigeria should arrogate the military leadership of any intervention to itself. Since 1990 ECOWAS has deployed three peacekeeping/peace-enforcement forces under the title of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Eric Berman and Katie Sams comment that ‘rather than building consensus and strengthening solidarity among ECOWAS member states, these missions have underscored and exacerbated sub-regional tensions’.³

The treaty establishing an economic community in West Africa was adopted in Lagos in May 1975. It had no security provisions. Overtly political aspirations were deemed too delicate to broach during ECOWAS’ gestation phase. However, in 1978 a ‘Protocol on Non-Aggression’ was adopted requiring member states ‘to refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against

¹ ECOWAS comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

² Article 2, Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States.

the territorial integrity or political independence of other states'.⁴ The 1978 Protocol was circumscribed by the lack of an institutional framework within which states accused of transgression might be held to account. This impediment was addressed by the adoption of a 'Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence' in 1981. This 'Defence Protocol' was designed to establish a more sophisticated framework within which to address regional security. A standby force comprising military units from member states called the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC) was mooted. The intention was for the AAFC to intervene on behalf of a member state aggressed by a non-member state and to act as an interposition force in the case of conflict between member states. Although not authorised to intervene in an internal conflict, the AAFC was empowered to act if an internal conflict is 'actively maintained and sustained from the outside'.⁵ Both Protocols remain moribund. The unwillingness of the francophone bloc to implement the Defence Protocol, together with the existence of ANAD as a parallel arrangement, are cited as underlying rationales for the circuitous development of ECOMOG. Francophone member states in particular have been concerned both by Nigeria's dominant position in a putative security structure and the effect full implementation of the Protocols would have on their existing defence agreements with France.⁶ The ubiquitous preoccupation of African leaders – the maintenance of *de jure* sovereignty – has also coloured the response of member states to the notion of a regional security framework.

ECOMOG's first foray into peace intervention was in Liberia. Former Master Sergeant Samuel Doe came to power in a bloody coup in April 1980. His regime was authoritarian and brutal. In 1989, Charles Taylor, a former soldier in the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and a convicted embezzler in the US, encouraged an insurrection under the name of the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL). The NPFL would eventually split, with Prince Yormie Johnson leaving to form the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). As the conflict deepened over the coming years the security environment would be further complicated by the creation of numerous factions, often

³ Berman, Eric G. and Sams, Katie E., *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2000), p.78.

⁴ Article 2, ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression.

⁵ Article 18, Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence

⁶ Benjamin, E., 'The Role of ECOWAS', in Douglas K. Zormelo and Peter Mayer, *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking* (Accra: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1996).

based on ethnicity. Nonetheless, by April 1990, following the disintegration of the disillusioned Liberian army, the NPFL could claim to control 90 per cent of the country. Doe retreated to his Executive Mansion. Deeply unpopular amongst all but his own Krahn kinsfolk, Doe was forced to request external assistance to prevent his being overthrown. Having cultivated a personal friendship with Nigeria's President Ibrahim Babangida, Doe looked to Nigerian military muscle to save his regime.⁷ Nigeria was unwilling to risk international condemnation and the potential collapse of ECOWAS by intervening unilaterally so the dormant ECOWAS Defence Protocol was invoked as a convenient tool to enable, what was certain to be, a Nigerian dominated intervention. The main obstacle to this plan was the deep animosity between the President of Côte d'Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, and Doe. Houphouët-Boigny had been related by marriage to William Tolbert, the Liberian President executed by Doe during the 1980 coup.

Babangida was determined to pursue the interventionist option. In May 1990, at the ECOWAS summit in Banjul, the Nigerians organised the establishment of a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) of five member states ostensibly to oversee mediation in any non-specified future conflict, but effectively to address the immediate problem of the Liberian insurgency. The SMC would serve as a legitimising mechanism in place of the inoperable Defence Protocol. Gambia, as the current Chair of ECOWAS, was entitled to a seat on the SMC. This ensured an anglophone majority generally favourable to the Nigerian position.⁸ The SMC, following Nigeria's lead, made the decision to send a force to Liberia designated the ECOWAS Monitoring Group. The arrival, on 24 August, of a 4,000 strong ECOMOG force met resistance from the NPFL.⁹ The only faction that did not contest the legitimacy of the intervention was Johnson's INPFL. Taylor's fighters shelled and harassed the arriving 'peacekeepers'. UN and foreign nationals quit the capital city, Monrovia, and a third of the Liberian population were displaced or became refugees in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea or Sierra Leone. In September 1990 Doe was captured by the INPFL *en route* to ECOMOG headquarters, tortured and killed. The intervention concretised into an operation that stretched the definition of peace-enforcement. Gerry

⁷ Babangida and Doe came to power by overthrowing civilian governments. Both were under pressure from the international community to return to a democratically elected government.

⁸ The initial SMC members were Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali and Togo.

Cleaver notes that, 'ECOMOG, far from being a peacekeeping force, immediately found itself in a war-fighting situation which often characterised its operation in the ensuing years'.¹⁰ Throughout the conflict the actions of ECOWAS, acting as mediator, and ECOMOG, as the intervention force often differed or operated along parallel paths.¹¹

The ECOMOG intervention in August 1990 was widely criticised for ignoring norms of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The SMC justified intervention on three grounds. Firstly, member states cited a clear threat to regional stability from severe refugee flows and concomitant violent contagion. The eruption of civil war in neighbouring Sierra Leone seemingly supports this contention *post facto*, although ECOMOG's continued engagement with Liberia was a prime causal factor in that conflict. Secondly, the SMC declared an imperative for intervention on humanitarian grounds. Finally, the SMC invoked the 1981 Defence Protocol on the grounds that Doe as Liberian Head of State had sent a letter to the Chairman of ECOWAS requesting assistance.¹² There were doubts that proper channels had been followed. Some commentators claim that the letter was not sent, others claim that the request was made direct to Babangida who passed it on to the ECOWAS chair.

As the conflict intensified further questions were raised over the legitimacy of extending an organisation established to promote economic integration into an overtly political body with an interventionist capacity scarcely considered during its evolution. Anthony Ofodile challenges ECOMOG's standing in international law.

The ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian civil war does not have any solid anchor in international law...It has been shown that humanitarian intervention *per se* has no strong basis in international law when undertaken by a state or group of states. Yet, even if humanitarian intervention is valid under international law, ECOWAS' action is questionable since it does not seem to satisfy many of the requirements for a valid humanitarian intervention...ECOWAS seems also to

⁹ The force was dominated by Nigerian troops, but also comprised soldiers from Guinea, Ghana and Sierra Leone.

¹⁰ Cleaver, Gerry, 'Liberia: Lessons for the future from the experience of ECOMOG', in Oliver Furley and Roy May, *Peacekeeping in Africa* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp.225-226.

¹¹ By mid-1991 the onus for mediation had switched from the anglophone-dominated SMC to a francophone-dominated Committee of Five (Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Togo). The efforts of the Committee of Five had scant effect on the conduct of the intervention force which remained dominated by Nigeria.

¹² Ero, Comfort, 'ECOWAS and the Sub-regional Peacekeeping in Liberia: Part I', *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* <<http://www131.111.106.147/Articles/A005.htm>> posted 25 September 1995.

have acted beyond the powers granted by the [UN] Charter to regional organisations, particularly since it failed to obtain the prior consent of the UN Security Council. Consequently, ECOWAS initial intervention in Liberia is not in accordance with international law and the doctrine of non-intervention.¹³

Applying just war criteria to the operation, it is far from clear that the principle of *right authority* was substantiated. Berman and Sams remark on the application of creative jurisprudence by the Nigerians.

Capitalising on the lack of a functioning security network, Nigeria pushed through an entirely new structure – one that would better serve its purposes. The Authority's decision to establish the SMC with a very broad mandate, and to make Nigeria a member of that body provided Lagos with an opportunity to influence ECOWAS policy on Liberia, which Nigeria fully exploited.¹⁴

Ofodile, as well as Berman and Sams, are right to impute Nigerian exploitation of its dominant position in the region to accomplish policy goals. The nature of these goals is less distinct. Regional stability benefits Nigeria's economic interests, whilst the need to discourage violent contagion must be imperative for any hegemon, especially a hegemon such as Nigeria with its own inherent tendency to disequilibrium.¹⁵ However, it should be noted that several analysts, not all Nigerian, have prioritised a humanitarian duty as the most convincing rationale for Abuja's perseverance with the Liberian mission. Amadu Sesay remarks that, 'of all the justifications advanced by ECOWAS and Nigeria for the interventions, the humanitarian one is perhaps the most enduring'.¹⁶ Herbert Howe comments that 'these African states allowed serious humanitarian concerns to erase their traditional hesitation to interfere in another state's internal affairs'.¹⁷ Ben Asante is more fulsome yet - 'ECOMOG's interventionist mission in Liberia was as straightforward as it

¹³ Ofodile, Anthony Chukwuka, 'The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia', *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 32/2 (1994), p.418.

¹⁴ Berman and Sams, op.cit., p.88.

¹⁵ See, Mays, Terry, 'Nigerian Foreign Policy and Its Participation in ECOMOG', in Karl P. Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan, *Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia* (London: Macmillan, 1998), p.116.

¹⁶ Sesay, Amadu, 'West African Military Interventions in the 1990s' in Louis du Plessis and Michael Hough, *Managing African Conflicts: The Challenge of Military Intervention* (Pretoria: HSRC Publishers, 2000), p.225.

¹⁷ Howe, Herbert, 'Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping', *International Security*, 21/3 (1996), p.176.

was noble...hardly anyone could fault its objectives.'¹⁸ Whilst Asante's comment oversimplifies a complex sub-regional debate over intervention, it affirms a distinctively benevolent aspect of Nigerian policy often underestimated in more censorious critiques. Given the parlous state of Liberia throughout the 1990s, if the criterion of *right authority* was not sustained, then, in terms of the existence of a specific and present humanitarian crisis, did the criterion of *just cause* apply? With the benefit of hindsight, the instances in which ECOMOG alleviated suffering were eventually outweighed by the militarisation, prolongation and extension of the conflict.

Berman and Sams' contention that the SMC's decision to extend ECOWAS' competence into the regional security sphere fell short of the requirements of international law should be seen within the context of the lengthy period of experimentation tacitly afforded the ECOMOG operation by both the UN and the OAU.¹⁹ The latter, being in no position to address the conflict under its own auspices, was readily amenable to a sub-regional solution. The UN and the international community in general were also disposed to test Chapter VIII subsidiarity at the dawn of the post-Cold War era. Although George Bush was at the time postulating a 'new *world* order', Africa was in effect secondary importance to the US. ECOMOG's period of grace lasted nearly three years. When it became clear that the situation on the ground was worsening, the Security Council made use of the Cotonou Peace Agreement signed in July 1993 to institute a measure of international influence in Liberia by establishing the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Intended as 'an honest broker' to assuage the mutual suspicion between Taylor and ECOMOG/Nigeria, UNOMIL rarely reached its modest authorised size and found itself unable to deploy throughout the country during the vicious and fluid conflict.²⁰ Howe notes that there was a feeling that the initial 'hands off' approach of the international community was a mistake. For Howe the 'prompt blessing' of an SRO initiative by the UN, US or other international organisation, together with the direct involvement of a neutral organisation such as eventually occurred with UNOMIL in

¹⁸ *West Africa*, 24 March 1997, p.462.

¹⁹ Ofodile, op.cit., p.148.

²⁰ See, Berman and Sams, op.cit., pp.103-104.

Liberia is beneficial to the success of the intervention especially in terms of mutual scrutiny.²¹

One problem inflamed by ECOMOG's dubitable inception was the already distinct anglophone/francophone divide within the sub-regional organisation. Houphouët-Boigny's Côte d'Ivoire was joined by Blaise Compaoré's Burkina Faso in denouncing Nigeria's manipulation of the SMC and dismissing ECOWAS' competence to intervene in civil conflict. The eventual deployment of an, almost entirely, anglophone force further compounded the schism between the linguistic axes.²² Anglophone politicians and military leaders also raised concerns over Nigeria's understanding of ECOMOG's role. In a diplomatic gesture a Ghanaian, Lieutenant-General Arnold Quainoo, was appointed as the first Force Commander. It soon became clear that Quainoo's notion of ECOMOG as a purely orthodox Chapter VI interposition force was not shared by Nigeria. On the contrary, Abuja saw ECOMOG as a means of bolstering Doe and pushing back Taylor. Following Doe's murder, Nigeria saw the force as the means to prevent Taylor's assuming power.²³ After just two months in charge, Quainoo found himself blamed for not preventing Doe's abduction and subsequent murder. Henceforward, a Nigerian would take the position of Force Commander. The intervention in Liberia always reflected Nigerian dominance to the extent that non-Nigerian officers often referred to their Nigerian counterparts as 'Big Brother'.²⁴ Nonetheless, given the diplomatic problems that resulted from Nigerian predominance some efforts were made to dilute Abuja's influence without undermining the force's operability. To that end the US sponsored the deployment of a battalion from Senegal that deployed between 1991 and 1993. Dakar was persuaded to join by Washington on the basis of flawed intelligence that Taylor was willing to negotiate – a position that was, with hindsight, never tenable.²⁵ In a further

²¹ Howe, op.cit., p.175.

²² All anglophone members of ECOWAS, excepting Liberia itself, sent troops. Only Guinea from the francophone bloc sent a contingent at the time of ECOMOG's deployment. It should be noted that Guinean participation was largely a result of the serious influx of refugees crossing from Liberia into Guinea. As a result of francophone objections, Mali and Togo withdrew initial offers to contribute troops.

²³ Vogt, Margaret Aderinsola, 'ECOWAS, Liberia and Peacekeeping', in Edmund J.Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds.), *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996) pp.168-169.

²⁴ See, Howe, op.cit., p.162.

²⁵ Mortimer, Robert, 'Senegal's Role in ECOMOG The Francophone Dimension', in Magyar and Conteh-Morgan, op.cit., pp.123-138.

initiative Tanzania and Uganda joined the intervention, albeit for scarcely a year, as part of an 'Expanded ECOMOG' between 1994 and 1995.²⁶ Despite these short-lived efforts the intervention became characterised as a pretext for Nigerian regional policy. Margaret Vogt notes that as a result of Nigerian dominance the ECOWAS Secretariat could assert only the 'most tenuous control of ECOMOG'.²⁷

ECOMOG suffered from operational difficulties common to many peace operations, particularly all-African operations. Finance was always precarious. A mooted Special Emergency Fund received no contributions. Troop contributing states were forced to find the majority of their own costs, although Nigeria underwrote some basic costs, as well as supplying fuel, air transport, naval vessels and heavy weaponry. The shortage of funds contributed to the growing lack of morale amongst ECOMOG troops. Frequently left to their own devices troops often resorted to looting. The professionalism of the contributing militaries was also reflected in the conduct in their officers. Whilst the Ghanaian contingent received praise from neutral observers, the Nigerians were criticised for egregious corruption. Senior Nigerian officers exploited the intervention whilst junior officers and other ranks lived in penury. Systematic looting repulsed many Liberians previously favourable to the ECOMOG initiative. Logistics were a further problem. ECOMOG in Liberia did not use a central logistical administration system. Each contingent supplied its own kit, arms, ammunition, food, transport and communication. Unsurprisingly this demonstrated a great disparity in the capacity and capabilities of the various contingents. Vital airlift capability invariably fell either to Nigeria or a US-funded private company called Pacific Architect Engineers.²⁸ The lack of helicopters either for transport or as air-to-ground attack platforms proved a particular impediment. Whilst Nigeria's Order of Battle appeared impressive on paper, there were severe problems with the operability of much of its armour and aircraft. Command and control problems also soon became apparent. There was little military doctrine, less shared doctrine and still less peace operations doctrine. The contingents suffered not only from

²⁶ Ajibewa, Aderemi, 'Regional Peacekeeping in West Africa: Learning and Lessons', paper presented ASAK Biennial Conference, University of Birmingham, 9-11 September 2002.

²⁷ Vogt, op.cit., p.177.

²⁸ See, Khobe, Mitishike Maxwell, 'The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa', in Mark Malan (ed.), *Boundaries of Peace Support Operations* (Pretoria: ISS Monograph Series, 2000).

linguistic differences, but also differences of military tradition and training left over from the colonial period.

In 1996 a tenuous ceasefire broke down and street fighting and looting erupted in Monrovia. Abuja came to the conclusion that continued involvement in a seemingly endless conflict was counter-productive. Nigeria pushed for a further agreement – there were at least thirteen plans agreed by the various factions during the war. Elections were held in July 1997. Taylor won an emphatic victory. Everybody involved in the war was utterly weary. Even senior Nigerian ECOMOG officers declared that ‘enough was enough’ and that the only chance of peace was the election of Taylor.²⁹ Samuel Kofi Woods, a Liberian human rights activist, criticises the Nigerian shift in policy as expedient and short sighted.

Did you know that when Charles Taylor went to vote, the Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs escorted him! There are photos to prove it. During the entire election ECOWAS and ECOMOG repeatedly broadcast the same message: the only way to peace is to elect Charles Taylor as President. Can you imagine: the same people the Liberians, in their desperation had pinned their final hopes on.³⁰

The bulk of ECOMOG pulled out of Liberia following the elections. Although some ECOMOG officers remained in the country to help train the new AFL they were required to leave by Taylor in 1998 and were replaced by a team of Burkinabe trainers. Since the election Liberia has remained highly volatile with continued serious threats to the Taylor regime. Moreover, the Liberian government has fostered rebellion in Sierra Leone and Guinea and undermined stability throughout the sub-region.

The outbreak of conflict in Sierra Leone was closely linked to both the civil war in Liberia and the ECOMOG intervention. Taylor and Foday Sankoh, the future leader of the Sierra Leone rebel group the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), met Muammar Qadafi in Tripoli in the late 1980s in order to solicit funds for their respective rebellions. In early 1991, with Taylor’s backing, a small RUF force entered Sierra Leone from Liberia. By encouraging the RUF Taylor hoped both to undermine Sierra Leone’s support for ECOMOG in Liberia whilst also disorienting the purpose of the intervention. During

²⁹ See, Seroo, Didier, ‘Interview with Samuel Kofi Woods of Liberia’, *African Affairs*, 99/394 (2000), p.107.

³⁰ Ibid., p.172.

the next six years Sierra Leone suffered a brutal civil war punctuated by three military coups. Successive governments were forced to rely on private security companies, notably Executive Outcomes (EO) a company with links to the *apartheid* era South African military, to counter the RUF. Elections held in February 1992 returned Ahmed Tejan Kabbah as President. In January 1997 the Kabbah government terminated EO's contract. Three months later Kabbah was ousted in a coup organised by disaffected Sierra Leone Army (SLA) soldiers led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma and calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) supported by the RUF. Nigeria was swift to act. At the time of the coup some 900 Nigerian troops were present in Sierra Leone.³¹ These troops were joined by smaller contingents from Ghana and Guinea and an attempt made to stabilise the country and reinstall the Kabbah government. Despite the force's aerial and naval bombardments the rebels in Freetown held firm.

Initially the intervening states justified their actions by reference to existing bilateral military agreements. These agreements did not sanction the type of action undertaken by the intervening states. Nigeria next sought to place the intervention within the context of ECOMOG. As had been the case in Liberia, Nigeria felt capable of employing this dubious jurisprudential manoeuvre because of the continued dearth of formal security structures within ECOWAS. The only difference was chronology. As Berman and Sams point out 'whereas in Liberia, Nigeria had some form of authorisation prior to intervening, in Sierra Leone, Nigeria responded militarily first and sought ECOWAS approval only after it had intervened'.³² Indeed, it took until June 1997 for ECOWAS Foreign Ministers to accept that force was a legitimate option in the Sierra Leone case. Despite unease amongst francophone members, the ECOWAS Authority formally sanctioned the extension of ECOMOG into Sierra Leone in August 1997. The OAU offered support for the Nigerian action at its Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Harare in June 1997 thus forcing the hand of recalcitrant francophone states within ECOWAS. UN Security Council authorisation for the deployment of ECOMOG came in the form of a limited mandate intended to support the intervention force's efforts to implement the existing fuel and arms blockade on Sierra Leone. Acting

³¹ A Nigerian training team was in Sierra Leone to train the SLA. A battalion of Nigerian troops attached to ECOMOG were at the airport outside Freetown *en route* to Liberia.

³² Berman and Sams, *op.cit.*, p.114.

under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the Security Council authorised 'ECOWAS, cooperating with the democratically-elected Government of Sierra Leone, to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of the resolution relating to the supply of petroleum and petroleum products, and arms and related materiel of all types, including, where necessary and in conformity with applicable international standards, by halting inward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations, and calls upon all States to cooperate with ECOWAS in this regard'.³³ As the position on the ground deteriorated, the ECOMOG forces became embroiled in an intervention that went way beyond imposing sanctions. Eventually, in February 1998, ECOMOG troops stormed Freetown sending AFRC and RUF fighters fleeing to the bush.³⁴ Kabbah was restored to power. By early 1999 rebel forces had regrouped and were in a position to once more threaten Freetown. Fighting intensified. Kabbah was wholly reliant on the ability of the 7,000 strong ECOMOG force to resist the rebels. The civilian population suffered terrible atrocities including widespread indiscriminate mutilation by the rebels. ECOMOG also became subject to growing criticism, including censure from the UN, that its troops were guilty of human rights abuses, as well as corruption and involvement in illegal commercial activities.³⁵ Indian Maj.Gen. Vijay Jetley, original force commander of UNAMSIL, claimed that Nigerian ECOMOG commander and former Chief of Staff of the SLA, General Maxwell Khobe, accepted \$10m to allow the RUF to continue to exploit certain diamond fields.

ECOMOG eventually secured the capital at an overall cost of 5,000 dead and a shattered city. The deprivations of the civilian population resulting from the RUF's scorched earth policy encouraged internationally sponsored negotiations and in May a peace agreement was concluded in Lomé that assured government posts for rebel representatives and a general amnesty. As UN peacekeepers arrived in late 1999 to oversee the agreement as part of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

³³ UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997), S/RES/1132 (1997).

³⁴ At this time ECOMOG was supplied with arms by a British private security company, Sandline International, on behalf of a third party, apparently in violation of the standing Security Council Resolution 1132. The British Ambassador to Sierra Leone, and probably the British government, approved these sales. See, Cleaver, Gerry, 'Interventionist Companies: Privatising the Military Option', in Oliver Furley and Roy May, *African Interventionist States* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp.276-278.

(UNAMSIL) the RUF reneged on the agreement and attacked both the UN troops and ECOMOG troops in Freetown.³⁶ Despite the hopes of Kofi Annan that at least part of the ECOMOG force would remain to bolster UNAMSIL, President Obasanjo was determined to cut Nigeria's losses and by early 2000 the last Nigerian troops had left. UNAMSIL's initial deployment proved disastrous with over 500 of its peacekeepers taken hostage by the rebels. In the wake of this humiliation the UN appealed for, and received, wider international support. A thousand British paratroopers supported a greatly enhanced UNAMSIL.³⁷ Sankoh was captured in Freetown and held awaiting trial. Heightened international engagement encouraged Koroma's AFRC to accept a negotiated peace. An agreement signed in May 2001 was followed by a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme aimed at all non-state fighters in the country.³⁸ In May 2002 Kabbah was returned with over 70 per cent of the vote in an election deemed free and fair.

What have been the consequences of the interventions for *Pax West Africana*? An assessment of the operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone finds a broad similarity between ECOWAS/ECOMOG's performance, political and military, and in terms of achievements and shortcomings. Most disappointing was the inability of politicians and generals to learn lessons from the Liberian experience. ECOMOG's achievement might be categorised in terms of an innovative can-do ethos in terms of African sub-regional conflict management. Deficiencies were many, but were often akin to problems faced by peacekeeping operations elsewhere in the world writ large through the brutality of the conflicts and the pernicious effects of poverty on peacekeepers, combatants and civilians. The most serious flaw was a probable long-term increase in militarisation and concomitant suffering.

³⁵ 'Special Report of the Secretary-General on UNOMSIL, containing updated information and revised observations and recommendations', Chapter IV, S/1999/20, 7 January 1999; Reno, William, 'War and the failure of peacekeeping in Sierra Leone', *SIPRI Yearbook 2001* (Stockholm, SIPRI, 2001), p.158.

³⁶ The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) established in October 1999 replaced the smaller United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) established in June 1998. UNAMSIL was hampered by a weak Chapter VI mandate [SC Res 1270], although subsequent revisions in February 2000 and March 2001 incorporated unambiguous Chapter VII enforcement authorisation.

³⁷ At its height UNAMSIL numbered 17,500 troops.

³⁸ The programme was also aimed at the pro-government Civil Defence Force also known as the Kamajor militias.

ECOMOG acted. Or rather, Nigeria ensured that ECOMOG acted. Despite international and continental inertia, as well as the misgivings of the ECOWAS Secretariat and several member states, the regional power led by example and intervened. Nigerian/ECOMOG action at certain junctures undoubtedly prevented suffering. Sesay stresses ECOMOG's role in putting 'a check on the most brutal and barbaric phase in the civil war by separating the warring factions in Monrovia'.³⁹ In the same vein, John Hirsch underlines the indispensable role of ECOMOG, and Nigeria within ECOMOG, in ridding Freetown of the RUF/AFRC and restoring Kabbah to power in early 1998.⁴⁰

From a utilitarian perspective, however, Nigeria's insistence on using ECOMOG as a foreign policy tool has, most likely, increased the overall level of suffering in the region. Nigeria's determination to use ECOMOG to intervene in Liberia led to hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and refugees with ensuing violent contagion in Sierra Leone, and, arguably, the increased levels of insecurity manifest in Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire and Gambia. In Howe's words, 'sub-regional stability was a goal of ECOMOG, but greater sub-regional instability was the result'.⁴¹ Nigeria's would-be hegemonic role is key when considering ECOWAS' potential as an intervening body. During a joint ECOWAS/International Peace Academy (IPA) seminar held in Abuja in September 2001, Nigerian Minister of Defence General Theophilus Danduma commented that 'West African states must face two realities: first the need to establish a security regime is inevitable if the sub-region and its component states are to develop...Secondly, a hegemon is required to propel the security regime and Nigeria fits into that description'.⁴² Nigeria earns three-quarters of West Africa's GDP, has half of the region's population and possesses by far the most substantial armed forces of any state in the region. Yet at the same ECOWAS/IPA seminar, Cheik Oumar Diarra, ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary, observed that Nigeria is both the problem and the solution in the move toward a *Pax West Africana*.⁴³ Nigeria's economic and demographic dominance in the sub-region cannot be ignored if viable intervention is to take place. However, of greatest

³⁹ Sesay, op.cit., p.233.

⁴⁰ Hirsch, John, 'War in Sierra Leone', *Survival*, 43/3 (2001), p.151.

⁴¹ Howe, op.cit., p.176.

⁴² Quoted in Ero, Comfort, Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh, and Touré Augustine [Rapporteurs], *Toward a Pax West Africana: Building Peace in a Troubled Sub-region* (New York: IPA, 2001), p.14.

⁴³ Ibid., p.15.

concern is Nigeria's inability to make its weight tell. The Nigerian military proved unable or unwilling to bring a swift end to either the Liberian or Sierra Leonean missions, whilst lack of political will in Abuja saw both missions come to unsatisfactory *dénouements* in the context of regional stability. Whilst Nigerian hegemony in the region rankles with many states, unrealised hegemony coupled with failed interventionist initiatives are no more palatable and more destructive to a wider, settled regional security framework. Christopher Clapham addresses the problem of hegemony in terms of perception and responsibility.

Nothing happens unless someone takes responsibility for making it happen. The responsibility devolves on major states. Leadership requires willing followers. We have to distinguish between leadership and taking advantage of power to impose one's will on weaker powers. How should the distinction be made? First, by structure. There should be a regional organisation within which the leader and others can meet together. Second a set of principles...Third, a recognition by the leaders of the need for constant communication with colleagues within the region and a willingness to change position.⁴⁴

During the Liberia and Sierra Leone interventions these precepts were not genuinely addressed. Nigeria's questionable cooption of the Defence Protocol, the legal chicanery of the SMC and the ensuing creation of ECOMOG enflamed animosity within the organisation. That Abuja duplicated dubious procedure at the time of the Sierra Leone intervention entrenched distrust. To date ECOMOG has to a great extent operated in parallel with ECOWAS. Throughout both crises the regional organisation and its intervention force split into rival groupings to discuss with a variety of actors contradictory notions of how to end conflict. This institutional distrust affects Clapham's third prescript – communication with compromise. A narrow space for compromise results from the propensity of ECOWAS member states to robustly promote their conception of 'national interest'. When individual member states - such as Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire in Liberia and Burkina Faso and Liberia in Sierra Leone – are actively undermining an intervention in progress, compromise remains an unlikely outcome of what is, in essence, a dialogue of the deaf.

⁴⁴ Quoted in Albaugh, Ericka, A., 'Preventing Conflict in Africa: Possibilities of Peace Enforcement', in Robert I. Rothberg (ed.), *Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention* (Cambridge and Washington DC: World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.130.

In order to overcome these impediments to effective sub-regional conflict resolution, ECOWAS needed to address Clapham's second reference – the need for a set of principles. On an institutional level a mechanism was required, whilst on an operational basis a peacekeeping doctrine needs delineating. W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, writing in 1994 in the midst of the Liberian intervention, stresses that,

[T]he first resource that the organisation must have is a decision-making machinery which is both quick and versatile. The African penchant for summitry does not seem to have given ECOWAS the ability for decisive decision-making. While strong decisions do not guarantee success, vacillation and indecisiveness decrease the chance of success.⁴⁵

The first step toward an effective institutional framework for peace intervention had been taken in 1993 with the adoption of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty. The amended Treaty included provision to strengthen 'appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of *intra*- and *inter*-state conflicts', as well as referring to the 'need to establish a regional peace and security system and peacekeeping forces where appropriate'.⁴⁶ In late 1997, with the Sierra Leone intervention exercising minds within ECOWAS, the Authority resolved to implement the regional security provisions of the Revised Treaty. After two years of discussion and debate by experts and 'resource persons' a meeting was held in Lomé between 17-19 November 1999 to discuss the Draft Protocol Relating to The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. The meeting put forward several key recommendations.

- ECOMOG should be the 'backbone' of the Mechanism.
- ECOMOG should be 'properly established and its composition, mandate, chain of command, appointment and functions of its Force Commander and the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary all clearly spelt out'.
- Provision is made for training and preparation of the composite stand-by units that will constitute ECOMOG.
- Contribution, formerly on an 'able and willing' basis should be made compulsory for all ECOWAS member states.
- 'Issues of human rights, rule of law, democracy and good governance' should be integrated into the Mechanism.

⁴⁵ Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., 'Regional Organisations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia', *International Peacekeeping*, 1/3 (1994), p.296.

⁴⁶ Article 58, paragraph 2, Revised ECOWAS Treaty.

- There should be linkages on all issues with the OAU Mechanism and the UN Charter.
- ‘In the spirit of ECOWAS’ desire to rationalise institutions within the sub-region, ANAD should be integrated into the Mechanism’.
- Given the close relationship between ECOWAS and the UN there would be no need for explicit authorisation for any intervention undertaken through the Mechanism – ‘the appropriate consultation and authorisation would be done as a matter of course’.⁴⁷

The Mechanism was finally ratified at the ECOWAS summit in Lomé on 10 December 1999. Most of the key recommendations of the Draft Protocol were adopted. However, the final text of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism moderates the intent of the recommendations concerning ANAD and the UN. Presumably in the face of francophone pressure the final document remarks that ‘ANAD *may* be transformed into a specialised agency of ECOWAS’. A meeting in 1999 in Banjul between representatives of ANAD and those representing the concept of the AAFC – all of whom were members of ECOWAS – agreed ‘in principle’ to defer to ECOMOG in future conflicts requiring intervention.⁴⁸ The final text is more ambiguous than the Draft Protocol in sanctioning military intervention prior to Security Council authorisation – ‘in accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter, ECOWAS shall inform the United Nations of any military intervention undertaken in pursuit of the objectives of this Mechanism’.⁴⁹

Taken on face value the Mechanism as a document presents a radical step forward for the concept of sub-regional conflict management in Africa. Wide-ranging proposals to enhance regional security are framed including improved cooperation in early warning, conflict prevention, small arms and drug trafficking and cross-border crime. The Mechanism also seeks a broad imitation of UN practice by creating a fixed chain of command in security issues with the ECOWAS Executive Secretary taking on a role analogous to the UN Secretary General, whilst the Mediation and Security Committee

⁴⁷ Item II, paragraphs 10, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 34, 35, Meeting of Experts on the Draft Protocol Relating to The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Lomé, 17-19 November 1999.

⁴⁸ Chapter XII, article 54, Protocol Relating to The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

⁴⁹ Chapter XI, article 52, Protocol Relating to The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

(MSC) would assume some of the functions of the UN Security Council. Although the ECOWAS Authority remains the highest decision-making body, the MSC when meeting at the level of Heads of State ‘shall take final decisions on all issues under their authority and competence, including field missions and approve the terms of reference, for such missions’.⁵⁰ The Executive Secretary has the ‘power to initiate actions for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security in the sub-region. Such actions may include fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conflict’.⁵¹ Three organs were formally established to assist the Executive Secretary and the MSC – a Defence and Security Commission, an ad hoc Council of Elders and ECOMOG itself. The Defence and Security Commission, comprised of Chiefs of Staff, police chiefs, immigration and foreign office experts, will provide administrative and technical expertise for peace operations. The Council of Elders is an innovative attempt to incorporate traditional African conflict resolution expertise into the contemporary framework for conflict management. Each year a database is updated comprising eminent persons from various segments of society, including women, political, traditional and religious leaders. These individuals can be called upon by the Executive Secretary and/or MSC to convene to mediate in conflict as the need arises.

Still more radical, the Mechanism requires member states to contribute to an effective stand-by force dedicated to peace operations. This initiative returns to the concept of the AAFC *prefigured in the 1981 Defence Protocol*, as well as to the original UN Charter intention that member states provide troops and equipment for a standing army under UN command. Grounds for intervention move beyond those envisaged in the 1981 Defence Protocol – internal conflict in a member state actively supported from outside and conflict between member states to – to include intervention in internal conflict in a member state that threatens humanitarian catastrophe, regional security and/or which follow the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically-elected government. The extension of ECOMOG’s formal ambit is based on a recognition that future interventions are liable to replicate ECOMOG’s three previous deployments in

⁵⁰ Chapter II, article 12, Protocol Relating to The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

⁵¹ Chapter II, article 15, Protocol Relating to The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

Liberia and Guinea-Bissau (justified on the grounds of humanitarian catastrophe and threat to regional security) and Sierra Leone (justified on the grounds of humanitarian catastrophe and threat to regional security, as well as the restoration of the democratically elected government).

The Mechanism largely ignores operational doctrine. The text reaffirms ECOWAS' commitment to 'freedom, people's rights and democratisation' and states 'the need to develop effective policies that will alleviate the suffering of the civil population, especially women and children, and, restore life to normalcy after conflicts or natural disasters, and desirous of making further efforts in the humanitarian sphere'.⁵² Draft Protocol recommendations to include a commitment to good governance and the rule of law were omitted from the final text. The conduct of interventions, or the *jus in bello* in terms of the just war tradition, remains the prerogative of the individual member states. This lends heavily on the curricula of the various Western peacekeeping capacity enhancement programmes undertaken by ECOWAS militaries. As noted in the next chapter there are problems of demarcation between peacekeeping training and counter-insurgency training given by Western militaries to their African counterparts. From the point of view of this research the most crucial aspect of operational doctrine concerns the effectiveness of the intervening force fulfils its mandate, together with the manner – impartiality and proportionality – in which it conducts itself.

If the legitimacy of an intervention depends in large measure on internal support, then the ultimate success of an intervention depends heavily on relations between the intervening forces and the local population - and particularly on local perceptions of force credibility. Credibility, in turn, will derive from what the military is expected to do, and how effectively it goes about doing it.⁵³

The series of interventions in Sierra Leone, and to a lesser extent Liberia, offers comparisons in the way in which various intervening forces related to, and were perceived by, the population. UN intervening forces – UNOMIL, UNOSOM and UNAMSIL – have rated poorly with the local populations in terms of mandate fulfilment,

⁵² Preamble, Protocol Relating to The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

⁵³ Malan, Mark; Rakate, Phenyio and McIntyre, Angela, *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone* (Pretoria: ISS Monograph Series, 2002), p.112.

although in general their conduct is perceived favourably. Conversely ECOMOG forces were welcomed by a majority of the civilian population of Monrovia and Freetown where they were seen as significantly more willing to engage the rebels than UN forces. However, as the conflicts became protracted, the behaviour of ECOMOG troops, from looting and ill-discipline to corruption, led to severe disaffection between the local populace and the intervening troops. In Liberia there were suggestions that 'UNOMIL was in place to monitor Nigeria's behaviour as much as the indigenous peace process'.⁵⁴ As a counterpoint to the interventions by international organisations it is worth noting that the operation by British armed forces that extended to supporting UNAMSIL's efforts to fulfil its mandate was highly credible. The majority of the population saw British troops as both effective and they operated within the standards of the *jus in bello* insofar as they equate to peace-enforcement.

Writing at the time, John Ingebedion questioned the durability of the first ECOMOG operation – 'does the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia really mark a departure from the political immobilism of the past in ECOWAS or just an isolated undertaking that holds no prospects for collective security and a common foreign policy?'.⁵⁵ ECOWAS intervened in Liberia for almost seven years and in Sierra Leone for over two years. An ECOWAS force also spent six months as an interposition force in Guinea-Bissau. ECOWAS has also established a sophisticated and radical Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. Yet, despite these achievements many of ECOWAS' integral problems persist. Whilst the effort and sacrifice of those involved in the interventions is praiseworthy, none of the operations can be said to have been successful by any overall analysis. The Liberian and Sierra Leone conflicts were finally, and temporarily, ended by the prolongation of fighting and intervention leading to weariness on both sides – in the case of Sierra Leone the ECOMOG troops had withdrawn or been coopted by UNAMSIL. The partiality of ECOMOG led to increased militarisation of both conflicts that also contributed to the prolongation and entrenchment of conflict. Both interventions were reliant on the

⁵⁴ Yorke, Edmund, 'Regional Initiatives and Non-UN Forms of Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa' in Stuart Gordon and Francis Toase, *Aspects of Peacekeeping* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p.89.

⁵⁵ Ingebedion, John E., 'ECOMOG in Comparative Perspective' in Timothy M. Shaw and Julius Emeka Okolo, *Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p.238.

political will of Nigeria's military rulers, as well as Nigerian military power. That Nigeria was unable to enforce a peace in either case implies either incapacity on the part of Nigeria/ECOMOG as a military force or/and a willingness on the part of sections of the intervening forces to prolong conflict in order to continue exploiting the conflict for self-gain. The one intervention in which Nigeria played no significant role – the operation in Guinea-Bissau – proved feeble. This intervention will be analysed in a later chapter.

Nigeria's inability to assume either an authentic or tempered hegemonic role coupled with continued rivalries within ECOWAS, notably the anglophone/francophone rivalry, continues to limit ECOWAS' ability to act. Just a few weeks after signing the new Mechanism, President Henri Konan Bédié of Côte d'Ivoire was overthrown in a coup d'état. Despite the overthrow of a democratic government being cited in the Mechanism as a justification for intervention, and despite the former colonial power France refraining from direct action ECOWAS restricted itself to condemning the coup. ECOWAS also proved ineffectual faced with cross-border conflict between Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone in 2000 and 2001.

Amadu Sesay asserts that 'ECOMOG as a mechanism for the maintenance of sub-regional security in West Africa has gained both local and international recognition, legitimacy and acceptability'.⁵⁶ This assessment holds to a point. The current success of UNAMSIL notwithstanding, the UN and US continue to see ECOWAS/ECOMOG as a prototype for African SROs. However, in terms of a sub-regional peacekeeping/peace-enforcement framework, ECOMOG and the Mechanism have laid foundations, but fundamental difficulties persist. The ECOWAS/IPA seminar distinguished essential, albeit axiomatic, steps that must be taken.

If ECOWAS is to build an effective peacekeeping mechanism, then all the countries in the sub-region should have a common goal on security priorities as well as a strategic and coherent vision on how they plan to tackle insecurity in the sub-region. This requires candid and open dialogue at the highest political level... While ECOWAS is establishing its political and institutional organs it also needs to develop a well-funded, well-trained and well-organized military structure on the foundations of ECOMOG.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Sesay, Amadu, 'ECOMOG and Sub-regional Security in West Africa', ACCORD Online Publications <<http://www.accord.org.za>> posted September 1999.

(b) Southern Africa Development Community

The current incarnation of SADC is built on the shoulders of two previous southern African organisations. The Front-line States (FLS) was established in the mid-1970s in order to support movements still fighting against minority rule and neo-colonial intervention in the region, notably in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Mozambique. In 1980, the nine majority rule states in the southern region formed a loose cooperative body - it had no formal treaty - intended primarily to reduce the region's economic dependence on South Africa and in so doing bolster the liberation struggle in that country.⁵⁷ The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was successful in internationalising support for its anti-*apartheid* programme, but failed to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. Indeed, the region became more dependent on trade with South Africa. Thus, when the South African government removed the ban on the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1992, SADCC moved towards including a democratic South Africa in a new organisation. In 1992 the ten SADCC member states signed the treaty establishing SADC. South Africa joined in 1994, followed by Mauritius in 1995, and the DRC and Seychelles in 1997.

Unlike ECOWAS, SADC's history was directly linked to regional security. It is, therefore, not surprising that SADC's original treaty included references to the security environment and set security related aims. Nonetheless, given that the original goal of regional economic dependence remained the core *raison d'être* of the organisation, these references are limited and unspecific. Article 5 of the treaty commits member states to promoting and defending peace and security, whilst Article 21 admits 'politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security', as areas for cooperation.⁵⁹

Without a detailed agenda for achieving the treaty's security aims, SADC was forced to fall back on a substructure of the FLS, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). By 1997 all SADC members had joined the ISDSC, although the FLS itself had disbanded in 1994. Although informal, without a governing charter,

⁵⁷ Ero, Sidhu, and Touré, op.cit., p.27.

⁵⁸ SADCC comprised Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Namibia joined in 1990.

⁵⁹ Declaration and Treaty of SADC, Article 5, para.1, section c; Article 21, para.3, section g.

secretariat or headquarters, the ISDSC has been reasonably successful in promoting peacekeeping capacity building through its three sub-committees – Defence, Public Security and State Security. From 1995 onwards, at the instigation of the Defence Sub-Committee, the Regional Training Centre of the Zimbabwe Staff College held a series of peacekeeping related courses. Other countries have followed this model. Malawi and Namibia held peacekeeping seminars and courses in 1998 and 1999.⁶⁰ SADC countries have also taken part in three medium-scale regional peacekeeping training exercises – Blue Hungwe in Zimbabwe and Blue Crane in South Africa with British assistance and *Tanzanite* in Tanzania with French assistance. These exercise are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

The *ad hoc* nature of the ISDSC led to calls for the creation of an institution devoted to security. Prior to its dissolution there were suggestions that the FLS could take on this role. In 1995, a formal proposal was made calling for the establishment of a security mechanism, the Association of Southern African States (ASAS), to operate independently from the SADC Secretariat, reporting directly to the SADC Heads of State and Government. The sensitive issues of sovereignty and the limits to the authority of such a body, as well as questions over the chairmanship of ASAS led to the idea being deferred for further consideration.

In the event ASAS was replaced by the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. The summit meeting in Gaborone in 1996 agreed that the Organ would act at summit level, independent of other SADC organs. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe would be the first Chairman, although it was intended that the Chair would rotate on an annual basis. The ISDSC would become an institution of the Organ. These plans soon proved controversial. South Africa and Zimbabwe disagreed on the level of autonomy that the Organ should enjoy with the former seeing the institution as subservient to the SADC summit and the latter proposing that it should effectively operate in parallel to SADC. Pretoria's proposal would see the authority to intervene derived from the SADC Heads of State and Government, whereas Harare sees the Chair of the Organ as ultimate authority for the functioning of the Organ.⁶¹ The 1997 summit failed to adopt the draft protocol

⁶⁰ The courses in Zimbabwe, Malawi and Namibia received British assistance, both financial and practical.

⁶¹ Kornegay, Francis and Chesterman Simon [Rapporteurs], *Southern Africa's Evolving Security Architecture: Problems and Prospects* (New York, IPA, 2000), p.5.

concerning the establishment of the Organ. Further meetings in Angola and Mozambique did little to resolve the impasse. In 1998, Mark Malan commented that the status of the negotiations over the structure of the Organ amounted 'to a ham-fisted effort at steering a middle road between the positions of South Africa and Zimbabwe'.⁶² International and regional discomfiture at Zimbabwe's continued presence in DRC helped turn opinion in Pretoria's favour. A draft protocol was presented in March 2001 leading to a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation being signed in August of the same year. The Organ would be subservient to the SADC summit. The Chair of the Organ would rotate. As a partial compromise the Chair 'shall be responsible for the overall direction and the achievement of the Organ'. However, a troika comprising the Chair, the incoming Chair and the outgoing Chair, who will report to the summit, would mediate this responsibility.⁶³ Berman and Sams consider the framing of the new protocol a sign that the controversy over the Organ is abating.⁶⁴ However, they warn that 'it is important not to oversell the potential impact of an "operationalised" Organ, at least in the short term'.⁶⁵

The complex war in the DRC, involving numerous Congolese armed groups and eight intervening states, has its immediate cause in the 1996-1997 rebellion that saw long-time dictator, Mobuto Sese Seko, replaced by Laurent Désiré Kabila.⁶⁶ By August 1998, Uganda and Rwanda, former supporters of Kabila, had switched allegiance to another rebel movement, the *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie* (RCD). Kabila's own forces, the *Forces armées congolaises* (FAC) proved no match for the rebels. Within two weeks the RCD had captured several strategic towns and were threatening Kinshasa. Kabila needed external assistance. Zimbabwe took an early interest in the conflict and made it clear that its support lay with Kabila. When the DRC officially requested support from SADC Mugabe lobbied the leaders of fellow member states on Kabila's behalf. A task force comprising Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe was formed to make recommendations. Just two weeks after the start of the rebellion the task

⁶² Malan, Mark, 'Regional Power Politics Under the Cover of SADC: Running Amok with a Mythical Organ', *ISS Occasional Paper*, 35 (1998), p.4.

⁶³ Article 4, para.4, SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, 14 August 2001.

⁶⁴ Berman, Eric G., and Sams, Katie E., 'Regional Peacekeeping in Africa', *Conflict Trends*, 3 (2001).

⁶⁵ Ibid.

force reported and Mugabe went on television to announce that SADC was in accord and that Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe intended to intervene to assist a fellow SADC member. Mugabe's assertion that SADC was in agreement misrepresented the private position of several SADC members of which South Africa was the most significant.

Justifications put forward by Zimbabwe for intervention in DRC had no basis in international law. The initial explanation was that the combined operation was based on a decision of SADC's Organ. As the longest serving Head of State Mugabe had assumed the Chair of the Organ, although that body was far from formally constituted. As discussed, at the time of the intervention, a definitive agreement on the scope of the Organ remained neither framed, nor ratified. Thus, Mugabe was in no position to speak or act on behalf of a security structure still in formation. Likewise an alternative justification, put forward by Angola and Namibia, that the intervention was authorised by a decision of the ISDSC was misapprehending that body's status. The ISDSC, more of a talking shop for regional security issues, had always been informal without a headquarters or secretariat. An *ad hoc* meeting in Harare on 18 August supported intervention. However, beyond the fact that the ISDSC had never claimed a mandate for mutual defence intervention, only four of its fourteen members were present, undermining its authority as a legitimising body.

The intervention stopped the rebel advance and saved Kabila. However, the intervention by SADC states was unable to win back much of the territory already lost to the RCD. The DRC became a patchwork of local conflicts, sometimes a part, sometimes divorced from the wider civil war. States with convoluted rationales for intervening, such as Chad and Sudan, became temporarily involved. There were splits within the RCD and between its main supporters, Uganda and Rwanda. An agreement concluded in Lusaka in mid-1999 proved difficult to implement. From the perspective of the intervening states, the DRC's territory had become a space within which to further strategic and economic interests. The size of the intervention - tens of thousands of troops were eventually deployed - and the number of states involved, bespoke no facile solution to the conflict. As David Shearer notes, 'peace in the DRC will depend on a substantial reconciliation of

⁶⁶ See, Cleaver, Gerry and Massey, Simon, 'DRC: Africa's Scramble for Africa' in Oliver Furley and Roy May, *African Interventionist States* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp.193-194.

its neighbours interests'.⁶⁷ In early 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son Joseph. The change of leadership advanced the mediation process and the Lusaka Agreement was resuscitated. Moreover, by this time, the majority of intervening states were counting the costs of intervention and finding liabilities in terms of financial cost, casualties and international disapproval outweighing gains. Nonetheless, it took almost two years for all foreign troops to quit DRC.⁶⁸ The Zimbabwean armed forces – the last to leave – held a parade at the end of November 2002 to commemorate 'a job well done'.⁶⁹

Of greatest interest to this research is the effect that the intervention in DRC of three of its members had on SADC. Zimbabwe's lead role in the operation clearly exacerbated the growing rift between Harare and Pretoria. The *Zimbabwe Mirror* notes the 'tug of war between Mandela and Mugabe on the SADC Organ threatening thereby to divide SADC itself into two camps' increasing 'pressure from certain countries in the region for Zimbabwe to withdraw from the DRC'.⁷⁰ As well as South Africa the author no doubt has in mind Mozambique and Tanzania who voiced concern, albeit usually in private, over the deleterious effects the intervention was having on regional cohesion and security. The peremptory nature of the intervention stymied efforts to construct a working structure for the Organ, as well as its ratification. The conduct of the intervening states also set a poor precedent for future operations. Troop-contributing states immediately set about furthering their own aims – largely strategic in the case of Angola and Namibia, but economic in the case of Zimbabwe. Numerous Zimbabwean politicians, businessmen and officers used the intervention to exploit the DRC's mineral wealth. Moreover, the operation was too wide and complex for SADC to address effectively. The combined strength of the intervening militaries together with the Congolese forces could not effect a victory, nor contain the conflict. Admittedly the anti-Kabila forces, with Rwandan and Ugandan help, were of comparable military strength. The allegation that the Zimbabwean contingent prolonged the fighting so as to protect their burgeoning mining portfolio further muddies the question of justification for the intervention.

⁶⁷ Shearer, David, 'Africa's Great War', *Survival*, 41/2 (1999), p.102.

⁶⁸ Uganda agreed to pull out its troops from eastern Congo. However, it accepted a request by the UN to keep a thousand troops in the area in order to fill a potentially calamitous power vacuum.

⁶⁹ *Harare Herald*, 27 November 2002.

Undoubtedly the conflict in DRC was large and unique – ‘Africa’s scramble for Africa’.⁷¹ Policing a settlement continues to exercise the minds of conflict resolution specialists from Addis Ababa to New York. However, an assessment of the political performance of SADC as an institution and the military performance of those SADC states that did intervene, leads to the conclusion that the conflict was beyond the scope of an SRO. The deployment of a UN monitoring group (MONUC) in mid-2001 recognises a need to broaden the size and scope of conflict resolution means and methods.

South African-led intervention in Lesotho was less contentious. The troubled post-colonial history of the small state of Lesotho, entirely surrounded by South Africa, has captured the attention of regional leaders on two occasions in the past decade. In January 1994 a diplomatic task force of representatives from FLS states attempted to mediate a constitutional standoff between Lesotho’s democratically-elected Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle and the Head of State, King Letsie III. However, the underlying causes of the crisis lay with unrest and split loyalties within the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF). The task force comprised representatives from Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa. It should be noted that at the time South Africa was not a member of the FLS, nor yet a member of SADC. However, in August, despite the diplomatic efforts, Mokhehle announced that he intended to establish a commission to inquire into the future of the monarchy. In response, Letsie dissolved the government and suspended the constitution. In early September, the protagonists met in Pretoria and came to an agreement to restore the constitution with the task force acting as guarantors. Despite the agreement Letsie endeavoured to further constrain Mokhehle with unacceptable conditions. The stalemate was broken by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) forcing Letsie’s hand by engaging in a series of ground and air manoeuvres on the South African-Lesotho border. The SANDF concluded the exercises on 11 September and within two days the government had been restored and Letsie had agreed to abdicate in favour of his father.

Would the task force have intervened militarily if Letsie had not capitulated? Berman and Sams suggest that, at the time, Botswana and Zimbabwe lacked the will and

⁷⁰ *Zimbabwe Mirror*, 17 August 2002.

⁷¹ Cleaver and Massey, op.cit., p.193.

capacity to intervene alone or in concert.⁷² Given Lesotho's location, SANDF support would have been vital for an effective intervention. The SANDF was in the process of downsizing and completing a complex post-*apartheid* integration process. The state of affairs in Lesotho would have had to deteriorate significantly to persuade Pretoria to embark on any peace operation.

In 1998, Lesotho's unsettled polity forced a military intervention aimed at restoring peace. Elections in May 1998 returned the ruling party, the Liberal Congress for Democracy (LCD) under the leadership of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, with 79 out of 80 seats. The opposition was furious given that it seemed that the LCD had achieved this result with only 60 per cent of the vote. To stem growing civil unrest SADC set up a Committee of Experts under South African judge Pius Langa to address the legitimacy of the poll. The Langa Commission found irregularities in the process, but concluded that they did not invalidate the elections. At this point the royal palace was being 'guarded' by rival militias. When junior officers in the RLDF put Mosisili under house arrest, and forced the removal of senior officers thought to support the LCD, the Prime Minister requested SADC states to intervene.⁷³

At dawn on 22 September, South Africa responded to Mosisili's request by launching Operation Boleas. The intervention proved a disaster. The operation was based on a standing plan formulated during the *apartheid* era, Operation Mountain, designed to overturn any government in Lesotho thought have become too sympathetic to the ANC.⁷⁴ The initial deployment of 600 South African troops was joined late in the day by a motorised infantry company of 130 men from the Botswana Defence Force (BDF). It proved inadequate to achieve the aims of the operation – 'to intervene militarily in Lesotho to prevent any further anarchy and create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order'.⁷⁵ The intervention was seriously bungled. Boleas was spearheaded by troops recently integrated into the SANDF from former guerrilla forces, whilst the Force Commander, Colonel Robby Hartsliet, was denied the use of the two units, the 2nd and 7th

⁷² Berman and Sams, op.cit., p.175.

⁷³ Mosisili requested help from the leaders of South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

⁷⁴ *Africa Confidential*, 39/20, 9 October 1989, p.6.

⁷⁵ See, Neethling, Theo, 'Southern African Military Interventions in the 1990s' in du Plessis and Hough, op.cit., p.289. The force would eventually number 3,000 personnel.

battalions, best trained and equipped for peace operations.⁷⁶ Nine South African and 58 RLDF soldiers were killed. The intervening forces took over 48 hours to secure key installations in the capital city, Maseru. There was an assumption that the Lesotho police, thought to be loyal to the government, would protect against looting and arson. In the event they withdrew from the streets, whilst the bulk of the army sought to repel the South African and Botswanan troops. As a result the capital was reduced to 'a smouldering, looted ruin, mutinous soldiers of the RLDF had taken to the hills to start a (probably ineffectual) guerrilla war, six districts in South Africa's neighbouring Free State were declared disaster areas and several South African political and military reputations lay in ruins'.⁷⁷ One Lesotho opposition representative remarked that 'we [the opposition] protested here for almost seven weeks without a single window being broken and now look at our city – it has been destroyed'.⁷⁸ As with the crisis in 1994, the response of the large majority of SADC states was restricted to words rather than deeds. General L. M. Fisher of the BDF justified South Africa's lead.

[I]f you look at Lesotho's geographical position, it is completely surrounded by South Africa. It was clear that there were hostages, and if you were going to save their lives, the nearest country was South Africa. Getting consensus is really at the strategic level. The operational level is a different matter. Mistakes at that level can be dealt with. The key thing is getting consensus to legitimate an operation. In Lesotho, time was critical.⁷⁹

As a senior Botswanan military officer, Fisher is partial. By invoking SADC authorisation, as well as emphasising the limited Botswanan military support, Pretoria sought to paper over what Berman and Sams have called 'a rash decision to intervene'.⁸⁰ To what extent *was* the sub-regional organisation involved in the decision to intervene. From the start of the operation, the SANDF claimed that the intervention took place under the auspices of SADC. South African spokesmen announced that the intervention had been a SADC initiative and the media reported that the operation was conducted by SADC troops.⁸¹ Although South African and Botswanan spokesmen, as well as Mosilili,

⁷⁶ *Africa Research Bulletin*, October 1-31 1998, p.13296.

⁷⁷ *Africa Confidential*, 39/20, 9 October 1998, p.6.

⁷⁸ *Africa Research Bulletin*, October 1-31 1998, p.13295.

⁷⁹ Quoted in Albaugh, op.cit., pp.181-182.

⁸⁰ Berman and Sams, op.cit., p.185.

⁸¹ Malan, op.cit., p.7.

would claim that the SADC summit held in Mauritius a week before Boleas authorised intervention in the case of a coup, no such explicit authority was given. Whilst the summit praised the mediation efforts, the Heads of State had merely called upon the task force plus Mozambique to remain *apprised* of developments in Lesotho. From Malan's perspective it is hard to understand how this stricture 'was translated into a SADC mandate for a peace operation that resembled a military intervention and occupation of the Kingdom of Lesotho'.⁸² General Fisher's remarks reinforce Lesotho's *de facto* dependence, both economic and political, on South Africa. Roger Southall notes that 'whether the events of September 1998 were an 'invasion' (as propagated by the opposition) or an 'intervention' (as maintained by SADC), the post-*apartheid* reality would seem to be that South Africa has become increasingly drawn into Lesotho's politics as an external guarantor of democracy'.⁸³ David Coplan goes further asserting that 'the SADC military intervention appears to have accelerated what might already have been an irresistible gravitation toward political incorporation'.⁸⁴ However, at the time, the Mandela government, wary of replicating the hegemonic tendencies of the preceding minority-rule regimes, misrepresented an evolving sub-regional peacekeeping framework to justify intervention. Yet, as with Nigeria in ECOMOG, successful sub-regional conflict management depends on a viable hegemon. Constant referral to a 'SADC intervention' obfuscated South Africa's legitimate grounds – grounds Pretoria were unwilling to articulate - to intervene bilaterally in a constitutional stand-off with ramifications beyond Lesotho's borders.

Edmund Yorke notes that beyond the immediate harm to the reputation of the SANDF, long considered sub-Saharan Africa's most competent military, 'the damage to South Africa's political credibility, her perceived legitimacy as a vehicle for regional peacekeeping, has been even more catastrophic'.⁸⁵ Prior to the South African/SADC operation in Lesotho, Pretoria had signalled a cautious approach to sub-regional peace operations. A draft White Paper on National Defence published in 1995 recognised that

⁸² Ibid. p.8.

⁸³ Southall, Roger, 'SADC's Intervention into Lesotho: An Illegal Defence of Democracy?', in Furley and May, op.cit., p.169.

⁸⁴ Coplan, David B., 'A River Runs Through It: The Meaning of the Lesotho-Free State Border', *African Affairs*, 100/398 (2001), p.116.

⁸⁵ Yorke, op.cit., p.91.

the dynamics for such operations were new to South Africa and the SANDF.⁸⁶ The final White Paper, *Defence in a Democracy*, proposes to restrict SANDF involvement in peace operations to instances where the following conditions are met.

- There should be parliamentary approval and public support for such involvement. This will require an appreciation of the associated costs and risks, including the financial costs and risk to the lives of military personnel.
- The operation should have a clear mandate, mission and objectives.
- There should be realistic criteria for terminating the operation.
- The operation should be authorised by the United Nations Security Council.
- Operations in Southern Africa should be sanctioned by SADC and should be undertaken together with other SADC states rather than conducted on a unilateral basis. Similarly, operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the Organisation of African Unity.⁸⁷

Even a superficial appraisal in the light of these conditions finds Boleas wanting. Southall makes the point that, from both a political and military perspective, the mission was based on ‘*ad hocery*’ attesting that that South Africa ‘had not yet attained the right blend of strategies and practices to implement its proclaimed role as regional leader, mediator and peacemaker’.⁸⁸ Up to Boleas, however, it might be argued that that South Africa’s regional claims had been made *sotto voce*. Jack Spence has analysed the tension between the ‘realist’ and ‘radical’ positions in post-apartheid South Africa – between ‘getting investment’ and ‘taking the moral high ground’.⁸⁹

South Africa is in the process of becoming ‘just another country’, and one which will have to compete with many others similarly placed for a share of the world’s largesse...Can South Africa, should South Africa, attempt – to use a much abused phrase – ‘to punch above its weight’ in international affairs? And can that punch be delivered with restraint, moral circumspection and relative success given the government’s inevitable preoccupation with pressing and often conflicting needs of its domestic constituency and the impact of globalisation?⁹⁰

Domestic policy concentrated on economic development and poverty alleviation.

Security priorities in post-apartheid South Africa stressed integration of the armed forces,

⁸⁶ *Defence in a Democracy*, Draft White Paper on National Security for the Republic of South Africa, June 1995, ch.5.

⁸⁷ *Defence in a Democracy*, White Paper on National Security for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, ch.5, para. 24, sub-paras. 21-25.

⁸⁸ Southall, *op.cit.*, p.168.

⁸⁹ *Mail and Guardian* [Johannesburg], 8 September 1995.

as well as achieving a reduction in defence spending without compromising the capacity to counter external or internal threats. Foreign policy was given a low weight. Reluctance to intervene in Lesotho in 1994 was followed by unwillingness to intervene in the Kivu crisis in eastern Zaire in 1996. This complex conflict incorporating troops from both sides of the Rwandan civil war together with local rebels and militias, as well as the Zairean regular army threatened to escalate into a serious humanitarian crisis. Despite seemingly falling within South Africa's reach as sub-regional hegemon, Pretoria deferred to an external initiative led by Canada.⁹¹ Andrew Cooper and Ian Taylor make the point that, 'at a time when "made in Africa" solutions to crisis situations had begun to generate some impetus, the "out of Africa" leadership role of Canada stood out as an apparent aberration'.⁹² Canada's ill-judged initiative – the Canadian military did not have the capacity to see through a potentially open-ended intervention – had much to do with domestic politics, restoring a tarnished reputation in the field of peacekeeping and no little naivety.

South African reluctance to involve itself in the DRC imbroglio was further emphasised by its opposition, albeit often tacit, to the Zimbabwe-led intervention in 1998. To what extent has the hesitancy toward taking a lead in addressing conflict in the DRC undermined South Africa's position in the sub-region? Pretoria learnt a lesson in Lesotho. Nigeria's experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone were also cautionary. As became clear with hindsight the DRC war was too big and messy to be amenable to sub-regional intervention. As Cooper and Taylor comment,

[S]outh Africa chose effectively to wait the activity out. To say no on this activity did not mean, though, that South Africa was uninterested or incapable of taking part in serious endeavours to deal with crises in its neighbourhood. South Africa simply wanted to act on these issues in its own time and on its own terms.⁹³

Reckless intervention would have left South Africa strategically weaker than it is today. South Africa still has problems. Its economy remains unstable and there are doubts over

⁹⁰ Spence, J.E., 'On Becoming "Just Another Country"', *World Today*, March (1997), p.69.

⁹¹ See, Massey, Simon, 'The Greatest Intervention that Never Happened', *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* <<http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a533.htm>> posted on 15 February 1998.

⁹² Cooper, Andrew F., and Taylor, Ian, "'Made in Africa" Versus "Out of Africa": Comparing South Africa's Non-Leadership with Canada's Leadership in the 1996 Crisis in Eastern Zaire', *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 39/1 (2001), p.24.

the effectiveness of its ageing troops and equipment. Nonetheless, Pretoria retains, and must retain, a diplomatic interest in mediating the conflict in DRC. Moreover, if a ceasefire can be made to hold, South Africa must soon decide whether to take the further step of involving itself militarily in the peace creation process as a contributor to an intervention force whether it be sub-regional, continental or international..

Conclusion

ECOWAS and SADC are the pioneers of subsidiarity at sub-regional level in conflict resolution in Africa. The chapter has considered the rationales behind the drift from organisations intended to encourage economic cooperation and development into the field of conflict resolution, the manner in which that task was undertaken and the consequences of that shift. The leaders of the member states of ECOWAS and SADC are at the sharp end of the imperative to summon the will to develop the capacity to intervene in conflicts within their respective regions. Although member states from each of these organisations have sent troops to intervene in regional conflicts the rationales and justifications for so doing remain muddled.

The two ECOMOG operations discussed above were bold but flawed attempts to address conflicts with serious humanitarian and regional security ramifications. Neither operation benefited from a singularity of purpose on the part of ECOWAS. Indeed the parent body in Abuja was often at odds with its Monitoring Group commanders in the field. The interventions underscored the rivalry – essentially along an anglophone/francophone divide – within ECOWAS. Member states undermined the efforts of other fellow member states. This trend was exacerbated by the manifest partiality exhibited by the Nigerian-led intervention force from its inception in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Like the OAU, ECOWAS has struggled to develop and operationalise effective institutional structures to oversee potential peace operations. In this regard much faith has been invested in the recently adopted Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. A frustrating aspect of the operation in Sierra Leone was the manner in which political and military errors made in Liberia were replicated.

⁹³ Ibid., p.38.

The 'SADC' interventions were qualitatively different to those of ECOWAS. As with the OAU and ECOWAS the construction of an effective security framework has been difficult. In the case of SADC, however, the operations supposedly conducted in its name took place before a legitimising authority had been established. The organisation, therefore, had practically no real input into the decision-making processes of the intervening states. The three states involved in the DRC intervention acted entirely according to national interest criteria, as did South Africa in Lesotho. As such, SADC's capacity to act in unison as a motor for conflict *resolution* has yet to be tested. As with ECOWAS the experience of intervention highlighted tensions within the organisation, in this case competition between a pro-active Zimbabwe and a reluctant regional power in South Africa. The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation that formally establishes the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security was ratified in 2001. However, Berman and Sam's comment that in terms of unity and commitment a post-Organ SADC might not differ much from a pre-Organ SADC is well taken.

The interventions by the two organisations share several characteristics. All four were of dubious legitimacy – both legal and moral. Whilst the organisations/states involved invoked bilateral agreements, letters of invitation and humanitarian justification the UN Security Council did not sanction any of the operations at the time. If just war criteria are employed in the context of these 'peace operations' each intervention fails on more than one count. In terms of the *jus ad bellum* the principles the ECOMOG operations potentially contravened six out of seven criteria, with the exception being the principle of *reasonable hope*. The most apparent infractions were against the principles of *right authority* and *just cause*. The same analysis applies to the intervention by SADC members in the DRC with more emphasis. The South African-led operation in Lesotho was less clear-cut. Although the criterion of *right authority* was breached, the principles of *just cause* and *right intention* give the intervention an ethical foundation.

The *jus in bello* adds another point of comparison. Once more Operation Boleas might be distinguished. The escalation of violence and subsequent destruction of much of Maseru was the result of poor planning rather than deliberate action. In the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone and DRC it is clear that the intervening forces breached the *discrimination* and *proportionality* criteria for the prosecution of a just war. The rapid

transit from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement to a war-fighting posture marked by looting and human rights abuses undermined ECOMOG's standing in the eyes of non-combatants. The SADC troops were never really perceived as involved in a peace operation, although once more the civilian population was often targeted for looting and abuse. These three operations were also conspicuous for the manner in which resources were exploited by the intervening forces. In Liberia and Sierra Leone this economic component was secondary. However, in DRC the expropriation of mining and mineral extraction concerns became the prime motive for continued Zimbabwean involvement. In terms of *proportionality* the amount of harm caused, in terms of entrenched militarisation and prolongation of the conflict, outweighed perceived advantages in each intervention.

A final point of comparison is the role of the assumptive regional hegemons in their respective SROs. Nigeria could be held to be a failed hegemon, whilst South Africa could be taken to be an unwilling hegemon. The two powers are on opposite sides of the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate. Abuja's regional policy has been distinctively communitarian with Nigerian involvement in all-African intervention stretching back to the peace operations in Chad between 1979-1982. Nigeria promotes 'try Africa first'. However, to date, it has been wary of accepting US support for peacekeeping capacity enhancement. South African policy under Mandela, on the other hand, was distinctively cosmopolitan. Privileging domestic policy over regional policy Pretoria adopted an internationalist stance spurning American suggestions that it should seek to live up to its assumptive hegemonic role.

ECOWAS, and to a lesser extent SADC, have been in the forefront of developing a capacity to intervene in regional conflict. Were the members of these organisations right to do so? Once more the recurrent theme of a lack of an alternative is relevant. Both organisations have reacted to, and in the case of ECOWAS prior to, Western disengagement from conflict resolution on the continent. Moreover, their decision to develop an interventionist capacity was taken in the knowledge that the continental body had effectively abandoned ambitions to develop a peacekeeping/peace-enforcement capacity of its own. In all the above cases, with the exception of the maverick intervention in DRC, whilst the political and moral bases for intervention might be

ambiguous, the intervening states/organisations might be said to have acted in good faith. None of the interventions, however, could be described as an unalloyed success. It is with this in mind that Mark Malan warns of SROs being shunted down a political cul-de-sac, taking prime and sole responsibility for regional conflict resolution but without reasonable prospects of meliorating institutional, structural, military and financial constraints.⁹⁴ Despite signs that Britain and France – with recent direct interventions in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire respectively - are less wedded to the concept than the US sub-regional subsidiarity continues to be the norm in terms of conflict resolution in Africa. The next chapter considers why the US, France and Britain disengaged from direct intervention on the continent and examines the various and joint peacekeeping capacity enhancement initiatives intended to take its place.

⁹⁴ Malan, Mark, ‘The OAU and African Sub-regional Organisations – A closer look at the ‘peace pyramid’, *ISS Occasional Paper*, 36 (1999), pp.1-12.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ROLE OF PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVES

For Jendayi Frazer, 'the complex relationship between Africa, Europe and the United States is captured nicely by the mutual survival system found in nature...they all have real interests in improving conflict management in Africa'.¹ Certainly it is true that whilst strategic interests evaporated at the end of the Cold War, there remain economic interests and investment prospects, as well as the potent stimulus of humanitarian catastrophe. Even so, by the end of 1990s the main Western powers with an interest in the field of peace intervention - the US, Britain and France, collectively called the P3 – seemed to have concluded that direct intervention on a large scale in African conflicts was not worth the candle. Indeed, as David O'Brien observes, 'the track record of major bilateral donors (and the US in particular) demonstrates that they are intent on leaving Africa to its own resources'.²

There has been a clear hierarchy of engagement by these powers since the independence era in Africa. Taking together a series of interests – strategic, economic, size of expatriate population and global standing – the hierarchy has been France followed by the US followed by Britain. Rivalry exists between these three, although the deepest competition has been between France and the 'Anglo-Saxons' - Britain and the US. This rivalry is sometimes referred to as the 'Fashoda syndrome' referring to an encounter between British and French forces in Egypt in 1898 that resulted in France withdrawing from the Nile. The formidability of direct intervention in post-Cold War Africa, notably in Somalia and Rwanda, finally led to a series of meetings intended to bury existing rivalries and initiate mutually beneficial strategic coordination in the context of African security. The result was the announcement on 22 May 1997 of a joint P3 initiative intended to coordinate ongoing and future efforts in the realm of African

¹ Frazer, Jendayi, 'The African Crisis Response Initiative: Self-Interested Humanitarianism', *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 4/2 (1997), p.115.

² O'Brien, David, 'The Search for Subsidiarity: The UN, African Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action', *International Peacekeeping*, 7/3 (2000), p.79.

peacekeeping.³ In a wider context, in an apparent effort to say ‘farewell to Fashoda’ the British and French Foreign Ministers, Robin Cook and Hubert Védrine, met in Saint-Malo in December 1998 and Chevening in July 1999 to declare their intention to put a halt to their historic rivalry and work together to enhance stability and development in Africa.

The extent to which these agreements and declarations have diluted rivalry on the continent is moot. The individual components of the joint initiative are as often in competition as consonant. This chapter weighs the positive and negative aspects of the constituent elements of the initiative from the perspective of the Western initiators, the African participants and those African states not invited or unwilling to take part in the several programmes. Three sections consider the American, French and British peacekeeping capacity enhancement programmes that together constitute the P3 initiative. The chapter concludes by examining the initiative’s effectiveness, validity and potential durability.

(a) United States

Daniel Bourmaud, articulating the habitual reaction to US African policy amongst French commentators, describes ‘the extremely small part that Africa plays in the thinking of US theorists...it [the US] must take an interest in Africa because nothing must remain foreign to the world’s greatest power, yet it does not know how or why’.⁴ The linchpin of US policy in Africa since 1996 has been the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Built from the ashes of the hastily constructed African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), ACRI seeks to convince African leaders that the US maintains an interest in the fate of the continent, whilst its inadequacy demonstrates the contrary. Despite the initiative’s limited goals, and even more limited results, ACRI remains controversial. Critics in Africa and beyond have questioned the selection procedure and the nature and intent of the peacekeeping training. The question of where accountability for an ACRI sponsored force would lie, at an international level or a continental level, is also problematic. The

³ Other countries that have undertaken bilateral programmes to enhance African peacekeeping capacity include Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and Italy.

⁴ Bourmaud, Daniel, ‘The Clinton Administration and Africa: A View from Paris, France’, *Issue*, 26/2 (1998), p.49.

initiative has relied on the participation of intermediary states in the absence of the two key sub-Saharan militaries, those of Nigeria and South Africa. The case of Uganda's participation, studied later in this section, evidences ACRI's problems in practice.

It is often held that African leverage on the world stage diminished with the end of the Cold War.⁵ This contention is true to an extent. However, the importance of the continent to the US up to the collapse of the Soviet Union should not be overstated. American anti-Soviet containment policies led to covert involvement in certain African conflicts, such as in Angola, Zaire and Chad. However, Christopher Clapham points out that 'from the viewpoint of the United States, most African states were closely enough connected to the Western alliance through their association with the former colonial powers to obviate the need for an active American policy'.⁶ In essence, US African policy was 'marked by indifference at worst, and neglect at best'.⁷

President Bill Clinton embarked on a peacekeeping policy review in March 1993. The following year saw Clinton's pro-UN, pro-intervention campaign promises watered down in the face of opposition from a sceptical Congress. A parallel struggle for influence developed through the rivalry between two key governmental departments - the State Department and the Department of Defence.⁸ The decisive factor in the review process was the experience of American troops during a peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

The UN Security Council approved a US-led unified task force (UNITAF) on 3 December 1992 with a mandate to create a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance and future political reconciliation. Intervention occurred in the glow of George Bush's evocation of a 'new world order'. However the conduct of the American forces in Somalia gave the lie to a notion of *Pax Universalis*. Ibrahim Gambari

⁵ Clough, Michael, 'The United States and Africa: The Policy of Cynical Disengagement', *Current History*, 91/565 (1992), pp.193-198.

⁶ Clapham, Christopher, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.137.

⁷ Schraeder, Peter J., 'Removing the Shackles? US Foreign Policy Toward Africa After the End of the Cold War' in Edmund J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds.), *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p.188.

⁸ See MacKinnon, Michael G., 'Rivals or Partners? Bureaucratic Politics and the Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy', *International Peacekeeping*, 6/1 (1999), pp.32-54.

sees it rather as an 'implicit vision of a *Pax Americana*'.⁹ The demise of the Soviet Union seemed to offer the potential to move beyond the restrictive 'vital national interest' criteria for the deployment of US troops outlined by the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.¹⁰ The deployment of UNITAF followed the failure of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to avert continued famine and an escalation in *inter-clan* violence that was undermining aid distribution. UN Security Resolution 794 authorised the intervention force 'to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible'. Writing in December 1992, Ted Galen Carpenter made a prescient comment.

That is what makes the Somali precedent so worrisome. If the United States abandons its own security interests as the standard by which to decide whether to use military force, there is virtually no limit to the possible arenas in which American lives may be sacrificed. Washington will have a rudderless foreign policy buffeted by the unpredictable winds of emotionalism. Where and when we intervene will be determined by television images of suffering or the lobbying skills of foreign political factions, not the relevance of the stakes to the security of the American republic.¹¹

Television images *would* profoundly affect US peacekeeping policy, but the shocking video footage would be of *American* soldiers killed and tortured in Mogadishu.¹² The intervention was dubbed Operation Restore Hope. Around 30,000 American troops were deployed. Taking a holistic perspective the operation might be taken as a success.¹³ Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary at the US State Department's Bureau of African Affairs during the Bush administration, points out that despite continuing unrest following the final troop withdrawal in 1994, 'the country did not revert to the widespread pillaging, raping and killing that had ravaged the southern third of the country

⁹ Gambari, Ibrahim A., 'The Role of Regional and Global Organisations in Addressing Africa's Security Issues', in Keller and Rothchild, op.cit., p.32.

¹⁰ First pronounced by Secretary of State Casper Weinberger in November 1984.

See, Campbell, Ken, 'The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and the Suppression of Genocide', speech given at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, 24 March 1999.

¹¹ Carpenter, Ted Galen, 'Setting a Dangerous Precedent in Somalia', *Cato Foreign Policy Briefing*, 20, 18 December 1992.

¹² In total 44 American soldiers were killed and 175 injured or wounded in Somalia between December 1992 and March 1994.

¹³ Crocker, Chester A., 'The Lessons of Somalia: not everything went wrong', *Foreign Affairs*, 4/3 (1995).

before intervention'.¹⁴ Other analysts were less sanguine. Daniel Compagnon notes that 'despite its overwhelming majority, it [UNITAF] neither disarmed the factions nor arrested the so-called warlords whose behaviour had been used to legitimise the intervention'.¹⁵

In January 1993 Clinton replaced Bush. In March 1993 UNITAF handed over to a UN peacekeeping force operating under a new robust Chapter VII mandate – UNOSOM II. Security Council Resolution 814 mandated the force to disarm the clans, rehabilitate political institutions and build a secure environment throughout the country. A Turkish Lieutenant-General, Cevik Bir, led the mission. America's role was seen as essentially logistical, although fatefully it was also asked to provide a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). American support for UNOSOM II was taken as a continued willingness within the Clinton White House to endorse UN peacekeeping.

However, throughout the summer of 1993 the deficiencies in UN and American comprehension of Somali culture and politics became clear. UNOSOM and the US adopted a partial position supporting Ali Mahdi's Somalia Salvation Alliance (SSA) over Mahamed Farah Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA). On 3 October the QRF and the US Army's Delta Force launched an ill conceived and poorly conducted foray against the SNA code named Task Force Ranger (TFR). The UN was not initially informed of the attack. Although two obscure clan leaders targeted by the raid were captured, the TFR degenerated into the worst military defeat for US forces since Vietnam. American soldiers needed to be extricated by UNOSOM troops from Malaysia and Pakistan. Final casualties were eighteen American dead or missing and 84 wounded. The US lost two helicopters with four severely damaged, as well as several vehicles. One Malaysian was killed and seven wounded, whilst Pakistan suffered two wounded.¹⁶ Total Somali losses, including many civilians massacred by panicking TFR troops numbered over five hundred. That evening American television repeatedly showed footage of the naked corpse of a US soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu tied to the back of

¹⁴ Cohen, Herman, *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p.215.

¹⁵ Compagnon, Daniel, 'Somali Armed Movements: the interplay of entrepreneurship and clan-based factions', in Christopher Clapham, *African Guerrillas* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), p.87.

a 'technical' or armoured truck. Journalist Mark Bowden in his detailed account of TFR makes the point that the Force Commander Major General William Garrison deemed the raid a success.¹⁷ Despite the losses, those involved with commanding TFR were surprised both by the reaction of the media and the government.

Clinton's political success was based on sensibility to image and responsiveness to opinion. The losses in Somalia saw Clinton's approval rating for his handling of the crisis drop significantly.¹⁸ Peter Schraeder and Brian Endless' study of the *New York Times*' coverage of African issues during the Clinton presidency indicates a consolidation of Afro-pessimism within the American media.¹⁹ By emphasising the supposed intractability of African *intra*-state conflict, the media diminished the administration's need to assuage opinion by reacting to crises with robust engagement. At the same time, the growing disquiet at the pro-UN posture of Clinton's peacekeeping policy in Congress came to a head. Following furious debates in both houses the White House found Defence Department appropriation bills cumbered by amendments – 'the administration began to feel the squeeze as the peacekeeping bills began to accumulate, and its requests for funding were denied'.²⁰

Within ten days the extent to which the 'Battle of Mogadishu' had traumatised Clinton and his Cabinet was illustrated in an interview given by Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Quizzed about future American participation in peacekeeping interventions he responded,

[I] think there have to be very hard questions asked: What is the mission? Can the mission successfully be carried out? Is there a departure date? Is it the kind of a mission that the American people will support? I think all of those questions will have to be examined in consultation with Congress. I don't doubt that at all.²¹

¹⁶ Day, Maj. Clifford E., 'Critical Analysis on the Defeat of Task Force Ranger', paper presented to the Research Department US Air Command and Staff College <<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/97-0364.pdf>> posted March 1997.

¹⁷ Bowden, Mark, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (London: Corgi Books, 2000), p.491.

¹⁸ Logan, Caroline J., 'US Public Opinion and the Intervention in Somalia: Lessons for the Future of Military-Humanitarian Interventions', *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 20/2 (1996), p.156.

¹⁹ Schraeder, Peter J., and Brian Endless, 'The Media and Africa: The Portrayal of Africa in the New York Times (1955-1995)', *Issue*, 26/2 (1998), pp.29-35.

²⁰ MacKinnon, Michael, G., *The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend?* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp.70-71.

²¹ 'Interview with Secretary of State Warren Christopher' on NBC-TV's Meet the Press, Washington DC,

Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-25) outlining the US position on peacekeeping operations post-Somalia on 3 May 1994. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake outlined the six elements of the Clinton administration's policy on US involvement in multinational peace operations.

First, ensuring that we support the right operations; second, that we reduce the cost of peacekeeping operations; third, that we improve UN peacekeeping capabilities; fourth, that we ensure effective command and control of American forces; fifth, that we improve the way the American government manages the issue of peacekeeping; and, sixth, to enhance the cooperation between the Congress and the Executive Branch.²²

Michael Lemmon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Security Affairs at the time of the signing of the directive, contends that PDD-25 was 'not prescriptive' and was designed to 'reduce the cost and improve the efficiency of peacekeeping operations both within the UN system and the US government'.²³ He adds that,

[A]fro-realists should welcome the discipline imposed by PDD-25 on decision-making in US peacekeeping. Far from promoting disengagement from Africa, the PDD complements the broad spectrum of initiatives... Often the US can support a peacekeeping operation efficiently by supplying essential airlift, training potential troop contributors, or supplying specialised equipment and unique capabilities such as logistics administration and intelligence.²⁴

Yet, although PDD-25 did not discount US involvement in future peacekeeping missions - under the auspices of the UN or otherwise - the tenor of the document implied that great caution would be exercised over when and how American forces would be deployed in the future. Out of the long list of criteria for US involvement in future interventions, the key caveat was Lake's warning that henceforward America would only support the 'right operations'.

UNITAF and American support for UNOSOM II seemingly connoted a dilution of the realist conception of national interest understood by successive administrations.

10 October 1993.

²² 'Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Tony Lake and Director For Strategic Plans and Policy General Wesley Clark', Washington DC, 5 May 1994.

²³ Lemmon, Michael C., 'The Role of the US in Peacekeeping', in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (eds.), *Peacekeeping in Africa* (Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs), p.212.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.213.

Following Bush's lead, the initial position of the Clinton administration was one of 'assertive multilateralism'.²⁵ Hans Morgenthau made the distinction between *vital* interests of security beyond compromise and *secondary* interests open to compromise.²⁶ Vital interests were defined as the defence of US territory and citizens and the protection of American values. In the African context this was construed as a need to maintain parity, in terms of military and political influence on the continent, with the Soviet Union. Clapham has made the point that the US was often content to leave the regional containment of anti-Western forces to the former colonial powers.²⁷ However, even this limited engagement with Africa effectively dissolved with the end of the Cold War. For the US, Africa was reduced to secondary importance. Henceforward, Africa's potential for economic exploitation, especially in terms of mineral extraction, was stressed. As such, Werner Biermann emphasises that 'virtually all US regional interests are threatened by breakdowns in regional or sub-regional stability'.²⁸ Yet, given their secondary status, US economic interests on the continent were insufficiently consequential to warrant heavy American involvement. The US had no economic interest in Somalia. Thus its intervention through UNITAF and support for UNOSOM II was fundamentally altruistic.²⁹ As such Clinton's position at this time was perceptibly cosmopolitan.

The implementation of PDD-25 effectively signalled a volte-face and retreat from either *Pax Universalis* or *Pax Americana*, from either the 'new world order' or 'assertive multilateralism'. In the wake of Mogadishu, Clinton acted on the media-led belief that contemporary American opinion is set against the use of ground forces except when American home territory is threatened. The lesson of Somalia most taken to heart by the Clinton White House was the received wisdom that the American public mistrusted 'prolonged interventions in complex political situations characterised by civil conflict, where US interests and principles are typically much less compelling or clear and success

²⁵ MacKinnon, 'The Evolution of US Peacekeeping', op.cit., pp.19-23.

²⁶ Morgenthau, Hans J., *Politics Amongst Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1956), p.528.

²⁷ Clapham, op.cit., p.137.

²⁸ Biermann, Werner, *African Crisis Initiative – the New US Africa Policy* (Hamburg: LitVerlag, 1999), p.166.

²⁹ A growing concern over the threat posed by militant Islam to vital US national interest was perceptible at the time of the Somalian operations. The threat emanating from Africa was generally downplayed, although efforts were made to establish a pro-US axis incorporating Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda to act as a bolster against Islamic fundamentalism in East Africa.

is often elusive at best'.³⁰ One consequence of this belief was that intervention by American troops during the Clinton era would be, as far as conceivably possible, casualty-free.³¹ Foreign policy during the Clinton era was nothing if not pragmatic. Clinton, cosmopolitan by nature, moved quickly to a communitarian position in order to reflect the assumed position in the country. The continued categorisation of Africa as of secondary interest to America and the move away from can-do cosmopolitanism to cautious communitarianism would come at a heavy price. Devastating attacks by Islamic militants on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrated how vulnerable US interests had become on the continent.

At the time of the signing of PDD-25, there was variance between the growing anti-intervention stance of the White House and the relative and mutually competing positions of the State Department and the Pentagon. In particular there was a growing 'turf battle' between the two departments over who should take the lead for organising and/or funding peace operations. The two departments eventually came to an unsatisfactory solution dubbed 'shared responsibility'. *Inter-departmental rivalry aside, both the State Department and Pentagon were apparently surprised at the restricted peacekeeping policy that eventually emerged.* Michael Mackinnon's analysis of the policy review that led to PDD-25 finds that there remained a 'growing level of support within the State Department and the Pentagon for strengthening the UN's peacekeeping capacity'.³²

Whilst the White House, State Department and Pentagon quarrelled over means and method, policy remained in stasis. Absence of a settled policy on the future of intervention led to two ineffectual initiatives. In June 1994, as the Rwandan genocide was unfolding with the US stalling UN action, the White House organised a conference - 'Building a Better Future in Africa'. The series of presentations were vapid and imprecise. If a need 'to help bring an end to the many conflicts and crises on the continent' was recognised, practical remedies were not forthcoming.³³ Clinton returned to

³⁰ Biermann, *op.cit.*, p.166.

³¹ Even when US sovereign territory was directly attacked the military response was often one step removed. The bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 did not result in the deployment of American troops but retaliatory strikes by cruise missiles on supposed terrorist targets in Sudan and Afghanistan.

³² MacKinnon, 'Rivals or Partners', *op.cit.*, p.50.

³³ 'Building a Better Future in Africa', White House Conference on Africa, Washington DC <<http://www.state.gov/index.html>> 26-27 June 1994.

the theme of 'an American people uncertain of where and when on earth they want their nation to get involved'.³⁴ A year later the Department of Defence published the *US Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*. Existing US military training programmes were rehearsed. The document was once more short on detailed proposals. However, the *boundaries* of Clinton's African strategy were becoming clear.

To help Africans find solutions to their problems...to help create and nurture an 'enabling environment' which is conducive to democratisation, human rights, conflict resolution, and economic and social prosperity...*it is also important to recognise the limitations of America's ability to influence events on the continent.* [italics added]³⁵

The ACRF was a hurried project intended to address a predicted escalation of ethnic conflict in Burundi and eastern Zaire potentially as murderous as the Rwanda genocide. An imprecise and rambling briefing given by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose prior to Secretary of State Warren Christopher's trip to Africa evidences the haste with which the project was developed.

We want to build on that [Africa's] capacity and help to create a capability within Africa to, if necessary and as appropriate, create – come together in international regional forces that can respond to certain kinds of crisis situations, or forces and elements that can participate in broader international peacekeeping or humanitarian response efforts. We think that is entirely consistent with what the OAU has been trying to do in its efforts in Addis Ababa, and also what some sub-regional organisations – ECOWAS on the one hand, SADC on the other – have been seeking to do. We think there is a complimentary role, contribution that the United States and other outside partners can make to that effort.³⁶

This ACRF evidenced the pressure that the White House was putting on State Department and Pentagon officials to 'come up with something'.³⁷ The proposal was elaborated during the Christopher trip to Africa in October 1996. The initiative received a tepid response in Mali, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Angola. Given Nelson Mandela's

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Department of Defence, Office of International Security Affairs 'US Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa', *Defence Issues*, 10/78 (1995).

³⁶ *African News Service*, 7 October 1996.

³⁷ US Department of Defence official quoted in Berman, Eric G., and Katie E. Sams, *Constructive Disengagement: Western Efforts to Develop African Peacekeeping*, (Pretoria: ISS Monograph Series, 1998), p.14.

signalled objections, the ACRF was downplayed in Christopher's keynote address to the South African Institute of International Affairs. Peacekeeping warranted just one short paragraph in a five-page speech. Christopher promised the 'engagement' of the Clinton administration despite 'debate in America about Africa's relative importance'.³⁸ Whilst expressing confidence that the ACRF could be established, the role of pan-Africanism and the OAU in the genesis of a common African security framework was stressed.

Although White House policymakers were aware that the ACRF was a second best option, they were unprepared for the scale of misgiving that the project engendered. African leaders were, in Howard French's words, 'left with the strong suspicion that Mr Christopher's proposal could result in the writing off of the continent with a grand-sounding plan for which no real funding or interest would follow'.³⁹ Lagos led the criticism. Defence spokesman, Colonel Godwin Ugbo, complained that 'the force in question is an American creation...it is neither a UN nor an OAU affair'.⁴⁰ At the time the Nigerian regime led by President Sanni Abacha was ostracised by Washington as undemocratic and authoritarian. However, was the US in a position to cherry pick participants? Nigeria's armed forces have the most experience in peacekeeping amongst African militaries. It is also the natural hegemon in West Africa. Ugbo queried, 'I do not know if it [the ACRF] is feasible without Nigerian support'.⁴¹ President Nelson Mandela sounded South Africa's doubts over the proposed force remarking that, 'Africans would like to feel that they are handling things themselves, not acting in response to suggestions that come from outside the continent'.⁴² OAU Assistant-Secretary General, Ahmed Haggag, was equally cool, questioning the financing of the force and noting that, 'many questions remain unanswered'.⁴³ Europe was also unconvinced. The proposal was 'strongly criticised by the French government as it was unclear on the selection process for the countries participating...as well as on the decision-making process where

³⁸ Christopher, Warren, speech delivered to the South African Institute of International Affairs, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 12 October 1996.

³⁹ *New York Times*, 20 October 1996.

⁴⁰ *Panafrican News Agency*, 'Lagos Not Impressed by US Proposal for an African Force', 16 October 1996.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *New York Times*, 20 October 1996.

⁴³ *Panafrican News Agency*, 'OAU Cool on Idea of an African Force', 14 October 1996.

American hegemony was all too obvious'.⁴⁴ The EU was frank in its assessment. Commissioner Joao de Deus Pinheiro stated that the EU would support UN, OAU or regional initiatives for conflict resolution, but not the proposed American-backed force.⁴⁵

The winter of 1996-1997 was spent building bridges with Europe, the UN and those middle-ranking African states that were not wholly dismissive of the project. An Interagency Working Group (IWG) was formed to finesse the proposal. The continuing humanitarian calamity in the Great Lakes region partially explains the need for haste. Moreover, special interest and pressure groups were levelling the charge that it was post-Mogadishu equivocation in Washington that had underpinned international inertia during the Rwandan genocide. Chris Alden notes, 'a growing chorus of American elite opinion on Africa decrying the lack of coherence in the formulation and conduct of US African policy'.⁴⁶ In particular, relations between the administration and the influential Congressional Black Caucus had become strained.⁴⁷ Clinton was standing for reelection in 1996. The rapid restructuring of the ACRF was, thus, timely.

By May 1997 the ACRF had been restyled the African Crisis Response Initiative.⁴⁸ The semantic shift reoriented the project. ACRI would be a limited programme based on enhancing the capacity of a number of selected African militaries to participate effectively in multinational peacekeeping operations. General James Jamerson, Deputy Commander in Chief European Command, assessed the initial criticism of the Christopher proposals – 'the advice was interesting and helpful: "don't create a force, create an interoperable capacity"'.⁴⁹ The IWG recognised that the central objection to the idea of an ACRF, both in Africa and Europe, was the creation of a *standing force* funded and trained by the US. The shift in emphasis was sufficient for France and Britain to agree to coordinate their own efforts with ACRI.

⁴⁴ Marchal, Roland, 'France and Africa: the emergence of essential reforms?', *International Affairs*, 74/2 (1998), p.364.

⁴⁵ *Panafrican News Agency*, 'EU Supports South African Stand on African Peace Force', 15 October 1996.

⁴⁶ Alden, Chris, 'From Neglect to 'Virtual Engagement': The United States and its New Paradigm for Africa', *African Affairs*, 99 (2000), p.365.

⁴⁷ Leanne, Shelly, 'The Clinton Administration and Africa: Perspective of the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica', *Issue*, 26/2 (1998), p.21.

⁴⁸ Cleaver, Gerry, 'The African Crisis Response Initiative', paper presented at the African Studies Association Biennial Conference, School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, 14-16 September 1998.

⁴⁹ Jamerson, James, 'The United States Contribution to Capacity-Building: The African Crisis Response Initiative', in Malan, 'Resolute Partners', op.cit., p.14.

The IWG established an understanding between ACRI and the UN that led to commitments from seven countries to provide troops for peacekeeping training. Ethiopia promised two battalions whilst Ghana, Malawi, Senegal, Mali, Tunisia and Uganda offered one battalion each. When Tunisia withdrew from the programme ACRI became an entirely sub-Saharan project. The outbreak of war with Eritrea halted the participation of Ethiopia. The onset of fighting between the two countries also highlighted the fragility of the selection process for nominating ACRI participants. The political motivation of both provider and participants in ACRI is an aspect of the initiative that will be discussed later. Benin and Côte d'Ivoire replaced Tunisia and Ethiopia to bring the pre-millennial graduates of ACRI back to seven.⁵⁰

The administration was at pains to emphasise the step back from the creation of a standing force.⁵¹ ACRI had transmuted into a training initiative. By standardising the training given to the various national battalions ACRI aims to ensure that future multinational interventions follow the same peacekeeping doctrine, as well as enhancing interoperability especially in terms of communications. The intended target for ACRI-trained battalions is participation in Chapter VI peacekeeping operations. Ambassador Marshall McCallie, Special Coordinator for ACRI stressed at the onset of the initiative that 'we are not talking about peace-enforcement or peace-building...we are really talking about developing forces that can maintain peace in a permissive environment'.⁵² In an effort to internationalise the peacekeeping curriculum ACRI developed a hybrid doctrine borrowing from US, UK, NATO and Nordic peacekeeping manuals, as well as consulting with the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). All African countries are invited to apply to participate in ACRI. However, in practice those militaries with a reasonable standard of expertise and experience in peacekeeping are given preference. Congress restricts ACRI funding to states with a democratically elected civilian government, civilian control of the military and a record of respect for human rights. All the criteria have proven open to wide interpretation.

⁵⁰ Kenya became the eighth ACTI participant in 2000.

⁵¹ Interview with Julie Winn (US-OAU Liaison Officer, US Embassy in Ethiopia), Addis Ababa, April 1998. Great stress was placed on the name change from ACRF to ACRI, as well as the inclusive nature of ACRI with a high premium placed on the experience of African armed forces in peacekeeping operations.

⁵² Department of State, On-the-record Briefing, Washington DC, 28 July 1997.

Colonel David McCracken, Commander of the Third Special Forces Group based at Fort Bragg, the unit of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) designated to run ACRI, outlined the specifics of the programme in July 1997.⁵³ The first phase of the programme is the distribution of equipment.⁵⁴ Prior to refresher marksmanship, trainees are given eye tests. Out of the first 350 ACRI troops tested, 70 soldiers need glasses.⁵⁵ Training is given at squad, platoon and company level. The concept followed is 'train the trainer'.⁵⁶ Sixty American SOF trainers employ top-down instruction in a 600-800-man battalion. Once a host nation soldier reaches training level he assumes the role of primary instructor and the American becomes the additional instructor. It is intended that newly trained host nation instructors share their expertise outside their own battalion. Specialists give instruction in logistics. There is separate leadership training. Situational exercises cover the gamut of orthodox peacekeeping techniques including convoy and perimeter security, checkpoints and roadblocks. The functioning of a civil-military centre is tested, as well as the integration of intervention forces with international organisations, NGOs and the media. At the end of the training period the battalion takes part in a final multi-echeloned command post and field training exercise to which observers from neighbouring countries, media representatives and NGOs are invited. The intention is to try to recreate the *extra*-military component of peacekeeping intervention. Follow-on training occurs six months after the end of initial training and continues every six months for two and a half years.

The official briefings by McCallie and McCracken paint the training as innocuous and straightforward. However, as the instruction progressed host nation commentators, including opposition politicians and journalists, voiced doubts over the credibility of ACRI's stated purpose. In general, the depth of unease was proportionate to the size and regional importance of the host state's armed forces. Thus the participation of Malawi and Benin provoked less concern than that of Uganda and Senegal. With many of the continent's pivotal states (South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, DRC) unwilling or

⁵³ Department of Defence, 'Briefing on African Crisis Response Initiative', Washington DC, 29 July 1997.

⁵⁴ About 500 Motorola hand-held VHF radios, repeater systems, high frequency radios, two satellite communications units, water purification machinery, night vision and mine detection equipment are issued to each battalion. Each soldier is given a full uniform from boots to helmet. A backpack with canteen is provided.

⁵⁵ Department of State, On-the-record Briefing, Washington DC, 28 July 1997.

unacceptable participants, ACRI has been forced to rely on intermediate states (Uganda, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire).

The absence of Africa's regional hegemons critically limits ACRI's military and political ambit. However, strict interpretation of the selection criteria applied to middle-ranking states would so limit the number of viable militaries as to jeopardise the initiative. Nonetheless, the inclusion of Uganda, as well as the original inclusion of Ethiopia, begs questions as to how the criteria of 'democratic civilian government' and 'respect for human rights' are applied. The Ugandan military does not fall under civilian control in the conventional sense. The Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) maintains a quota of members of parliament. Army Commander Major-General Abubaker Jeje Odongo was a former MP and the previous Commander, Major-General Mugisha Muntu, now sits in parliament to oversee army interests. In Uganda's unorthodox non-party polity the military continue to enjoy privileged access to the decision-making process. The UPDF confronts insurgency in many parts of the country including the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the West Nile Bank Front (WNBK) and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF). In 1997 the US State Department reported 'numerous serious problems' in the government's human rights record.⁵⁷

Until the outbreak of war with Eritrea, Ethiopia was slated to become the largest participant in ACRI. The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in a landslide victory resulting from the boycott of legislative elections by most opposition groups. At the time of the proposed entry into ACRI, Ethiopian military forces were engaged in low intensity operations against, amongst others, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The State Department reported that 'serious problems' remained with the government's human rights records.⁵⁸

Inclusion of Uganda, and the proposed involvement of Ethiopia, as pioneer ACRI participants emphasises the precedence of US interests in the selection process. ACRI's development coincided with the promotion of Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea as a pro-US

⁵⁶ Department of Defence, 'Briefing on African Crisis Response Initiative', Washington DC, 29 July 1997.

⁵⁷ US Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, *Uganda Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997*, 30 January 1998.

axis in East and Central Africa. US support was predicated on the three countries maintaining a front against an anticipated militant Islamic threat emanating from Sudan. The emerging threat, or perception of threat, from militant Islam had risen throughout the Clinton presidency. However, despite the presence of effective Islamic terrorist cells in Africa, the US perception of the continent as of secondary interest endured. This left US diplomatic and economic interests in Africa as potential 'soft targets'. The retreat from cosmopolitanism and the adoption of a communitarian stance in the context of intervention signalled by PDD-25 left the administration poorly positioned to counter this threat. One response was to coopt the communitarian concept to America's advantage. It was within this context that the US sought to enhance the aptitude – albeit within the limited field of peacekeeping capacity enhancement - of the Ugandan military.

American SFO troops arrived in Uganda on 22 July. A battle-hardened elite combat unit, the Third Battalion, was chosen by the UPDF High Command to undergo ACRI training. This unit went by the decidedly non-pacific nickname of the 'Suicide Battalion'. The arrival of the American troops was not well received by some MPs. The Foreign Affairs Committee summoned government ministers to explain why the UPDF had embarked on the initiative without parliament being consulted.⁵⁹ The presence of US troops in the provincial town of Jinja concerned MPs wary of the precarious security environment both within Uganda and over the border in the consistently volatile DRC. They complained that they had been 'kept in the dark about the terms and conditions of their [the ACRI training team's] assignment'.⁶⁰

In response, all those connected with ACRI reemphasised the limits of the initiative. The US Embassy Public Affairs Officer, Judy Buttermann, restated the long list of uncontroversial peacekeeping techniques that Ugandan troops would be taught.⁶¹ Rumours persisted. President Yoweri Museveni took the unusual step of issuing a denial that the Americans were in the country for any other reason than peacekeeping training. Speaking at the passing out ceremony for the newly trained peacekeeping troops of 'Suicide Battalion' he blamed 'certain politicians in Africa' for undermining ACRI by

⁵⁸ US Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, *Ethiopia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997*, 30 January 1998.

⁵⁹ *Sunday Vision* [Kampala], 27 July 1997.

⁶⁰ *New Vision* [Kampala], 28 July 1997.

intimating that the US was using the cover of peacekeeping training to help Uganda fight Sudan. He continued, 'this suspicion is out-dated and people who believe in it should update themselves'.⁶²

Paul Omach disputes the argument that provision of non-lethal equipment, and instruction in basic soldier skills, does not buttress a host nation's ability to counter insurgency.⁶³ He maintains that good basic equipment such as boots and uniforms are in short supply even in an army of regional high standing such as the UPDF. Night-vision devices and, especially, communication sets have clear practical use in counter-insurgency operations. The provision of SOF trainers ensures a very high standard of instruction. Omach's contention is supported by Daniel Volman who notes that, 'the declared intent of the programme is to enhance the capability of [African] forces to conduct peacekeeping operations, but much of the training and equipment provided can also enhance their capability to engage in counter-insurgency operations or conventional warfare with other states'.⁶⁴

Museveni considers the army's inability to contain insurgency throughout large parts of the country as the major brake on Ugandan development. Since the publication of the *Report of the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs* in 1997, the army has been forced to embark on a process of modernisation. The replacement of Major-General Muntu, regarded by many officers as a bureaucrat, by the more involved Major-General Odongo, signalled change. Finances remained a problem. Odongo promised to make more effective use of available funds than Muntu who was seen as profligate and unable to control corruption.⁶⁵ Seen in this light 'it is not inconceivable that the ACRI is viewed as an integral part of the broad agenda of modernising the army'.⁶⁶

There are no restrictions on the use of ACRI trained battalions. Clearly it would be wholly impractical to insist that such units only be used for peacekeeping duties. Indeed, participation in ACRI does not commit a state to make troops available for any

⁶¹ *New Vision* [Kampala], 23 July 1997.

⁶² *Panafrican News Agency*, 'Museveni Says Americans Not Helping in Sudan Fighting', 18 September 1997.

⁶³ Omach, Paul 'The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests', *African Affairs*, 99/394 (2000), pp.92-95.

⁶⁴ Volman, Daniel, 'The Development of the African Crisis Response Initiative', *Africa Policy Report*, 23 April 1998.

⁶⁵ *New African*, 'Museveni Purges the Army', March 1998.

future peacekeeping operation. When interviewed Odongo is candid about the fact that the ACRI battalion is an elite combat unit and that shortly after the graduation exercise it was deployed to combat the ADF in western Uganda. Odongo emphasised that the size and scope of the army's existing responsibilities made future involvement in any peacekeeping operations, especially by the ACRI trained Third Battalion, impossible in the medium-term.⁶⁷

What demarcates ACRI from the range of non-peacekeeping training and material supply programmes sponsored by the US? Uganda and Senegal are recipients, on a grant basis, of Excess Defence Articles (EDA) under Article 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act (1961). This equipment is not restricted to use in peacekeeping operations. Senegal was also chosen as the location for the first seminar of the African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS). The venture will cost \$42m over five years. Currently, described as 'a moving school', the ACSS has as its goals the development of strategic visions for African militaries, the budgeting of those plans and the maintenance of civilian control over the military.⁶⁸ Some concern has been voiced. Sensing a military, rather than civilian-military priority for ACSS, critics cite the excesses of the US-sponsored 'School of the Americas' where counter-insurgency tactics were taught which breached human rights principles.⁶⁹ ACSS Director, Nancy Walker, promotes the 'the imperative of engagement, making sure the US is able to work with and get to know our partners around the world', but is sufficiently candid to accept that 'the Pentagon doesn't spend unless its in US interests'.⁷⁰ The ACSS would seem to replicate ACRI's communitarian ethos – promoting African self-pacification, whilst also seeking to manipulate the manner in which Africans address that task.

ACRI is further linked to the increasing use of Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programmes.

⁶⁶ Omach, op.cit., p.92.

⁶⁷ Interview with Major-General Abubaker Jeje Odongo (Army Commander of the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force), Kampala, February 1999.

⁶⁸ USIS Washington File, 'South Africa and Nigeria Key to Peace and Stability in Africa', 23 February 2000. The ACSS will eventually be permanently located in Arlington, Virginia.

⁶⁹ Hartung, William, and Moix, Bridget, 'Deadly Legacy: US Arms to Africa and the Congo War', *World Policy Centre Report*, January (2000); Kayosa, Clarissa, 'Military School of Africa?' <<http://www.ciponline.org>> posted 1999.

⁷⁰ USIS Washington File, 'African Centre for Strategic Studies Begins November 1 in Dakar', 22 October 1999.

IMET is a financing mechanism through which the US pays for the training of foreign military and some civilian personnel. Goals of IMET include encouraging mutually beneficial relations with foreign countries and increasing awareness of basic issues involving international human rights. The programme also aims to increase the effectiveness of foreign militaries in utilising resources. The Expanded International Military Education Training (E-IMET) programme established in 1991 is a sub-set of IMET intended to stress the importance of civil-military relations, military justice and law enforcement cooperation. The Pentagon promotes IMET and E-IMET as opportunities for the US military to inculcate American values abroad. However, the programme has had a poor record. Officers trained under IMET have been involved in human rights abuse, notoriously in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. The underlying ethos of IMET and E-IMET evokes questions of moral relativism based on the universal/particular dichotomy. If the US maintains the communitarian position that regions such as Africa operate within a particular ethos as a justification for not intervening itself, is it viable for American trainers to inculcate military ethics as perceived by the West? Benjamin Schwartz believes that lofty IMET goals 'put the cart before the horse'.⁷¹ For Schwartz, 'worthwhile military cooperation cannot be born of IMET but only of common interests and values...when those are present, IMET is superfluous...when they are absent, IMET is useless'.⁷² In the Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 thirty-three sub-Saharan African militaries participated in IMET. These included states with human rights records consistently criticised by the US State Department. All ACRI states also took part in IMET.

Although not officially recognised, there exists a clear link between JCETS and ACRI in that SOF carry out both programmes. JCETs have become controversial during the Clinton presidency. The exact extent and number of JCETs in Africa, and throughout the world, is hard to determine since their funding does not attract the same level of

⁷¹ Schwartz, Benjamin, 'The Illusion of US Influence', in anon., 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment Within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution', in OAU Information Services Publications – Series (II), *Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options* (1993), 30 September 1999.

⁷² Ibid.

Congressional oversight as the conventional deployment of US troops abroad.⁷³ The remit of JCET is wide. As a former senior SFO officer points out, 'the definition of training is extremely elastic depending upon the wishes of the decision-makers'.⁷⁴ However, it can be assumed that many training exercises concern anti-terrorism measures, control of drugs trafficking and foreign internal defence (FID). Moreover, JCETs are conducted in countries otherwise considered beyond the pale. In Africa, even states such as Equatorial Guinea, where the State Department recommended that IMF funds be withheld because of human rights violations, receive JCET. The Defence Department line is that 'by training host-nation forces to provide their own security, and using integrated civil affairs and psychological operations programs to strengthen government infrastructures, SOF foster stability and help prevent local problems from developing into threats to international security'.⁷⁵ However, critics of the programme point to frequent human rights abuses committed by JCET-trained troops. Indeed as Dana Priest notes, 'JCETs often appear to bring America's premier soldiers into conflict with aims of American diplomacy enunciated in Washington'.⁷⁶ In 1998, a *Washington Post* investigation revealed that troops from the Third Special Forces Group, the unit entrusted with ACRI, had 'taught light infantry or other military tactics to troops in Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe,' in the previous year.⁷⁷ All ACRI members also receive JCET. Is it feasible for instructors from Third Special Forces Group working in ACRI countries to adopt a schizoid approach to training – one month teaching non-lethal peacekeeping techniques and a month later possibly demonstrating robust FID? Unlike IMET where the problem lies with teaching universal principles from within the explicit communitarian position promoted by the administration, the problem of JCET is teaching military techniques that potentially run contrary to established Western conceptions of human rights. That said, problems connected with

⁷³ Priest, Dana, 'Free of Oversight, US Military Trains Foreign Troops: 1991 Law Waives Many Restrictions on Aid Policies Don't Stop Military Exchange', *Washington Post*, 12 July 1998.

⁷⁴ Quoted in *ibid.*

⁷⁵ Schoomaker, General Peter J., 'Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead', *Defence Issues*, 13/10 (1999) p.10.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.10.

training troops to fulfil the dual roles of war fighting and Chapter VI peacekeeping apply to militaries throughout the world.

A key drawback for the initiative has been the response of the two major sub-Saharan powers. As mentioned above, the Abacha regime in Nigeria was rigidly opposed to ACRI. However, the reestablishment of the democratic process led to gentle overtures from the State Department. Olusegun Obasanjo's electoral victory encouraged Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to suggest that 'if Nigeria continues on the path of civilian/democratic government and the military stay out of politics ...it should then benefit, if it wants to, from that type of training [ACRI]'.⁷⁷ Although outside the time frame of this research it should be noted that the US embarked on an emergency peace-enforcement training mission called Operation Focus Relief (OFR) in November 2000. This programme was larger and better funded than ACRI. OFR was part of the international effort to reverse the deteriorating security environment in Sierra Leone. About 250 members of the 3rd Special Forces Group from Fort Bragg, the unit that runs ACRI training, taught Nigerian troops how to use mortars, light anti-tank weapons and M-60 machine guns. Training was halted for about 10 days in October when roughly 80 unknown Nigerian soldiers arrived unexpectedly to take part in the mission. The operation was suspended while US State Department officials checked if any of the new soldiers had been accused of past human rights abuses. The Nigerians, whose human rights record during the ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone was poor, received instruction on how to handle civilians and prisoners. The training culminated in mid-December when 750 Nigerian soldiers held a coordinated company-level attack and defence simulation. The \$20m training program was part of \$66m in military aid and training the United States extended to Nigeria. Between May-August 2001 the same robust infantry/peace-enforcement training was given to Ghanaian and Senegalese troops. Ghanaian and Senegalese battalions received about 1,500 sets of individual equipment, including rucksacks, canteens and new uniforms and boots. The US also armed the soldiers with M16 rifles and light machine guns, and equipped them with 2.5-ton cargo trucks, medical supplies and communications equipment. The style of

⁷⁷ Priest, Dana, 'Africans Use Training in Unexpected Ways', *Washington Post*, 14 July 1998.

⁷⁸ USIS Washington File, 'Pickering Says US Wants to Work with Nigerian Military', 8 November 1999.

training differed markedly from the Chapter VI techniques taught by ACRI. The shift in emphasis from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement came very late in the Clinton presidency and was a reaction to events in Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries in West Africa where conditions for traditional peacekeeping were clearly not appropriate.

South Africa was no less sceptical of American intentions, if more guarded in its language. As noted in Chapter Four, foreign policy came a poor third to economic development and integration. Why and how South Africa should engage in peacekeeping intervention must be a mixture of design and experience. The *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions* concludes by accepting that 'such experience can only be gained by converting potential resources into actual capabilities'.⁷⁹ These sentiments might encourage US hopes that South Africa will accept peacekeeping capacity enhancement training and equipment. In February 2000, US Defence Secretary William Cohen visited Cape Town to discuss peacekeeping training and future JCET. Despite evident US pressure, Minister of Defence Mosioua Lekota refrained from formal comment on ACRI, restricting himself to the noncommittal statement that 'we are happy to acknowledge the United States' interest and support in these training exercises'.⁸⁰ Both Nigeria and South Africa have failed to assume hegemonic status. Nigeria has proved an ineffective hegemon whilst South Africa, in Ali Mazrui's words has been a 'hesitant hegemon'.⁸¹

It should be recognised that Nigeria and South Africa both face difficulties and limitations, albeit different, that undermine their military effectiveness. Nigeria has a proven capacity to project force. Nonetheless overextension, both in terms of manpower and funding, has been cited as a main reason for Nigeria's recent reappraisal of its commitment to regional peacekeeping. South Africa's problems are more entrenched. The government has mismanaged the integration of the disparate fighting units into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The security forces are top heavy with

⁷⁹ South African Department of Foreign Affairs, *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions*, approved by Cabinet on 21 October 1998, presented to parliament on 24 February 1999.

⁸⁰ *Africa News Service*, 'Cohen Press Conference in Cape Town, South Africa', 16 February 2000; 'South Africa and the United States: Natural partners for Peace', *Salut* [The Official Magazine of the South African Department of Defence] <http://www.mil.za/SANDF/Media/Salut/April'2000/April_main.htm> posted April 2000.

a highly disproportionate number of senior officers. Recruitment has slowed leading to the majority of personnel being too old for active deployment. Equipment is out of date and decrepit. Furthermore the incidence of HIV/AIDS is high with a possible 60-70 per cent of personnel being infected. South Africa continues to maintain a larger budget and spend more as a percentage of GDP than Nigeria, although current spending has diminished steadily since the *apartheid* era and seems to be subject to the law of diminishing returns. Military expenditure in South Africa has dropped from \$4345m in 1988 to \$2631m in 2000 (figures in US\$ at constant 1998 prices and exchange rates and for calendar year) and from 4.3% of GDP in 1988 to 1.5% of GDP in 2000. Military expenditure in Nigeria has risen from \$976m in 1988 to \$1981m in 2001 (figures in US\$ at constant 1998 prices and exchange rates and for calendar year) and from 0.8% of GDP in 1988 to 0.9% of GDP in 2000.⁸²

Yet, where would ACRI fit in the foreign policies of Nigeria and South Africa? Both Lagos and Pretoria give the impression that, given the limited size and ambition of the programme, they consider ACRI beneath their standing as regional powers. On a practical level ACRI would have little new to teach either military. Both militaries receive military training through IMET and JCET. ACRI without the two Nigeria and/or South Africa was self-limiting. On the other hand an expressed willingness to accept ACRI training – presumably as part of an expanded programme – would also mean accepting the ACRI ethos. Both states are wary of giving the impression that in Mandela's words, they are 'in bed with America'.⁸³

How to assess ACRI? In October 1998, Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs asserted that 'America has never debated whether our interests lie in remaining actively engaged...if we seek quick returns over long-term gains, we will never be well-positioned to advance important US economic and political interests in Africa'.⁸⁴ Ostensibly ACRI provides good value for money. Non-intervention also occasions financial costs. Michael Brown and Richard Rosecrance make a convincing

⁸¹ Mazrui, Ali, 'Forward', in Ricardo René Laremont (ed.), *The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peace in Africa* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002), p.xv.

⁸² Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) <[http: first.sipri.org](http://first.sipri.org)> accessed 17 July 2002.

⁸³ *The Star* [Johannesburg], 8 May 1998.

argument for early, or at least timely, intervention in conflicts.⁸⁵ Their study of intervention in conflict as against non-intervention finds that the costs of large-scale peace-enforcement operations, humanitarian aid and reconstruction far outweigh an early preventive mission.⁸⁶ Michael O'Hanlon concurs. Noting that the US and its European partners are unwilling and/or unable to provide sufficient troops to address the scale of African conflict he advises a massive expansion of ACRI and the P3 initiative.

Peacekeeping capacity enhancement is not inexpensive. But it can be addressed in a proactive manner over an extended period as the ACRI program has accomplished during the past 4 years. Peacekeeping operations, and especially peace enforcement operations, are, on the other hand, usually very expensive; and we believe that costs can be limited by virtue of enhanced African capacity and early response... African militaries should ultimately receive hundreds of millions of dollars a year in aid and training, not only for simple peacekeeping, but also to prepare for more difficult, dangerous and lethal operations.⁸⁷

Madeleine Albright defended before Congress a \$15.09bn request for foreign operations out of a total international affairs budget of \$22.75bn for FY 2000.⁸⁸ The requested allocation for ACRI out of that budget request is \$20m. Since its inception ACRI has cost \$15m in FY 1997, \$22m in FY 1998, and \$18m in FY 1999. Yet, as Congress consistently reiterates, any expenditure is wasted if the initiative fails to meet its stated aims. In mid-1999 Congress proposed a 40 per cent cut in the voluntary peacekeeping fund. This was a blow to an administration which had pinned much of its African policy on the notion of Africa policing itself with the, albeit limited, assistance of ACRI. The cut was opposed in a muscular response State Department spokesman James Rubin.

We find this [proposed budget cut] particularly unconscionable because many of the same members of Congress who opposed this funding are the same ones that

⁸⁴ Rice, Susan E., 'Today's Africa: Transformation of a Continent', address before the Meridian International Centre/ Smithsonian Institution Forum, Washington DC, 13 October 1998.

⁸⁵ Brown, Michael E., and Rosecrance, Richard, *The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p.230.

⁸⁶ In the case of Rwanda an early intervention would have cost the international community \$1.3bn against the eventual cost of the conflict to the international community of \$4.5bn.

⁸⁷ O'Hanlon, Michael, 'Saving Lives with Force: An Agenda for Expanding the ACRI', *Journal of International Affairs*, 55/2 (2002), p.300.

⁸⁸ Madeleine K. Albright, 'Testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs', Washington DC, 15 March 2000.

indicate the United States should not get involved in dealing with conflicts in Africa. And if we're not going to get involved – and very often we agree that we should not take the lead in resolving these conflicts – we have to at least assist the Africans in resolving these problems themselves, through their own capabilities.⁸⁹

In the light of the proposed cut in its budget, and following the election of George Bush in 2000, the future of ACRI seemed in doubt. However, with Africa as low on the new administration's list of priorities as it was on its predecessors, ACRI was allowed to continue with limited funding from the peacekeeping operations account. Most recently, and outside the time limits of this research, ACRI has been replaced by a new programme, the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA). The new programme promises to tailor assistance to the specific needs of participating militaries and to further encourage joint exercises and interoperability. However, funding remains nugatory and the early performance of ACOTA suggests that it will not greatly improve on ACRI's highly limited achievements.

ACRI has been the chosen tool for US engagement in Africa. However, the viability of the initiative was questionable from its establishment. An official from the Department of Defence described the hastily conceived proposal for a standing African peacekeeping force, the ACRF, as 'total bullshit, and we knew it from Day One'.⁹⁰ The central problem lay in the rapid shift following Mogadishu from a cosmopolitan to communitarian stance. There remained a vague, residual feeling that the remaining superpower 'should do something' in the face of increasing conflict in Africa. The transformation of the ACRF to ACRI was an expedient move aimed at pleasing all, but in effect pleasing nobody. Indeed, despite the many objections coming out of Africa, it is arguable that dropping the ACRF was one more equivocation. Malan expands.

By dropping the idea of creating a force, or at least a standby brigade or division, these initiatives lose much of their meaning. An inordinate amount of resources are spent worldwide on military training including, latterly, peacekeeping training. But this has not solved the problem of lack of political will to act on the part of the UN Security Council and potential troop contributing countries in the face of man-made crises in Africa.⁹¹

⁸⁹ USIS Washington File, 'Proposed US Budget Cut Would Undercut African Peacekeeping', 29 October 1999.

⁹⁰ US Department of Defence official quoted in Berman and Sams, *op.cit.*, p.14.

⁹¹ Malan, 'Peacekeeping in Africa', *op.cit.*, p.23.

In general, ACRI has failed to achieve its aims – stated or otherwise. Four graduate militaries have taken part in all-African peace operations. Senegal, Ghana, Benin and Mali have sent troops to operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, CAR and Guinea-Bissau. Set against this achievement, several ACRI militaries, or potential ACRI militaries, have engaged in coups or other dubious military action. Ethiopia went to war with Eritrea immediately prior to participation in ACRI. Within months of completing its first phase training, the Senegalese army was embroiled in a controversial bilateral intervention in Guinea-Bissau. Ugandan forces remain in DRC. In Côte d'Ivoire sections of the army under General Robert Guei ousted the elected President Henri Konan Bédié. Sanctions varied. Ethiopia's participation was postponed until after hostilities with Eritrea ceased. Uganda's ACRI battalion was allowed to complete its follow-on training, but future participation has been postponed until the UPDF withdraws from DRC. Côte d'Ivoire's participation is likewise postponed until stability returns to the country.⁹²

Has ACRI succeeded in fulfilling American goals? During the Clinton presidency the programme acted as a point of reference to argue that the US was indeed 'doing something'. During this time a major internal conflict was unfolding in DRC. At the same time conflict continued in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Few of the troops intervening in those conflicts – from SADC and ECOWAS – had ACRI training. If ACRI was intended to support the efforts of pro-US middle-ranking states to address insurgency then the record is poor. Neither ACRI equipment nor training has enabled the UPDF to contain its several rebellions. Likewise, in view of the heavy losses that it has sustained, it is clear that ACRI training has not significantly helped the Senegalese contain insurgency in the south of that country. Of course, not all countries embark on ACRI with a view to enhancing the capacity of their militaries to cope with insurrection. The motivation of Ghana and Mali is to enhance the peacekeeping capacity of their armed forces.⁹³

⁹² US Department of State, Office of International Information Programmes, 'Africa Crisis Response Initiative: Fact Sheet', May 2000.

⁹³ See Aning, Emmanuel K., 'African Crisis Response Initiative and the New African (Dis)order', *African Journal of Political Science*, 6/1 (2001), p.60.

Following the 'Battle of Mogadishu' the US did participate in selected peace operations, albeit in Europe not Africa. On this basis Clinton essayed a doctrine on peacekeeping. Speaking to American troops in Macedonia in 1999 he announced,

[W]hether you live in Africa, Central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent people and tries to kill them *en masse* because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion - and it is within our powers to stop it - we will stop it.⁹⁴

These sentiments must have a hollow ring in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC. Richard Haass offers a refined Clinton Doctrine – 'a willingness to intervene when the domestic political cost of standing aloof exceeds the cost of a carefully staged and limited operation'.⁹⁵ Carefully staged and limited operations were and are not a viable option for many of Africa's conflicts. As Jonathan Rauch points out, 'the [American] people want humanitarianism on the cheap, and that is what the Clinton Doctrine gives them'.⁹⁶

(b) France

A revaluation of French relations with Africa was signalled during the two terms of François Mitterrand's presidency. Yet, Stephen Smith comments that Franco-African policy, 'did not change its ultimate clientelism, or its central decision-making, or the method of intervention'.⁹⁷ Questions remained over the extent of the projected changes and the nature of superseding structures. On 8 November 1994 during the Franco-African summit in Biarritz, Mitterrand prefigured the French peacekeeping capacity enhancement programme for Africa the *Renforcement des capacités de la maintien de la paix* (RECAMP).

Several amongst you have suggested the formation of an *inter*-African peacekeeping force that could be rapidly deployed in certain situations until UN forces can be put in place. France is ready to lend its expertise, both technical and

⁹⁴ Quoted in *Haagsche Courant* [The Hague], 10 July 1999.

⁹⁵ Haass, Richard, N., 'The Squandered Presidency: Demanding More from the Commander in Chief', *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2000.

⁹⁶ Rauch, Jonathan, 'Two Cheers for the Clinton Doctrine (OK Maybe Just One)', *National Journal*, 26 May 2000.

⁹⁷ Smith, Stephen, 'France-Afrique: la fin d'une époque', *Politique Internationale*, 67 (1995), p.271.

logistic. But it is for you, as Africans, to define its contours, missions, and conditions for use...it is imperative to avoid the confusions that might discredit a force of this type. However, I'm partial; France will help you. Now it is necessary to work out exactly the means of bringing this plan to fruition.⁹⁸

Prior to the Biarritz summit France had been heavily involved in the conflict surrounding the Rwandan *genocide*. A French intervention based on a bilateral treaty obligation that took place between 1990 and 1993, named *Opération Noroît*, became an extensive, overt effort to bolster President Juvénal Habyarimana against an incursion by the anti-Habyarimana rebels, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) operating out of Uganda. France was held responsible during this period of 'assisting through arming and training the exponential growth of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) which grew from 5,200-strong in 1990 to 35,000 in 1993', as well as playing an active role in defending Kigali and commanding artillery at the front.⁹⁹ On 6 April 1994, the plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down in controversial circumstances, most probably by disaffected elements of the FAR, leading to the setting in motion of *Opération Amaryllis* intended to evacuate French diplomats and officials. The withdrawal of French officials was taken as a belated attempt to redefine a failing strategy in Rwanda.

The country fell into genocidal chaos. The RPF advanced pushing back *Interahamwe* militia and the FAR, but too late to prevent the slaughter of at least 500,000 Tutsi, as well as Hutu opposed to the genocide.¹⁰⁰ By mid-July the killing had abated. Nonetheless, Paris proposed to intervene in Rwanda on a humanitarian basis under Security Council Resolution 929, passed by 10 votes with 5 abstentions. The operation, dubbed *Opération Turquoise*, would involve Chapter VII peace-enforcement, or, as French doctrine has it, *restauration de la paix* [peace restoration]. France's expressed hopes that the operation would be multinational were not realised. Italy soon withdrew an offer of troops. The multinational element eventually consisted of 350 francophone

⁹⁸ Mitterrand, François, 'La France doit maintenir sa route et refuser de réduire son ambition africaine', in P. Decraene, *Lettres d'Afrique entre Cancer et Capricorn* (Paris: Editions Denoel, 1995), p.266.

⁹⁹ McNulty, Mel, "'Un bilan très positif'?: the legacy of French military intervention in Rwanda 1990-94', paper presented at the international conference 'L'Afrique, les Etats-Unis et la France', Centre d'Etudes d'Afrique Noire (CEAN), Bordeaux, 22-24 May 1997.

¹⁰⁰ Human Rights Watch, *Leave No One to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), p.1.

African troops including 243 from Senegal and others from Chad, Congo, Niger and Mauritania.¹⁰¹ Mel McNulty sums up the record of the intervention.

If intended as a humanitarian response to genocide, *Turquoise*, organised with apparent urgency came three months to late, occurring only when the genocide was all but completed...French troops failed to rescue or protect, within the Safe Humanitarian Zone, a community threatened by genocide...Elite combat troops and heavy military equipment were deployed, more suited, by the French army's own admission, to a textbook 'restoration of client' intervention...In sum, *Opération Turquoise* acted as a smokescreen for earlier French involvement.¹⁰²

An official French enquiry conducted in 1998 cleared France of direct involvement in the massacres, but admitted that policy in the region had been 'shortsighted and naïve'.¹⁰³ The report blamed the UN for failure to act at the time, and the US for encouraging UN procrastination. Nonetheless, France stood accused by many commentators of training the *génocidaires* and, under the auspices of the supposedly humanitarian *Opération Turquoise*, helping to spirit the murderers and their 'blood-stained élite' out of Rwanda.¹⁰⁴ Shaun Gregory comments that, 'France had sleepwalked into a disaster on the assumption that established policy would continue to work...subsequently it was unable to escape the consequences of either its association with a murderous regime or its failure to provide security for that regime or the Rwandan people'.¹⁰⁵ For Sam Kiley, 'France was as culpable in the Rwandan genocide of a million people as the nastiest anti-Semites of the Vichy regime were in the Holocaust'.¹⁰⁶ The operation could by no stretch of the imagination be construed as impartial. Mats Berdal remarks that, 'it is simply impossible to isolate the dubious short-term "tactical"

¹⁰¹ Connaughton, Richard, 'Military Support and Protection for Humanitarian Assistance – Rwanda: April-December 1994' *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* <www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/freps/FR001A> posted 1995.

¹⁰² McNulty, op.cit.

¹⁰³ Assemblée Nationale, *Mission d'information sur le Rwanda: Rapport d'information* (Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1998); *Agence France Presse*, 15 December 1998.

¹⁰⁴ *Financial Times* [London], 14 November 1996.

¹⁰⁵ Gregory, Shaun, 'The French Military in Africa: Past and Present', *African Affairs* 99/396 (2000), pp.440-441.

¹⁰⁶ *Times* [London], 8 November 1996.

achievements of *Turquoise*, whatever the admixtures involved, from that of French policy towards the conflict and the region before, during and after the genocide'.¹⁰⁷

Turquoise proved to be as much a watershed for French interventionist policies in Africa as 'Restore Hope' was for the US. Henceforward, France would attempt to retain maximum influence on the continent with minimum direct intervention. The Great Lakes region, once more, proved a testing ground for the evolving reassessment of policy.¹⁰⁸ A rebellion started in the eastern province of Northern Kivu in Zaire in October 1996. Foci for the conflict were massive refugee camps commanded by ex-FAR officers and *Interahamwe* who had fled Rwanda under the cover of *Turquoise*. Civil war threatened to spread throughout the country. France supported Zaire's dictatorial Mobutu Sese Seko against the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Kinshasa* (AFDL) of Laurent-Désiré Kabila perceived by Paris to be a proxy of a Ugandan/Rwandan Anglo-Saxon ascendancy in the region. For France, Mobutu's political regeneration was guaranteed by his support for the use of airports in eastern Zaire as bridgeheads for the deployment of *Turquoise*. As the AFDL gained the upper hand, France struggled to find a way to contain the rebellion.

If the interventionist reflex, *à la* Jacques Foccart, had waned, it had certainly not perished entirely. The continuing presence of Foccart, together with his protégé, Fernand Wibaux, within Chirac's *cellule africaine* ensured a strong interventionist lobby committed to rescue the Mobutu regime in time-honoured fashion. A less confrontational stance was advanced by the Elysée's secretary-general, Dominique de Villepin - a panoptic intervention with contributions from the US, Europe and Africa intended to secure a limited humanitarian operation.¹⁰⁹ To this end, France became by far the most vociferous state calling for military intervention. The Quai d'Orsay once more sought to claim the humanitarian high ground. As the crisis progressed in late October and early November, France's sedulous entreaties for the international community to react became increasingly shrill and insistent. In an interview on 6 November, the French Foreign

¹⁰⁷ Berdal, Mats, 'Lessons Not learned: The Use of Force in 'Peace Operations' in the 1990s', *International Peacekeeping*, 7/4 (2000), p.70.

¹⁰⁸ Massey, Simon, 'The Greatest Intervention that Never Happened', *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* <<http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a533.htm>> posted on 15 February 1998.

¹⁰⁹ *Africa Confidential*, 37/24, 29 November 1996, p.3.

Minister, Hervé de Charette, sought to impress on the outside world that France had no individual interests in the region, but only 'a shared responsibility'.¹¹⁰

Ultimately, the settled French interventionist strategy, as outlined by senior government advisor Gérard Prunier was not designed to allay fears in Kampala or Kigali. As a member of the Ministry of Defence's crisis unit during *Turquoise*, and the author of a critical history of the genocide and intervention, Prunier understood the extent of mistrust engendered by any French-led intervention.¹¹¹ However, the need or *right* to intervene superseded the potential for an escalation of the conflict following a French intervention. Prunier advised, 'a unilateral French operation because we have the military capacity in Africa...we may have to forget about the rest of Europe or the UN because it will take too long'.¹¹² Moreover, the intervention force was to be charged with securing a corridor to allow refugees to escape - not back to Rwanda, but due west, deeper into Zaire. French helicopters were to be used to lay a trail of food, water and medicine to enable the refugees to escape on foot. Prunier's humanitarian motives were beyond reproach. The extent of the suffering amongst the refugees was great. However, it was beyond doubt that the strategy would never be acceptable to the AFDL or their allies. In a veiled threat, Rwandan Foreign Minister Anastase Gasana, promised that an intervention of the French type would, 'incur opposition from within the sub-region by all means, not only political ones'.¹¹³ Any attempt to implement the plan would have been resisted.

As the refugee crisis intensified, the Security Council endorsed Resolution 1080. A multinational force under Canadian command was authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use commensurate force to secure specific humanitarian objectives. On the eve of the deployment of *Operation Assurance*, rebel forces stormed the refugee camps in Kivu forcing the retreat of pro-Mobutu forces and forestalling permanently the proposed intervention. The Kivu crisis highlighted continued tension over French interventionism. Even with a Gaullist government and presidency, there were signs of a split between old-style intervenors and modernisers who recognised the limits, both political and in terms of financial cost, to unilateral intervention.

¹¹⁰ 'Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, M. Hervé de Charette', Paris, 6 November 1996 <<http://www.france.diplomatie.fr>>. posted 7 November 1996.

¹¹¹ Prunier, Gérard, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (London: Hurst 1995), p.189.

¹¹² *Times* [London], 4 November 1996.

On the left of the political spectrum, a further layer of debate was added by the proponents of the *droit d'ingérence* - the *right* to intervene in humanitarian crises. French doctors and intellectuals have played a central role in internationalising this concept throughout the 1980s and 1990s. A key personality supporting the right to intervene is Bernard Kouchner, four times a French government minister and UN Special Representative to Kosovo. In April 1999, during an interview broadcast by *France 2*, Kouchner expressed a fundamental distinction between a *devoir d'ingérence* [a necessity or duty to intervene] and a general *droit d'ingérence* [a right to intervene].¹¹⁴ It should be noted that, in French unlike English, the right to intervene carries more weight than the duty to intervene.¹¹⁵ Few efforts have been made to conceptualise what level of violence should trigger intervention.¹¹⁶

France entered a period of enforced *cohabitation* with the victory of Lionel Jospin's Socialists in May 1997. Commenting on relations with Africa, Roland Marchal notes a 'standardisation of an existing policy rather than the affirmation of a new one'.¹¹⁷ He isolates two exceptions – 'the role of French troops in Africa and the debate on spheres of influence'.¹¹⁸ Jospin inherited advanced plans to restructure the bloated armed forces. The decrease in the size of the army following the professionalisation of the armed forces entailed a reduction in the French military presence in Africa. The total cost of the pre-reform *dispositif* was FF3bn. A decrease in troop numbers from 7,913 prepositioned troops in mid-1997 to about 5,600 soldiers in 2002 aims to save FF800m each year. French forces will concentrate in five bases creating a three-link chain for possible intervention. The base in Djibouti will cover East Africa, as well as security in the Middle East and Indian Ocean. Bases in Gabon and Chad will cover central Africa. Bases in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal will cover West Africa and allow air reach to French Guyana and the West Indies.¹¹⁹ A central strand in the cost reduction plan was a shift in

¹¹³ *Libération* [Paris], 6 November 1996.

¹¹⁴ *France 2*, 'Mots croisés', 12 April.

¹¹⁵ Allen, Tim, and Styan, David, 'A right to interfere?: Bernard Kouchner and the "new humanitarianism"', *Journal of International Development*, 12/6 (2000), p.832.

¹¹⁶ Note, however, the Solarz-O'Hanlon formula discussed in Chapter Two.

¹¹⁷ Marchal, Roland, *op.cit.*, p.362.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.362.

¹¹⁹ *Financial Times*, 30 July 1997; Marchal, *op.cit.*, p.363; Sada, Hugo, 'Le nouveau dispositif militaire français en Afrique', *Radio France International*, 27 November 1997
<<http://www.rfi.fr/Kiosque/Mfi/SommetAF/Lundi/fichez2.htm>> posted 23 November 1998.

the numbers of troops based permanently in Africa toward short tours of duty. The single biggest loser in the reorganisation was the Central African Republic (CAR). The closure of the bases at Bangui and Bouar had a double impact. The loss of the garrisons had an immediate effect on the local economy, whilst the closures also sent the signal that the maintenance of French installations in Africa could not be taken for granted.

The conduit for French military cooperation changed on 1 January 1999. The integration of the Ministry of Cooperation into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw the *mission militaire de coopération* (MMC) replaced by a *direction de la coopération militaire et défense* under the *Quai d'Orsay*. The new regime in military cooperation envisaged further cuts beyond the reduction in the presence of French troops. The number of military technicians in Africa had been decreasing since the 1980s. The number of technicians in sub-Saharan Africa (and Cambodia) in 1992 was 900, dropping to 570 in 1998, and 506 in 1999.¹²⁰ The number of subsidised military trainees from Africa in French military academies has also fallen since the mid-1980s. In 1990 there were about 1,800 African officers receiving training in France, dropping to 1,300 in 1994 to 916 in 1998. The last figure is estimated to halve by 2002.¹²¹

As a concomitant to the diminishing number of places at French schools, Paris proposed enhancing support for African military training schools in order to 'better adapt training to the needs of African militaries'.¹²² Four schools – two in Mali and one each in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire – receive credits and instructors from France. The number of trainees at these academies has climbed already from 192 in 1997 to 269 in 1998, coming from twenty countries. By the end of 1999, a further nine training institutions should have been established.¹²³ The peacekeeping training centre at Zambakro opened in 1999. Whilst material aid has stabilised at FFr180m in 1998 and FFr172m1999, a change in

¹²⁰ In 1999 the main recipients of technical assistants were Chad (46 technicians), Cameroon (42), Côte d'Ivoire (40), Mauritania (39), Niger (39), Gabon (35), Djibouti (32), Senegal (30), CFA (28) and Togo (27).

¹²¹ In 1998 the main beneficiaries of training programmes were Madagascar (76 trainees), Togo (67), Chad (66), Senegal (64), Gabon (61), Burkina Faso (57), Mauritania (56), Cameroon (52), Côte d'Ivoire (51), Mali (50), Benin (49) and Guinea (43).

¹²² Sada, *op.cit.*

¹²³ The other training schools are in Côte d'Ivoire (gendarmerie, naval instruction, peacekeeping), Togo (medicine), Benin (police), Burkina Faso (mechanical engineering), Senegal (basic officer training) and Cameroon (pilot training, maintenance of law and order).

priorities has been signalled. Improving the capacity to maintain existing stocks is to take priority over the provision of arms and materiel.¹²⁴

Jospin's administration consistently underlined the thrust of this 'change of habits' in military cooperation with Africa, insisting that the era of 'French interventionism in Africa was over'.¹²⁵ Yet, the point is not laboured. In a five-page communiqué on France's Africa policy intended to map the processes of adaptation and adjustment, the *Quai d'Orsay* frequently reiterates its 'loyalty', 'solidarity' and 'traditional objectives' with and to its traditional partners. The document emphasises the intent to continue to honour existing defence accords. When the document refers to a preoccupation with African security 'without recourse to direct intervention', it prefaces an outline of RECAMP.

A model for RECAMP was the *Mission de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui* (MISAB). France underwrote the costs of an all-African interposition force in the CAR. Moussounga Itsouhou Mbandinga argues that MISAB was only possible 'due, first to the change of France's military policy in which external intervention had been strictly interpreted and, secondly, to the French government's desire to let African leaders settle their political crises by themselves'.¹²⁶ The composition was all-francophone with troops from Chad, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali and Gabon. Although the command was African there was a continued dependence on logistical support from the French *dispositif* deployed in the CAR. Moreover, MISAB also benefited from the dissuasive presence of troops from the *Éléments français d'assistance opérationnelle* (EFAP) that had already intervened twice to put down mutinies against President Félix Patassé. Although deemed a reasonable success, the intervention was marked by outbreaks of violence and looting by MISAB forces based in Bangui.¹²⁷

By 1997 the RECAMP project had substance. In March a small peacekeeping exercise was held in Nangbeto, Togo with troops from France, Benin, Burkina Faso and

¹²⁴ Credits for arms and materiel in 1998 – Chad (FFr12m), Senegal (FFr11m), Côte d'Ivoire (FFr11m), CFA (FFr10m) and Cameroon (FFr9m)

¹²⁵ Marchal, *op.cit.*, p.363.

¹²⁶ Mbandinga, Moussounga Itsouhou, 'The Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB)', *International Peacekeeping*, 8/4 (2001), p.32.

¹²⁷ *Le Monde* [Paris], 3 March 1998; interview with Colonel Gustave Zoula (Senior Military Officer, OAU Conflict Management Division) and Commodore Binéga Mesfin (Military Consultant, OAU Conflict Management Division), OAU Conflict Management Centre, Addis Ababa, April 1998.

Togo. Gabriel Régnault de Bellescize, the former French Ambassador in Mali, was named as the first ambassador for RECAMP. He was charged with raising donations, developing the initiative, coordinating and maintaining links with external and African partners, and meshing the French agencies involved in the project, notably the ministries of foreign affairs and defence.

In May 1997, following sharp exchanges between Washington and Paris over the scope and shape of the proposed US-sponsored ACRF, the P3 agreement was signed. Charles Josselin has referred to 'a tripartite coordination, which stands witness to our willingness to move on, in this area at least, from a logic of duplication or competition'.¹²⁸ RECAMP was to play a pivotal role in the multilateralisation of French military policy in Africa. One plank of that new policy was the Africanisation of regional security with African states taking the lead in conflict resolution. The other element of the policy was the multinationalisation of Western policy towards African security with France joining the US and Britain, amongst other western states, in a coordinated strategy of capacity building. Tony Chafer believes that multinationalisation is in France's interest for two main reasons.

It helps avoid the danger of France becoming militarily and diplomatically isolated and, in the case of a decision to intervene militarily, it shares the responsibilities, risks, and financial burden of military intervention. Also, if France is to succeed in making its development aid more effective and in opening up new markets and investment opportunities, this can only happen in the context of greater political and economic stability in Africa.¹²⁹

Security and peacekeeping capacity dominated the Franco-African summit in Paris in November 1998. Prior to the start of the debates, de Bellescize outlined the areas on which RECAMP would concentrate – instruction, equipage and training.¹³⁰ A first priority is peacekeeping instruction. The aim is for participating African countries 'to

¹²⁸ Josselin Charles, 'Ouverture de la XIIIeme Session Internationale Afrique-Madagascar de l'IHEDN Prevention des Conflits en Afrique Intervention du Ministre Délégué à la Coopération et à la Francophonie', Paris, 14 June 1999.

¹²⁹ Chafer, Tony, 'Franco-African relations: No Longer So Exceptional', *African Affairs*, 101/404 (2002), p.349.

¹³⁰ BBC Monitoring Service, 'Africa-France: French official explains role of new peacekeeping force', 23 November 1998.

Materiel, valued at US\$3m was transported to Dakar at the cost of US\$2m.¹³⁵ The equipment was used during *Guidimakha*. It has since been used by the UN mission in CAR (MINURCA) and again during the ECOMOG intervention in Guinea-Bissau. Materiel stored in Dakar remains under the control of France and French forces will maintain it. Materiel sufficient to equip a battalion of 600 men has been stored, including 140 vehicles and a field hospital. Colonel Poncet has been at pains to emphasise that 'this materiel is at the disposal of African countries and not at the disposition of France'.¹³⁶ He carries on to explain that the equipment is held under French control since it is necessary to maintain the stocks in climate controlled conditions, and near air and sea hubs for ease of distribution in case of crisis. French bases are best placed to fulfil these conditions.

Unlike America's bilateral approach France has concentrated on training at a regional level. Significant resources have been set aside for multinational peacekeeping exercises. There have been three to date, one each in west, central and east Africa. A civil-military seminar was held in Dakar in October 1997 in preparation for a multinational peacekeeping exercise.¹³⁷ *Guidimakha*, was conducted from 16-28 February 1998 in an arid region at the intersection of Senegal, Mauritania and Mali. These three countries provided battalion-strength contingents. Smaller units were sent by Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. France provided about 900 troops. The US and Britain also sent small contingents. Altogether 3,600 troops took part. A central component of the exercise was to allow troops from different countries to work alongside one another as part of a RECOMP battalion. The Commander of that battalion, the Senegalese Colonel Mbaye Faye, noted that, 'we have gone from a collection of different elements to a real amalgam'.¹³⁸ In *Guidimakha* this *inter-army* battalion comprised 608 troops mainly from the five countries contributing sub-battalion strength units. There were ironies. The Commander of the Mauritanian battalion noted that 'it's an extraordinary thing to see Senegalese and Mauritians as brothers in arms when less

¹³⁵ Berman and Sams, 'Constructive Disengagement', op.cit., p.14.

¹³⁶ Point de Presse de JF Bureau, Délégué à l'Information et à la Communication de la Défense, 26 November 1998.

¹³⁷ *PANA*, 'Joint Franco-African Military Manoeuvre', 16 October 1997.

¹³⁸ *Le Monde* [Paris], 3 March 1998.

than ten years ago they were opposing each other in an armed conflict'.¹³⁹ Yet, the platoon from Guinea-Bissau was training in the same battalion as Guinean and Senegalese troops, and camped alongside the main Senegalese battalion. Five months later soldiers from these armies were fighting against one another in Bissau. Nonetheless, it was solidarity that French Minister of Defence, Alain Richard, chose as the keynote of his address at the end of the exercise.

What should be underlined by this exercise is the feeling of deep solidarity, comradeship and familiarity between the militaries involved in these manoeuvres. I believe that confidence has been engendered here, the capacity to work shoulder to shoulder. We have shown that this confidence and solidarity would work under real conditions, in conflicts. This is a sure guarantee of friendship and willingness to act together that we must bring to fruition and preserve.¹⁴⁰

Berman and Sams note that 'subregional training exercises under RECAMP are designed to prepare troops for a number of contingencies and thus cover a broad range of topics'.¹⁴¹ The fictitious political scenario for the exercise was plausible. Severe drought had resulted in civil conflict resulting in a country divided between a zone governed by the democratically elected government and another controlled by rebels. After the conflict had stabilised and a ceasefire established an *inter*-African force, supported by elite troops from external donors, intervenes under UN and OAU mandates.¹⁴² *Guidimakha* was divided into four phases covering intelligence and reconnaissance, securing key installations, widening a safe humanitarian zone and providing humanitarian assistance, in this case grouping and protecting refugees.

France ensured that the exercise was visible to the media. There was a daily flight to the exercise area organised for journalists. Moreover, there was training in audiovisual skills given by the *Etablissement cinématographique et photographique des armées* (ECPA) and techniques of media control taught to Malian, Mauritanian and Senegalese officers. Daily press reports from the French Ministry of Defence, however, read like a bad *roman à guerre*, concentrating on the supposed camaraderie between the

¹³⁹ Ministère de la Défense, 'Le carnet de route de Guidimakha'

<<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualities/event/guidimakha/22/carnet.htm>> Dakar, 22 February 1998.

¹⁴⁰ Déclaration de M. Alain Richard, Ministère de la Défense dans le cadre de l'exercice Guidimakha, Bokar, 28 February 1998.

¹⁴¹ Berman and Sams, op.cit. 'Constructive Disengagement', p.12.

participating contingents, whilst giving little real detail and supplying no video footage of encounters between the competing forces in the exercise.

There was little mention of the fact that the assault on the rebel-held airport at Bakel, which included paratroopers, was conducted by French, US and British forces. The vaunted relief of these troops by the RECAMP battalion lacked realism and was described apologetically, and privately, by a French officer as *familiale*.¹⁴³ On the other hand, UN observers reported that the part of the exercise aimed at manning checkpoints and grouping refugees had been conducted in a heavy-handed manner. A non-francophone soldier was critical of the extent to which francophone African contingents were dependent on RECAMP-supplied high-technology logistical equipment. Referring to a part of the exercise in which a pontoon bridge was built over a river, he pointed out that by using the French-supplied interlinked metal pallet system, rather than an indigenous African solution using linked pirogues, the RECAMP soldier was reliant on France maintaining the supply of pallets.¹⁴⁴

Could *Guidimakha* be replicated in a real crisis? The unstated reality of RECAMP is the reliance of all-African intervention forces on external funding and logistical support. But did the exercise enhance the capacity and consent of regional states to join together to intervene? The use of donor troops in the airborne assault implies that future interventions under RECAMP would be limited to Chapter VI peacekeeping interventions with total consent and little residual opposition. The senior American officer at the exercises, the Deputy Commander of US forces in Europe, US Air Force General Jamerson was equivocal. He believed the effort expended on *Guidimakha* showed 'that we're serious about what we're doing'. Asked if the RECAMP battalion could be deployed tomorrow he said, 'one never knows...the important thing is that it's happening'.¹⁴⁵ In the event RECAMP would be tested in the Guinea-Bissau civil war by the end of 1998. This operation will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

A smaller exercise than *Guidimakha* was held between 17-29 January 2000. *Gabon 2000* brought together about 700 troops from eight central African countries –

¹⁴² *Le Soleil* [Dakar], 18 February 1998.

¹⁴³ *Associated Press*, 'New African Military Evolves', 7 March 1998.

¹⁴⁴ *Le Monde* [Paris], 3 March 1998.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Gabon, Burundi, Cameroon, the CAR, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tomé and Príncipe. France supplied logistical support and training with symbolic representatives from the US, Britain, Spain, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands. The exercise was preceded by a well-attended civil-military seminar held in Libreville between 16-18 June. The scenario for *Gabon 2000* was a fictitious country emerging from civil war in which a ceasefire has been declared along a line bisecting the country resulting in the exodus of a part of the population. An *inter*-African force is deployed under UN and OAU mandates to maintain peace, protect the civil population and to aid the distribution of humanitarian aid. A force is assembled and enters from a fictitious neighbouring country. There are similarities between this scenario and the situation faced by the peacekeeping force sponsored by France and RECAMP in Guinea-Bissau in 1998-1999. *Gabon 2000* can be seen as an effort to learn lessons from the deficiencies of that operation. The three phases of the exercise were force assembly (including instruction and spearhead deployment), engagement in theatre (deployment of the RECAMP battalion, command and control, start of manoeuvres) and disengagement (assessment of the humanitarian aspects of the exercise by UNICEF and UNHCR, reintegration of materiel into the RECAMP stockpile, withdrawal of African contingents to their home countries).

France outlined the objectives of the exercise. For the African participants the objectives were -

- To develop a working knowledge of the relative aspects of multinational peacekeeping operations.
- To assemble, deploy and command a multinational, inter-army peacekeeping force with support from donor nations.
- To participate in the construction of a multinational command structure.
- To test the capacity for an inter-army force to conduct operations in a safety zone.
- To organise, prior to the arrival of international organisations, civil-military action to aid the civilian population, taking into account the constraints of logistics, media relations and humanitarianism.

For the donor states the objectives were -

- To develop coordination between donor countries (especially in the field of civil-military affairs) and international organisations and the OAU representing African states.

- To reinforce cooperation between donor countries and central African states.
- To help by employing logistical support in a peacekeeping operation.¹⁴⁶

As with *Guidimakha* the reported response from the participants was positive. Alain Richard returned to the theme of the unity of interests commenting that, 'African solidarity is essential for being ready to act in a crisis situation'.¹⁴⁷ Emphasising the command and control role taken by African officers during the exercises, the French Chief of Staff, General Jean-Pierre Kelche, added that *Gabon 2000* had shown that 'one can entrust the command of a multinational force to African countries'.¹⁴⁸ These sentiments were echoed by the African contingents. Lieutenant Leopoldo Vaz Foernandes from São Tomé and Príncipe said that he was 'pleased with this new experience with my Chadian, Burundian and Gabonese brothers in arms'.¹⁴⁹ The Gabonese Chief of Staff, General Anguile, praised the exercise for contributing to 'a *rapprochement* between countries which are neighbours and friends but who, in general, rarely interact'.¹⁵⁰

There were caveats. A BBC correspondent enquired which sections of the multicoloured operational maps the 'enemy' held. The following exchange took place.

'It's not about war games anymore,' said the Paris spin doctors, 'but humanitarian duties, feeding refugees and "regional co-operation"'.
 'But isn't this a bit limited in the circumstances,' someone protested.
 'After all, most of central Africa seems to be involved in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo'. There was no answer. It was time to get on the bus.

¹⁴⁶ Ministère de la Défense, 'RECAMP Gabon 2000: L'Exercice avec troupes'
 <<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/exercices/gabon2000/troupe.htm>> Libreville, 17 January 2000.

¹⁴⁷ *Agence France Presse International*, 'African troops complete peacekeeping exercises', 27 January 2000.

¹⁴⁸ Ministère de la Défense, 'Le carnet de route de Gabon 2000'
 <<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualities/event/gabon2000/28012000/carnet.htm>> Libreville, 28 January 2000.

¹⁴⁹ *Agence France Presse International*, 'African troops complete peacekeeping exercises', 27 January 2000.

¹⁵⁰ Ministère de la Défense, 'Le carnet de route de Gabon 2000'
 <<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualities/event/gabon2000/28012000/carnet.htm>> Libreville, 28 January 2000.

It was always time to get on the bus. Especially if you asked the wrong sort of questions.¹⁵¹

Doubts remain over the size of the RECAMP battalion and the artificiality of the exercises overstating the capacity of an inter-army force to intervene in a complex emergency. General Kelche describes RECAMP as 'very ambitious'.¹⁵² However, given the scale of conflict in Africa, a single battalion could fulfil only a limited role in any intervention. The ECOMOG intervention in Guinea-Bissau in early 1999, based on the RECAMP model and using prepositioned materiel, proved ineffectual. Whilst this operation suffered from numerous sub-agenda, it was clear that there were serious shortcomings in the capacity of the intervention force to fulfil even its limited mandate. The absence of a workable command and control structure was particularly notable. The Guinea-Bissau case will be studied in depth in Chapter Seven.

RECAMP still needs to be sold both at an international level and within Africa. Rivalry still exists within the P3. Despite promises of deeper cooperation between France and Britain bias endures. Although exercises were held in Tanzania in February 2002, a feeling persists that RECAMP's natural area of operation is francophone West Africa.¹⁵³ BBC Diplomatic Correspondent Barnaby Mason notes that despite the diplomacy, 'commercial and cultural competition between Britain and France in Africa is intensifying, each seeking to make inroads into the other's former colonies'.¹⁵⁴ Whilst Paris undoubtedly still considers Washington's grasp of African affairs tenuous, there seems to be an acceptance that even in Africa there could be no gainsaying a committed US policy. However, there is equally a belief that Africa remains a low priority for the

¹⁵¹ BBC Online Network, 'The retreat from empire' <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/from_our_own_correspondent/newsid696000_696997.stm> 1 April 2000.

¹⁵² *Radio France International: Afrique Matin*, 21 October 1999.

¹⁵³ An exercise for East African states dubbed *Tanzanite* was held in Tanzania in February 2002. Two preliminary mini-exercises were held in preparation – *Tulipe '99* in Madagascar and *Géranium 2000* in Réunion. The majority of the participants in *Tanzanite* were anglophone. The intended location for the exercise, Djibouti, is suffering an internal rebellion by the *Front révolutionnaire uni de Djibouti* (FRUD) supported by Eritrea. Because of war and unrest, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti did not participate in the exercise. The participants were Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Ile Maurice, Mozambique, Namibia, RDC, South Africa, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia et Zimbabwe. As with *Guidimakha* and *Gabon 2000*, *Tanzanite* was criticised for artificiality and reliance on non-African logistics and planning.

¹⁵⁴ BBC Online Network <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa>> 11 March 1999.

US. RECAMP stands as an attempt to prolong influence on the continent. A Malian Colonel relates an instructive anecdote.¹⁵⁵ When the French Embassy in Bamako learned that a delegation from the US army had scheduled a meeting with the upper echelon of Mali's military command to discuss participation in ACRI, it purposely organised a meeting with French defence officials to take place at the same time. This was regarded by the Colonel as a sign of petty jealousy on France's part and the meeting with the Americans went ahead as planned.

As Rupert Cornwell points out 'differentiation will not end easily'.¹⁵⁶ He continues, 'and then there are the feelings of the Africans themselves...why in a world of dissolving frontiers, should Côte d'Ivoire be forced to use Paris as its gateway to the world?'.¹⁵⁷ RECAMP is a further distraction in the already confused African regional security prototype. In West Africa RECAMP, as well as ACRI, is currently developing at variance with Nigeria's design for regional security. Abuja *must* object to efforts to enhance the role of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire in regional security. The RECAMP initiative in central Africa is a chimera. *Gabon 2000* brought together a dubious selection of armed forces, many with recent histories of domestic repression and interventionism. Congo, Chad, CAR, and Burundi - participants in the exercise - have all been involved in the conflict in DRC. Given the scale of the conflict in central Africa, the exercise in Gabon was not so much unrealistic as an irresponsible evasion.

An army coup in Côte d'Ivoire on Christmas Eve 1999 tested France's supposed non-interventionist resolve. *Jeune Afrique* noted at the time that the temptation to intervene militarily was great, recognising that an intervention to secure the safety of French citizens would most probably result French forces reversing the coup.¹⁵⁸ This was Chirac's position. Other reports suggest that the Socialist government had a role in the coup. *African Business* intimates that Jospin, exasperated by incumbent President Bedié's anti-democratic practices, encouraged General Guei to act during a meeting in Paris in early December.¹⁵⁹ The question of the tension between the old style intervenors, essentially within Chirac's *Elysée*, and those seeking a less direct means of achieving

¹⁵⁵ Related by an alumnus of IMET 1997. Discussions at IMET conducted under Chatham House rules.

¹⁵⁶ *Independent* [London], 12 March 1999.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *Jeune Afrique*, 18-24 January 2000.

French ends within Jospin's *Matignon*, arises. Reinforcements were sent from Gabon to Senegal ostensibly to evacuate 20,000 French citizens. However, the *Financial Times* reports that 'Mr Jospin vetoed plans for French military intervention to restore the unpopular regime'.¹⁶⁰ The events in Côte d'Ivoire show that France still nurtures advocates of intervention in its widest sense on both sides of the political divide - the potential to intervene whether by stealth, through the manipulation of RECAMP or directly. The intervention debate is not yet resolved.

As for RECAMP itself, the annual review of development aid produced by the French *Senat* recognises that, 'in the face of continuing conflict, responses remain limited'.¹⁶¹ Nonetheless, the *rapporteuse* sounds a note of optimism commenting that, 'for a long time the subject of rhetoric but little action, the reinforcement of African capacity for peacekeeping has shown an undeniable élan in recent years'.¹⁶² A more realistic appraisal should recognise that RECAMP offers African participants little other than fresh uniforms and basic equipment. The advantages largely accrue to France. As with ACRI, RECAMP will only serve as a pause for breath whilst Paris decides whether to embark on a more engaged strategy in Africa in the medium term. These decisions will be event-led. Berman and Sams summarise RECAMP's failings.

RECAMP is billed as a strengthened commitment to African peacekeeping, but it can best be understood as a cost-cutting measure intended to reduce France's traditional exposure and expenses on the continent. At the instigation of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, France is scaling down its military presence substantially throughout Africa... its commitment to strengthening peacekeeping on the continent is dubious.¹⁶³

(c) Britain

Britain's efforts at African peacekeeping capacity building have been more modest and less politically loaded than those of the US and France. Although it falls outside the temporal limits of the research it should be noted that within the past two years Britain has greatly enhanced its involvement in peacekeeping capacity building in Africa as part

¹⁵⁹ *African Business*, February 2000.

¹⁶⁰ *Financial Times*, 25 February 2000.

¹⁶¹ Briseperre, Paulette [Rapporteuse], 'Projet de Loi de Finance de 2000, Tome III – Aide au Développement, Avis-92 Tome III' (1999-2000).

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

of a large and ambitious new programme - the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP). This period also saw Britain take the highly unusual step of deploying its own troops in support of the UN mission in Sierra Leone.

Britain has followed a policy of seeking to enhance African peacekeeping capacity since 1994. The initiative stemmed from an address by Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd to the UN General Assembly. The British government was acutely embarrassed over the stalling tactics that it had employed at the time of the Rwandan civil war - effectively denying that genocide was in progress - that had stifled an international response.¹⁶⁴ Hurd's proposals prefigured the eventual shape of both ACRI and RECAP in that it recognised that future Western peacekeeping interventions in Africa would be limited and piecemeal or not sought. Hurd's proposed solution was for capacity building measures such as training initiatives and the supply of basic equipment and logistics to be put in place for use by willing African states.

By 1996 Britain had developed an 'African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme' with a budget of about £4m per year.¹⁶⁵ The training schedule is top-down with the emphasis placed on officer training. As with ACRI the methodology is 'train the trainer', albeit at officer rather than NCO level. Peacekeeping training in Africa is now conducted by one, formerly two, British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs).

BMATT Southern Africa was based in Harare until the end of March 2001 when the volatile political situation in Zimbabwe forced it to relocate to Britain. Since 1980 BMATT in Zimbabwe had assisted with the complex integration of the former Rhodesian armed forces with the irregular soldiers of the various former independence movements. By 1994 only four members of the British team remained. The switch to a regional role based on conflict resolution saw the number of British officers in the team rise to eleven. Partially as a result of South Africa's ambivalence towards peacekeeping, and partially as a result of a dedicated and consistent peacekeeping training programme supported by Britain, the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) earned a reputation as the preeminent

¹⁶³ Berman and Sams, *op.cit.*, p.17.

¹⁶⁴ See, Melvern, Linda, 'British foreign policy and the Rwandan genocide', paper presented at the ASUK conference, University of Birmingham, 9-11 September 2002.

¹⁶⁵ Now subsumed by the CPP.

military in the region in the specialised field of peace support operations. In April 1997 BMATT Southern Africa helped to organize a battalion level field exercise dubbed Blue Hungwe. Britain spent around \$500,000 on the event. The exercise brought together 1,100 troops from eight SADC countries.¹⁶⁶ At the time, President Mugabe remarked that ‘an exercise of this nature removes suspicion, creates transparency, and builds confidence, mutual trust and understanding amongst participating defence forces’.¹⁶⁷ In April 1999 a follow-up exercise at brigade level, dubbed Blue Crane, was held in South Africa. Although subject to similar criticisms as the RECAMP exercises, including artificiality and inconsistency of troop quality, non-African input was much less conspicuous. Blue Crane was essentially organised and run by African officers. Intended as the start of a rotating cycle of regional exercises the ‘Blue’ series has faltered. One reason was the scheduling of the French-sponsored *Tanzanite* exercise for 2002. More fundamental has been the controversial involvement of the ZDF in the DRC, and the ongoing political crisis in Zimbabwe. Britain has criticised Mugabe’s current policy of land redistribution. Following the departure from Zimbabwe of the BMATT team, Zimbabwe’s Minister of State for Information Jonathon Moyo said ‘probably they should not have been here in the first place...to us their departure is like lowering the Union Jack’.¹⁶⁸

Peacekeeping training in Ghana mirrors that given in Zimbabwe until 2001. British training in West Africa is carried out by a small team from BMATT West Africa established in 1996 and fully operational since 1997. Officers from BMATT are an integral part of the command structure of the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College in Accra. British instructors of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and above assist the Ghanaian staff in running the year-long joint services senior command and staff course. The course is open to officers throughout Africa of the rank of Major and above or the equivalent rank in other services. Up to eight countries, mainly Anglophone, are represented on each course. Lt Col Simon Diggins, a British member of the Directing Staff in Ghana, describes the course as ‘a significant career milestone for its

¹⁶⁶ The participants were Zimbabwe, Malawi, Lesotho, South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Swaziland and Namibia.

¹⁶⁷ Quoted in Nyambua, Michael, ‘Zimbabwe’s Role as Lead Nation for Peacekeeping Training in the SADC Region’, in Malan, ‘Resolute Partners’, op.cit., p.3.

participants.¹⁶⁹ A four-week module focuses on planning interventions at the operational level. The course begins with theory, discussions, seminars, and lectures from both internal and external tutors. The course culminates in a four-day desktop simulation starting at the UN level with the participants acting as military commanders advising the Security Council. The module includes a humanitarian element such as discussion about the rights of children in conflict. BMATT West Africa also introduced a three-week international 'stand-alone' PSO course in 1998, effectively a shortened version of the four-week Staff College module. Forty-three individuals from 13 different countries participated in the course, including Ghanaian police officers and a civilian representative from the OAU. The Ghanaians, and their British co-sponsors, selected officers who had previously undergone training with ACRI or who had some sort of peacekeeping training or experience.

Central to BMATT peacekeeping training is military discipline and professionalism. As Melanie Bright notes in *Jane's Defence Weekly*,

[W]here the French and American programmes may explicitly interest themselves in professionalism, the British emphatically single out professionalism as the key to their training. A British official emphasised that having a responsible and disciplined military force is an essential component of democratic government. Britain is therefore training civilian control of the military to make sure soldiers are responsible to a democratic government.¹⁷⁰

Stress on democracy and civil-military relations as part of a holistic development strategy for Africa ties in with current British government thinking. The election of a Labour, or rather New Labour, government in 1997 saw both the creation of a dedicated Department for International Development (DFID) and the commencement of a consistently engaged policy for African regeneration.¹⁷¹ Indeed by April 1999 *Africa Confidential* could state that,

[O]f the three Western powers that matter in Africa, Britain is now seen as the most likely to put its diplomatic weight behind Africa. Britain's Ambassador to the UN is pushing for greater focus on Africa's conflicts by the Security Council.

¹⁶⁸ Dispatch Online <www.dispatch.co.za> posted 25 April 2001.

¹⁶⁹ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 26 May 1999.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Peacekeeping training is funded through the FCO with personnel, equipment and logistics supplied by the MoD. DFID has funded non-military peacekeeping exercises. The FCO, MoD and DFID are committed to enhanced cooperation as part of New Labour's policy of 'joined-up government'.

British diplomats want to counter fatalistic notions about 'letting Africa's conflicts fight themselves out', adding that, without outside assistance, the conflicts may spread even further. 'There are no good wars now. The liberation wars were justified in the past. African wars now simply kill people, divert resources, and don't bring lasting security,' a FCO official told *Africa Confidential*. All the other imperatives of a more ethical foreign policy in Africa - in favour of the poor, human rights, good governance and against arms proliferation - are being subsumed in efforts to resolve and limit the continent's wars. 'As long as the wars rage, the development agenda is on hold'.¹⁷²

The basis of New Labour philosophy is the nebulous concept of the Third Way. Tony Blair argues that the Third Way 'seeks to combine economic dynamism with social justice'.¹⁷³ In this context, Africa has become the measure of a Third Way foreign policy or foreign policy 'with an ethical dimension'.¹⁷⁴

Britain has undoubtedly ratcheted up its own engagement with the continent and in so doing raised Africa's profile on the international stage. In terms of conflict resolution strategy Britain is a signed-up partner in the P3 initiative. The Head of the UN Department at the FCO outlining Britain's contribution to the initiative in 1997 noted that from the perspective of the Western powers the key principles should be 'transparency, openness, legitimacy and long-term capacity enhancement'.¹⁷⁵ To this end Britain engaged in bilateral consultations with African countries involved in the initiative, as well as with the OAU.¹⁷⁶ Britain has been involved in efforts to operationalise the OAU's Conflict Management Centre and has invested both in infrastructure and training. Internal problems within the OAU, bureaucracy, lack of funding and the ongoing transition from OAU to AU structures, have undermined this project and funding levels are liable to drop.

In response to a Select Committee question about BMATT Southern Africa, former Minister for African Affairs, Tony Lloyd outlined government thinking in mid-1998.

¹⁷² *Africa Confidential*, 40/9, 30 April 1999, p.1.

¹⁷³ Blair, Anthony, 'Facing the Modern Challenge: The Third way in Britain and South Africa' speech given at the Parliament Building, Cape Town, 8 January 1999.

¹⁷⁴ Cook, Robin, 'British Foreign Policy', speech at the launch of the FCO Mission Statement, FCO, London, 12 May 1997.

¹⁷⁵ See Marsden, Rosalind, 'Comments on "Enhancing African peacekeeping capacity"', paper presented at an informal meeting chaired by Under Secretary-General Miyet, New York, 5 December 1997.

The logic behind that [BMATT Southern Africa] is a very simple one, that we believe first of all in the rule of law so that the actions are not only consistent but they are determined by the UN and the OAU as the continental representation of the UN, but also recognition that it is very unlikely that there would be direct military action by Britain in the event of conflict breaking out in southern Africa, so in terms of offering proper and effective action in the event of conflict in southern Africa a local response is the rational and credible one, Britain playing the role of with the Americans and French to build that capacity is a sensible way of approaching the problem.¹⁷⁷

However, against expectations, Britain has more recently shown a willingness to move beyond capacity building. Although it falls outside the time limits of this thesis, the most precedent-defying illustration of this trend was the intervention in support of the UN operation in Sierra Leone in May 2001. Blair has implied that this intervention should not be seen in isolation.

And I tell you if Rwanda happened again today as it did in 1993, when a million people were slaughtered in cold blood, we would have a moral duty to act there also. We were there in Sierra Leone when a murderous group of gangsters threatened its democratically elected government and people.¹⁷⁸

The capacity of a single country, or a single military, especially that of a middle-ranking power such as Britain, to make a substantial difference in Africa is limited. The Sierra Leone intervention will surely prove the exception rather than the rule. Even so, its comparatively uncontroversial exit from empire on the continent and continued influence in international fora *do* enhance Britain's efficacy as an advocate for Africa. Blair's vision of Britain as a 'guiding light' is clear – 'we can't do it all...neither can the Americans...but the power of the international community could, together, if it chose to'.¹⁷⁹ The Blair government is currently more committed to the stated principles of the P3 initiative than the other two partners. Clearly there are practical constraints on what is possible in Africa. There are cautious heads in the Cabinet and in Whitehall who do not

¹⁷⁶ Interview with David Williams (Second Secretary, British Embassy in Ethiopia) Addis Ababa, April 1998.

¹⁷⁷ Select Committee on Defence, Question 2823, 23 July 1998 <www.parliament.the-stationary-office>.

¹⁷⁸ Blair, Anthony, 'Speech given by the Prime Minister to the Labour Party conference', Blackpool, 2 October 2001.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

share Blair's messianic vision. Minister of Defence Geoff Hoon has stated categorically that the government is aware of the limits to its capacity to intervene unilaterally.¹⁸⁰ Nonetheless, Blair has associated himself directly with peacekeeping capacity enhancement in Africa. The new CPP project brings together three departments, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development and the Department of Defence. It benefits from an enhanced budget with the specific purpose of realising the P3 initiative's basic aim of preparing African militaries to organise their own peace operations.¹⁸¹ Berman states that, 'the CPP may have a significant positive impact on promoting stability, and peacekeeping, in Africa'.¹⁸²

A caveat should be entered. Under New Labour performance does not always live up to the perorations. To what extent is the current policy of peacekeeping enhancement in Africa a product of 'spin'? Rita Abrahamsen and Paul Williams make the point that,

[T]here is nothing *new* and certainly not anything particularly '*ethical*' about New Labour's foreign policy the critics claim. Instead international ethics are conducted in more or less the same manner as under previous Conservative administrations, that is, with a calculating eye to the national interest and Britain's international reputation.¹⁸³

New Labour certainly accentuates the positive elements of its African policy. Former Foreign Secretary Hurd comments sardonically that what he finds most annoying about the 'ethical' foreign policy is the pretence that 'a shift of two or three degrees is a shift of 180 degrees and that all [New Labour's] predecessors were immoral rogues'.¹⁸⁴ Likewise, New Labour discourse tends to give the impression that it has assumed the

¹⁸⁰ *Marché Tropicaux*, 15 February 2002.

¹⁸¹ The CPP is still in its preliminary stages. The CPP is divided into the Global Pool chaired by the FCO and the Africa Pool chaired by DFID. The Global Pool can fund African projects that contribute to overarching thematic aims. In the Africa Pool alone £50m has been set aside for programmes in FYs 2001, 2002 and 2003, whilst £65m has been set aside for peacekeeping in FY2001 and £60m for peacekeeping in FYs 2002 and 2003. The relative budgets of the Global Pool are significantly larger. The extent to which CPP funds are spent on peacekeeping capacity enhancement programmes as intended does, however, depend on specific peacekeeping costs elsewhere notably larger than intended costs in the Balkans and the potential costs of the UN mission in DRC. See, Berman, Eric G., 'French, UK and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects', *Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI) Paper*, 622 (2002), pp.13-20

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p.13.

¹⁸³ Abrahamsen, Rita and Williams, Paul, 'Ethics and Foreign Policy: The Antinomies of New Labour's "Third Way" in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Political Studies*, 49 (2001), p.249.

¹⁸⁴ Quoted in *ibid.*, p.261.

mantle of Africa's champion in the West. It should be noted that, although the total aid budget has increased by 28% to about £3bn a year this only equates to 0.32% of GNP spent on aid, the same as France and well short of the international target of 0.7% of GNP set by the UN. It should, however, be noted that aid to sub-Saharan Africa has increased disproportionately to the overall budget. The 'ethical' component of Britain's African policy is selective. The issue of arms sales to the continent is especially pertinent. Despite promises to refuse licences for arms and defence equipment that might be misused, Britain remains a major arms exporter to African governments. Abrahamsen and Williams comment, 'as long as Britain maintains an export oriented defence industry a fundamental tension will be contained within Britain's desire to promote peace and human rights abroad and lofty ideals will continue to be attenuated by the necessities of domestic policies'.¹⁸⁵

Conclusion

The hypothesis states that all-African peace operations might require external assistance, but not direct *extra*-continental intervention. By these lights does the P3 initiative work? In its existing form the initiative satisfies neither the donors nor the recipients. Nonetheless, the initiative is not without positive aspects. For its supporters the occasional deployment of the first graduates of the initiative shows that capacity building can be the way forward for peace operations in Africa. Even some sceptics admit that, *faute de mieux*, the initiative and its component parts are the best that Africa can realistically expect in the current geopolitical climate. Dennis Jett remarks that,

[T]he ACRI is clearly not the solution for all situations. In fact, there may be very few problems for which it will be an adequate answer. It may be one of the few responses available, however.¹⁸⁶

Participants in the initiative have deployed and/or used equipment supplied by the P3 powers as part of peacekeeping operations and observer missions in Guinea-Bissau,

¹⁸⁵ *ibid.*, p.254.

¹⁸⁶ Jett, Dennis C., *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p.193.

Comoros and the CAR whilst ACRI equipment was used by Malawian troops in providing emergency relief during the Mozambican floods of 2000.¹⁸⁷

Yet, several shortcomings intrinsic to the capacity building programmes have limited the scope of the interventions attempted. The one peacekeeping mission based explicitly on a P3 programme, the ECOMOG intervention in Guinea-Bissau sponsored by France, was so circumscribed and constrained by geopolitical considerations that the only unambiguous conclusion to be derived is that the intervention could not have taken place without the funding, logistics, kit and equipment supplied by France through RECAMP. Larger, more complex and pernicious conflicts remain beyond the capacity of ACRI battalions, RECAMP battalions, BMATT battalions or indeed any combination of the three. The necessity for direct British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 and French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002-2003 might be taken as an indictment of the limitations of the existing peacekeeping capacity enhancement initiative.

The reasons for the limited success of capacity building programmes in Africa are related to what the participants and the recipients expect from the initiative. A key issue is a disparity of motivation and enthusiasm for the project underpinned by continued rivalry between the three powers. There is a growing economic rivalry between the three powers.¹⁸⁸ As a result, with the early exception of *Guidimakha*, cooperation between French, American and British governments and militaries has been limited. There have been only cautious signs that France and Britain are willing to extend their efforts beyond their former colonial fiefs. The US is also partial in its choice of ACRI participants often favouring countries deemed useful for strategic purposes. By splitting their input, financially and in terms of expertise, the P3 lose much in duplication and economy of scale. Continued rivalry, moreover, extends beyond the relative national interests of the P3 powers to the initiative's participants.

To some observers, the differences between anglophone and francophone supporters in Africa appear symbolic, an irritating hangover from an earlier,

¹⁸⁷ ACRI participants that have been involved in peacekeeping are Ghana, Mali, Benin and Senegal. RECAMP participants include Senegal, Mali, Benin, Niger and Togo. BMATT participants include Kenya and Ghana.

¹⁸⁸ Investment in oil exploitation remains important for all three states. In particular the US has signalled an interest in increasing the amount of oil it imports from Africa. Other strategic minerals, for example coltan from eastern DRC, are of potentially great economic and strategic value.

bygone era. But this would be a serious misreading of the situation, for the rivalry between the two blocs is increasingly taken up by Africans themselves who play the same game in seeking support from different alignments in the regional and international system.¹⁸⁹

There are fundamental restraints that undermine each individual programme within the initiative. Battalion-sized training is too limiting. Interventions requiring the deployment of a single battalion are rare in Africa. Yet, even if the P3 initiative evolved the capacity and command structure to deploy a number of trained battalions as part of a coordinated multinational force the numbers of troops involved would be insufficient for most purposes. A related obstacle circumscribing the initiative's potential is the inability or unwillingness of Nigeria and South Africa to take part in the programme, although there have been recent efforts to rectify this situation. According to the current Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for African Affairs, Michael Westphal, two-way discussions are underway to establish how South Africa and Nigeria might take part in a redesigned ACRI. Nigerian troops have already received peace-enforcement training under Operation Focus Relief. Without these two major militaries the various programmes have been forced to cultivate middle-ranking powers. All-African peacekeeping, and certainly peace-enforcement, operations of any size and complexity have succeeded or failed according to the performance of the supposed regional hegemon. South African timidity and Nigerian inefficacy in stamping regional authority in the field of conflict resolution has hindered the conduct of effective peace operations for the past decade. For the P3, however, to embark on a capacity building exercise without the support of these powers placed restrictive boundaries around the project from its inception. It is clear that if ACRI is to be reformulated and extended there is a need to encourage participation by Nigeria and South Africa.¹⁹⁰ Likewise RECAMP should encourage Nigerian input at Zambakro, whilst Britain should either relocate the former Zimbabwe BMATT or establish a new peacekeeping-oriented BMATT, possibly in South Africa. Finally, by restricting training to non-lethal peacekeeping techniques rather than allowing robust peace-enforcement training, and by supplying only non-lethal equipment

¹⁸⁹ Cilliers, Jackie, 'Still...France versus the rest in Africa', *African Security Review*, 10/3 (2001).

¹⁹⁰ See 'DoD New Briefing' <www.defenselink.mil> posted 2 April 2002.

the various programmes ensure that the P3 initiative is unable to address the large majority of existing or anticipated conflicts.

The three Western powers come to the issue of all-African peacekeeping from different directions. For the US the notion of African self-pacification has gained currency since the reversals of Mogadishu. Peacekeeping capacity building was designed to keep what the American media depict as 'intractable' African conflicts at arms length. To adjust to the drift away from the cosmopolitan discourse of the late Bush and early Clinton administration, US policy of late has adopted a communitarian outlook emphasising the ethical validity of helping Africa to help itself. Although France and Britain are partners in the P3 initiative their discourse remains more cosmopolitan. French policy reflects a residual universalism derived from its own history and filtered through its experience of empire. The impulse might be described in many ways – paternalism, neo-colonialism or cosmopolitanism. The urge to intervene spans the political spectrum from the Foccart-influenced *cellule Africaine* of Chirac to the proponents of Kouchner's *droit d'ingérence*. Of late this has been tempered by the realisation that ubiquitous direct intervention is no longer a political or practical option. As James Petras and Morris Morley comment, RECAMP's place in the P3 initiative reflects 'France's determination to contest efforts to undermine its power and influence within the region while simultaneously accommodating itself to the new reality of intercapitalist competition in its historic sphere of influence'.¹⁹¹ Britain's re-engagement with the continent is a partial reversal of a non-interventionist policy extant since the early days of African independence based on Blair's hybrid Third Way foreign policy melding morals and markets. In a sense Britain's post-colonial history of non-intervention is an advantage as the Blair government seeks to heighten engagement with Africa. Practical restraints and a degree of hyperbole notwithstanding, British policy in supporting peacekeeping capacity enhancement is currently the most committed to achieving the original goals of the initiative.

African countries, at least those African countries liable to be invited to take part in one or more programmes of the P3 initiative, recognise its intrinsic limitations. For the

¹⁹¹ Petras, James, and Morley, Morris, 'Contesting Hegemons: US-French Relations in the 'New World Order'', *Review of International Studies*, 26 (2000), p.60.

regional powers it remains superfluous given the range of alternative military assistance programmes. For middle-ranking states the training and equipment is useful if not essential. Taking part in the project is worthwhile for the diplomatic and economic privileges that participation might afford. African governments realise that as it stands ACRI, RECAMP and BMATTs have not greatly enhanced the existing capacity for effective medium to large-scale multinational peace operations. States enjoying P3 initiative training such as Uganda and Senegal have used troops trained under the initiative and equipment supplied by the initiative to counter domestic armed opposition. More controversially, participants in the initiative have been involved in the conflict in DRC - either as part of the dubious SADC intervention, or on a unilateral basis. It is unlikely that the advantages of P3 membership were decisive in any of these cases.

The P3 initiative as it stands is inadequate to cope with intervention above the level of a one or two battalion interposition force. If the ideological basis of the initiative, that it is valid and valuable to enhance Africa's own capacity to police itself, has a future then there must be radical changes in the methods, means and aims of the project. The US, in particular, promotes the fitness of African militaries to address, what it perceives as, the particularity of African conflict. Yet, the training it gives is universal – basic orthodox peacekeeping techniques – and the overall funding and resources it donates are scant. If the P3 initiative is to succeed in its stated aims then all three constituent programmes, operating with a greater degree of reciprocity and complementarity, must expand in size and scope. The strongest argument for continuity of the initiative, albeit in an altered form, is the likelihood of further genocidal/large-scale conflicts in Africa and the relative costs of addressing or not addressing these conflicts. It is not necessary to adopt the strict criteria of the Solarz-O'Hanlon formula elaborated in Chapter Two to envisage instances of genocide or mass killing in Africa that will test the current stated policy of highly limited direct intervention. As Nan Borton and Victor Tanner observe, 'conspicuous failure to respond effectively could damage the [US] administration's standing, domestically and internationally, and invite accusations of callousness, ineptitude, and irresponsibility'.¹⁹²

¹⁹² Borton, Nan and Tanner, Victor, *Strengthening US Government Humanitarian Action in Africa*, working paper part of the Centre for Strategic International Studies Africa Programme Study 'Africa in the Clinton Years', April (2000), p.2.